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I. 	 Introduction 
When a corporation needs funds for working capital, inventory, or 
general operations, it can take one of two financing approaches: right hand 
side (RHS) balance sheet funding or left hand side (LHS) balance sheet 
funding. RHS funding methods include a firm's issuance of traditional 
debt (secured and unsecured) and equity obligations, which are backed by 
the general credit of the issuer. In contrast, when a firm uses an LHS 
funding approach, it raises capital based upon a specific asset pool's cash 
flow and value. Examples of LHS funding approaches include asset 
leasing,1 project finance,2 factoring,3 and the most recent financial 
innovation, the securitization of financial assets.4 
1. Asset leasing involves the "ttansfer of the right to possession and use of goods for a tenn in 
return for consideration.• U.C.C. § 2A-103(1)(j) (1994). 
2. Project finance refers to a method of raising funds that relies on the value of the project being 
financed and the revenues generated. Typically, the project developer or borrower is a "single purpose 
entity whose only asset is the project being financed." Jonathan Birenbaum, ·Credit and Related 
Documentation for Project Fuumce Transactions, In PROJECT FINANCING 1993: DOMESTIC AND 
INlERNATIONAL, at 269, 271 ( PU Commercial Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 672, 
1993). 
3. Factoring originated in England in the fourteenth cennuy as a way for textile manufacturers to 
liquidate their accounts receivable. Holders ofaccounts receivable sold them at a discount and without 
recourse to a "faetor." In most cases, the factor accepted the account receivable's credit risk and rook 
control of the accounts' collection. This beneflned the manufacturer in two ways: (I) the manufacrurer 
did nothave to review the credit of its customers, and (2) it enabled the manufacrurer to liquidate assets 
quickly so that it was able to purchase more raw materials. See generally Peter H. Wei!, Factoring, 
in ASsET-BASED LENDING INCLUDING COMMEROAL FINANCE AND ACQUISITION FINANCING 1988, at 
41 ( PU Commercial Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 443, 1988). Factors made their 
money by purchasing only the highest quality receivables-those with the greatest chance of full 
payment-at a substantial discount. See Harper v. Uoyd's Factors, Inc., 214 F.2d 662, 663 (2d Cir. 
1954) (stating that the usual factoring commission was 15%); see also Monon M. Scult, Accounts 
Receivable Financing: Operational Patterns Under the Unifonn Commercial Code, 1 I ARiz. L. REv. 
I (1969) (discussing both factoring and accounts receivable financing as pre-UCC methods of 
financing). . 
4. The tenn "asset securitization • will be used in this Article interchangeably with the tenns 
"structured finance transaction," "asset-backed arrangements, • "asset-backed imancing," "asset 
securitization," and "structured securitized credit." 
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Quite a few articles have appeared in the legal and financial journals 
on the subject of securitization,5 and implicit in much of this literature is 
the message that securitization transactions are efficient. This literature has 
invariably viewed these transactions from the perspective of the originator 
and the other transaction participants; its conclusion with respect to the 
efficiency of securitization is hardly surprising. The literature has not ade­
quately considered the perspective of third parties-specifically, the per­
spective of the originators' unsecured creditors. 
Viewing these transactions from an unsecured creditor's perspective 
is important because unsecured creditors are harmed when an originator 
sells its most valuable assets. In the event of bankruptcy, the originator's 
residual estate, available for pro rata distribution to unsecured creditors, 
likely will not include the securitized assets. 6 If the originator has used or 
spent the consideration it received from the sale of the securitized assets, 
its unsecured creditors will receive no benefit from the value of these 
assets.7 
Predictably, bankruptcy trustees will use aggressive and creative tech­
niques to try to recapture previously transferred assets. 8 As an increasing 
5. See, e.g., 1liE AssET SECUR111ZATION HANDBOOK (Phillip L. Zweig ed., 1989); AssET 
SECURITIZATION: INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES (Joseph Jude No non & Paul 
R. Spellmaneds., 199!); I TAMAR FRANKEL, SECUR111ZATION: STRUCTURED FINANCING, FINANCIAL 
AssET POOLS, AND AssEr·BACKED SECUR111ES (1991); THE GLOBAL AssET BACKED SECUR111ES 
MARKEr: STRUCTURING, MANAGING AND ALLoCATING RISK (Charles A. Stone etal. eds., 1993); THE 
HANDBOOK OF AssET-BACKED SECUR111ES (Jess Ledennan ed., 1990); MORTGAGE AND AssET 
SECURITIZATION (Roben Lawrence Kuhn ed., 1990); JAMES A. ROSENTHAL & JUAN M. OCAMPO, 
SECUR111ZATION OF CREDIT: INSIDE THE NEW TECHNOLOGY OF FINANCE (1988); SECUR111ZATION OF 
FINANCIAL AssETS (Jason H.P. Kravin ed., 2d ed. 1996 & Supp. 1997 ); Stephen I. Glover, Structured 
Finance Goes Chapter 11: Asset Securitization by Reorganizing Companies, 47 Bus. LAw. 611 (1992); 
Harold H. Goldberg et al., Asset Securitization and Corporate Financial Health, I. APPUED CoRP. 
FIN., Fall 1988, at 45; Claire A. Hill, Securitization: A Low-Cost Sweetener for Lemons, 74 WASH. 
U. L.Q. 1061, 1065 (1996); James A. Rosenthal & Juan M. Ocampo, Analydng the Economic Benefits 
ofSecuritized Credit, I. APPUED CoRP. FIN., Fall !988, at 32; Steven L. Schwan:z, The Alchemy of 
Asset Securitization, I STAN. J. L. Bus. & FIN. !33 (1994) (hereinafter Schwan:z, Alchemy]; Steven 
L. Schwan:z, Structured Finance: The New Way to Securitize Assets, 11 CARDOZO L. REv. 607 (1990) 
[hereinafter Schwarcz, Structured Frnance]; Joseph C. Shenker & Anthony J. Colletta, Asset 
Securitization: Evolution, Current Issues and New Frontiers, 69 TExAs L. REv. 1369 (1991); The 
Comm. on Bankr. and C01pomte Reorganization of the Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., 
Structured Frnancing Techniques, 50 Bus. LAW. 527 (1995) [hereinafter Structured Fmancing 
Techniques]. 
6. The Bankruptcy Code was enacted through the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. See Pub. L. 
No. 95-598, 92 Slat. 2549 (1978). Section S4I(a) of the Bankruptcy Code slates that an eslate is 
created upon the commencement of the bankruptcy case. See II U.S.C. § S4I(a) (1994). As pan of 
the Bankruptcy Code's liquidation and asset distribution procedure, that property deemed to be a pan 
of the debtor's bankruptcy eslate, and not collateral securing a secured creditor's claim, is liquidated 
and distributed to the general unsecured creditors. See id. § 726(a); DAVID G. EPsrEIN ET AL., 
BANKRUPTCY 4 (1994). 
7. See infra notes 205-08 and accompanying text. 
8. Section S44(a) of the Bankruptcy Code gives the trustee so-called "strong arm powers," which 
include .the power to avoid cenain transfers of property made by the debtor prior to bankruptcy. II 
U.S.C. § S44(a). 
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number of financially marginal firms securitize an increasingly exotic array 
of assets and subsequently enter bankruptcy,9 courts may be persuaded by 
trustees' legal, economic, and equitable arguments to unwind the securiti­
ution transaction and preserve the assets for the benefit of the bankruptcy 
underdogs-the unsecured creditors. Although neither trustees nor bank­
ruptcy courts have the power or authority to unwind a transaction in the 
absence of adequate grounds, if the transaction results in significant harm 
to a firm's unsecured creditors at a time when the firm is in a precarious 
financial position, bankruptcy judges, in the exercise of their equitable 
discretion, will rely on existing equitable doctrines and may expansively 
interpret these doctrines to support their decisions to invalidate these 
transactions. 10 When this occurs, there will be a drastic adjustive reaction 
in the market for asset-backed securities. 
This Article identifies the possible challenges to the claim of structured 
finance's efficiency and examines the potential equitable bases for a court's 
avoidance of these transactions. Part II defines structured finance and 
describes the nature of the current market for asset-backed securities. Part 
ill outlines the benefits that securitiution provides to originators and other 
transaction participants. Part IV outlines and discusses the debate on the 
efficiency of secured transactions, applies the substance of this debate to 
structured finance transactions, and then examines the equitable challenges 
that may be made to avoid securitized asset transfers. Finally Part V illus­
trates how the rapid expansion of the securitiution market has subjected 
transaction participants and third parties to mounting uncertainty. 
This Article begins a discussion of these issues-it provides no defini­
tive answers. This Article predicts, however, that further research will 
support the conclusion that securitiution is an inefficient transaction. 
Securitiution's structure is designed to divert value away from the 
originator, in the absence of any compensating controls on either the 
consideration received in exchange for the asset sale, or the debtor's 
behavior. The originator enjoys the benefits of this distributional 
inefficiency, at the expense of its unsecured creditors. 
This Article further predicts that courts, in the name of equity, will 
more carefully examine these transactions' structures in connection with 
their supervision of an originator's bankruptcy case. When the effects of 
these transactions on the recovery of unsecured creditors are fully recog­
nized, courts and legislators will take steps to regulate these transactions 
to address this distributional inefficiency. 
9. See Suzanne Woolley, What's Next, Bridge Tolls? Almost Any Risk Can Be Securitized-But 
Quality May Be ljfy, Bus. WK., Sept. 2, !996, at 64 ("'When evezybody wants to securitize, and 
evezyone is willing to buy, and cvczyone thinks nothing will go wrong, there gets to be a· feeding­
frenzy atmosphere, and you have to remain cautious,' says Paul Stevenson, managing director of 
Moody's Investors Service Inc.'s Asset-Backed Finance group."). 
10. See discussion infra notes 209-79 and accomoanving text. 
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Experiential and empirical evidence is needed before unqualified con­
clusions can be drawn concerning the effects of securitization on unsecured 
creditors. 11 Further exploration of the effects of securitization on other 
participants in the credit markets will become increasingly important as 
more originators face the prospect of bankruptcy and as more trustees and 
bankruptcy courts have the opportunity to scrutinize these transactions 
aggressively. 
ll. Structured Finance Defined 
Securitization has been defined as a "structured process whereby loans 
and other receivables are packaged, underwritten, and sold in the form of 
securities."12 The firm originally owning and selling the receivables is 
11. Empirical research, as with most types ofresearch, begins with the identification of a problem. 
The problem this Anic!e identifies is a distributional inefficiency experienced by the unsecured creditors 
ofa securitizing finn. Since, ultimately, courts and legislators' policy choices concerning securitization 
will have profound societal effectS, such policies must be supponcd by empirical evideocc of the 
inefficiencies. This kind of empirical study requires complicated fact finding and analysis of a host of 
variable factors. Those variables that must be carefully identified and studied include: (1) the incidence 
ofinsolvency among securitiaing finns; (2) the interest rate chaQ!ed by secured creditors of securitizing 
finns; (3) the interest rate charged by unsecured creditors of securitizing finns; (4) the incidence of 
default payment to unsecured creditors by securitiaing firms; and (5) the dividend paid to unsecured 
creditors of liquidating finns. The results of this study must be compared to a "control group" of 
similarly situated finns who utilize secured credit as a method of financing. To be truly valuable to 
those chaQ!ed with sccuritization·rclated policymaking, such a study ought to be designed by those 
trained in the quantitative and statistical social sciences. Then: will be an extraordinal)' number of 
variables to account for, given the complexity of these transactions and the type offinns that commonly 
originate them, the great variation among the finns' capital structures, and the dearth ofpublicly avail­
able information regarding the fmancial and economic circumstances surrounding these transactions. 
Such challenges, however, should not overshadow the need for policy-informing studies, or chill the 
enthusiasm of those who, trained in the appropriate research methods, engage in them. See Teresa A. 
Sullivan et al., The Use ofEmpirical Data in FormuiDting Bankruptcy Policy, LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS., Spring 1987, at 195, 196 (theorizing that "empirical research is vitally needed in the formation 
of bankruptcy policy"); if. Craig Allen Nard, Empirical Legal Scholarship: Reestablishing a Dialogue 
Between the Academy and Profession, 30 WAKE FoREST L. REv. 347, 348-49 (1995) (aQ!Uing that if 
law professors conduct more empirical research that focuses on the actual effect law has on society, 
the "gap" between the legal academy and the legal profession would narrow significantly); Howard A. 
Shelanski & Peter G. Klein, Empirical Research in Transaction Cost Economics: A Review and 
Assessment, !1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 335,352 (1995) (concluding that empirical studies of transaction 
cost economics prove that its predictions are usually accurate). See generally JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, 
AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE (1995) (explaining why law has not fol­
lowed the path ofother academic disciplines in adopting a natural science model ofempirical inquil)'). 
12. ROSENTHAL & OCAMPO, supra note 5, at 3. Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code 
(UCC) does not, however, define the tenn "receivables." For purposes of this Article, the term receiv­
ables will mean payment obligations--such as accounts, geoeral intangibles, or chattel paper-owed to 
a company from a third party. The UCC does define both "account" and "general intangibles.• 
U.C.C. § 9-106 (1994). Ac~ording to the UCC, an "account" is "any right to payment for goods sqld 
or leased or for services rendered which is not evidenced by an instrument or chattel paper, whether 
or not it has been earned by performance. • Id. "General intangibles" an: "any personal property 
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a financing-seeking firm, commonly referred to as the "originator, " 13 and 
the purchasing and securities issuing entity is generally an affiliated special 
purpose corporation (SPC). 14 SPCs are generally organized in one of two 
forms: either as a "pay-through" entity or as a "pass-through" entity. A 
pay-through entity is the transferee of receivables and the issuer of fixed­
income securities. The return on these securities is based upon the trans­
ferred receivables' anticipated cash flow. A pass-through entity is typically 
a type of trust that serves as a conduit for the sale of the receivables to 
investors, with the receivables' payments merely passing through the 
trust. 15 
The sale of the receivables by an originator to an SPC returns a lump 
sum cash payment to the originator. 16 Once sold, the receivables' debtors 
pay on their accounts, either directly to the SPC as servicer, or through a 
servicing agent who in turn transfe~ the payment to the SPC. 17 The SPC 
(including things in action) other than goods, accounts, chattel paper, documents, instruments, 
invesnnent properly, and money." Id. Further, the UCC defmes "chattel paper" as "a writing or 
writings which evidence both a monetary obligation and a security interest in or a lease of specific 
goods." ld. § 9-105(b). 
Other definitions of "securitization" include: (1) "the ttansformation of an illiquid asset into a 
tradeable security with a secondary market?"' Changes in Our Financial System: Globalization of 
Capital Markets and Securitiztltion of.Credit: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, 
and Urban Affairs, IOOth Cong., at 177 (1988) (statement of Prof. David A. Walker, Georgetown 
University) (cited in Shenker & Colleua, supra note 5, at 1373); (2) the trend toward fmancial assets 
being securities rather than loans, see Tim S. Campbell, Innovations in Financial Intermediation, Bus. 
HORIZONS, Nov.-Dec. 1989, at70, 71-73; and (3) a process whereby ttaded instruments such as bonds, 
notes, and certificates of deposit are substituted for direct borrowing from financial institutions, see 
Cooper, Innovations: New Market Instruments, OXFORD REv. EcON. POL'Y, Winter 1986, at I, 3. In 
her treatise, Professor Tamar Frankel broadly defines securitization as the ttansformation of an asset 
into securities. See I FRANKEL, supra note 5, § 1.1. This definition includes both loan participations 
as well as the substitution of securities for loans. While much of the discussion in this Article may be 
applicable to loan participations, the primary focus will be on ttansactions involving the raising offunds 
in the public and private markets through the issuance of securities backed by pools of assets. 
13. Firms can originate such transactions when they have earnings in the form of cash flow from 
medium- to long-term obligations owed to them by debtors. Securitized assets commonly have stan­
dardized terms, uniform underwriting standards, and both delinquency probability and value that are 
capable of estimation. See Shenker & CoUeua, supra note 5, at 1376 & n.25. 
14. I SECURITIZATION OF FINANCIAL AssErs, supra note 5, § 2.02, at 2-13 (defming a special 
purpose vehicle as a "corporation, trust, or other person organized for a specific purpose, the activities 
of which are limited to those appropriate to accomplish such purpose, and the structure of which is 
designed to insulate the vehicle to some degree from the credit risk of an originator or seller of 
financial assets"). 
15. See I FRANKEL, supra note 5, § 1.1; see also infra note 288 (discussing a new trust entity 
created by statute, the Fmancial Asset Securitization lnvesnnent Trust (FASIT)). 
16. See Joan Barmat, Securitiztltion: An Overview, in THE HANDBOOK OF AssET-BACKED 
SECURITIES, supra note 5, at 3, 9 (diagraming pay- and pass-through structures). 
17. The servicer is the entity that receives payment from the securitized receivables' debtors. This 
entity may be the originator or may be a non-affiliated entity conttacted specifically to perform the 
servicing function. If the servicing entity is not rated as highly as the ABS, rating agencies require 
some further protective devices. For example, Standard & Poor's requires payment made to the 
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issues securities backed by the receivables' cash flow {known as asset­
backed securities or ABS) to investors in the capital markets. 18 
Asset-backed securities can be roughly characterized as either real­
estate related or non-real-estate related. 19 Real-estate related asset-backed 
securities, known as mortgage-backed securities, or MBS, are securities 
backed by the payments on loans secured by residential or commercial real 
estate.20 Non-real-estate ABS are backed by the cash flow on any non­
real-estate related receivables. 21 
investors' trustee within 48 hours of receiving the payments, and Moody's requires that there he a 
substirute serviceravailable if the original scrvicerfails. SeeM. Douglas Watson, Jr. & Stephen Joynt, 
Ro.tingAsset-BackedTransaaions,in1l!EASsETSECURITlZATlONHANDBOOK,supranoteS,at22S-29. 
18. These securities may he either privately placed or sold in the public markets. See Lowell L. 
Bryan, Structured Securitized Credil:A SuperiDrTechnologyforLending, J. APPUED CoRP. FIN., Fall 
1988, at 6 (noting that although public issuers dominate, the number of private issuers is increasing). 
19. See generally WilliAM W. BARTI.E'IT, MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES: PRooucrs, 
ANALYSIS, TRADING 54-79 (1989). 
20. See id. 
21. The clear market distinction between mortgage-backed and all other asset-backed securities 
tr.msactions can he traced to the difference in the respective market's historical development. The 
mortgage market has historically been the largest user of long-term credit. When the "credit crunch" 
ofthe 1960s decreased the funds available for residential real estate purchases, the secondary mortgage 
market flourished. See id. at 7. Although the real estate market is comprised of many different public 
and private players, the central asset that drives this securities market remains the single-family home 
and the corresponding loan and mortgage. See id. at 54-55. In the most basic formulation, shifts in 
the secondary mortgage market and the market for mortgage-backed securities correspond to the behav­
ior of homeowners. as well as the economic and interest rate realities at a particular time. See 
gen.ral/y id. 
As the government-insured and guaranteed securities market developed, private sector lenders 
increasingly saw the advantages of selling off both their residential and commercial real estate loans 
in the secondary market. As a result, lenders interested in securitizing their real-estate-related assets 
tried to address investor concerns regarding portfolio quality and documentation uniformity. 
Consequently, uniform legal documentation for conventional loans for real estate purchases became 
more common, further facilitating the sale of these loans to secondary market investors. See Andrew 
Lance, Balancing Private and Public Initiatives in the Mortgage-Backed Security Market, 18 REAL 
PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 426, 438 (1983); Michael E. Stone, Housing and the Dynamics of U.S. 
Capitalism, in CRITICAL PERsPECTIVES ON HOUSING 56 (Rachel E. Bratt ed., 1986). 
In 1984, the federal government once again supported and encouraged active trading in the sec­
ondary mortgage market by enacting the Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act (SMMEA). 
See Pub. L. No. 98-440, 98 Stat. 1689 (1984) (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. and IS 
U.S.C. (1988)); Shenker & Colletta, supra noteS, at 1385. This Act was designed to further facilitate 
the market for mortgage-backed securities by removing some of the legal impediments to the issuance 
ofprivate mortgage-backed securities. The SMMEA removes legal impediments to the issuance ofpri­
vate mortgage-backed securities in four principal ways. First, it permits depository institutions to invest 
in privately issued, mortgage-related securities (as that term is defined in the Securities and Exchange 
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(41) (1994)). See 12 U.S.C. § 24, at 9 (1994); id. § l7S7(7)(E). 
Second, it preempts certain state legal-investtnent laws thereby permitting state-regulated institutions 
to invest in mortgage-related securities, see IS U.S.C. § 77r-I(a) (1994), althougb a number of states, 
including Arkansas, Louisiana, Minnesota, New Mexico, South Dakota, Utah, and West Vilginia, have 
overridden SMMEA 's preemption of its legal investtnent laws. See Shenker & Colletta, supra note 5, 
at !385 (citing Pub. L. No. 98-440, 98 Stat. 1689 (1984) (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. 
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The market for non-real-estate-related asset-backed securities 
is relatively new compared to the MBS market.22 The early non­
real-estate-related, quasi-securitizations involved the issuance of standard 
accounts-receivable-backed commercial paper fuily supported by 
letters of credit.23 Foiiowing these early transactions, firms became 
increasingly more creative and began securitizing automobile loans, 
leases, and credit card receivables.24 As the market for ABS has 
expanded in recent years, issuers have become even more imaginative 
with respect to the type of receivables securitized. Examples of 
recently issued ABS include bond issuances backed by unpaid real 
estate taxes, 25 securities backed by hotel and hospitality receivables,26 
taxi cab medallion-backed securities, 7:1 securities backed by the excess 
spread from previously issued credit card securitizations,28 securities 
and 15 U.S.C.)). Third, it preemptS state blue sky laws by exempnngmongage·relatedsecurities from 
registration under state securities laws to the same extent that securities issued or guanmteed by the 
government or a related agency or instrumentality are exempt. See 15 U.S.C. § 77r-l(c). Fourth, it 
amended § 7 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by permitting delayed delivery of mortgage-related 
securities under certain conditions, thereby allowing a forward-trading marlcet to develop. See 15 
U.S.C. §§ 78g(g), 78h(a), 78k(d)(l). These developments have resulted in significant increases in the 
capital available to the residential housing market. See Shenker & CoUetta, supra note 5, at 1386. 
22. See William J. Haley, SecuririzPtion Teclmiquesfor Non-MongageAssels, in MORTGAGE AND 
AssET SECURITIZATION 216, 216 (Robert Lawrence Kuhn ed., 1990); Barmat, supra note 16, at 14. 
23. See ROSENTHAL & OcAMPO, supra note 5, at 26. 
24. The asset-backed securities matket saw its real start in 1985 when the Spetry Corporation orig­
inated the first true structured finance transaction, in which it sold, through a special purpose 
corporation, $192 million lease-backed notes in the public markets. General Motors Acceptance 
Corporation foUowed the Spetry deal with its securitization of more than $8 billion between late 1985 
and 1986. Three investment banking firms, First Boston, Salomon Brothers, and Drexel Burnham 
Lambert captured the bulk of the lucrative commissiolis from these deals. Seeing an opportunity to 
expand into this marlcet, at least 14 major investment banks, including Goldman, Sa cbs & Co., Mertill 
Lynch, Dean Witter Reynolds, Kidder Peabody, and the investment banking units of Cibbank and 
Chemical Bank began aggressively seeking asset-backed security issuances to underwrite. See Btyan, 
supra note 18, at 4-5; Structured Ftna11cing Techniques, supra noteS, at 538-39. 
25. New York City raised $208 million in a AAA-rated public bond offering backed by $1.5 
billion in unpaid real estate taxes. In 1993, Jersey City, New Jersey was the first municipality to raise 
fonds in the markets backed by unpaid teal estate taxes. See Big Apple is Second City to Securitize Tax 
Liens; Chemical Underwriles Successor to Jersey City Deal, iNVESTMENT DEALERS' DIG., June 27, 
1994, at 13. It has been predicted that the "municipal tax lien securitization matket will grow to at 
least $S billion a year." as governments get out of the tax collection business. Amy B. Resnick, Tax 
lien Markel Is Sel to Take-off. Industry Players Say, BOND BUYER 1996, available in 1996 WL 
564443. Securitization of tax liens offers municipalities the opportunity to raise cash and clean their 
balance sheets. See id. 
26. See Ken Wilson, Hotel Ftna11cing Returns; Securitization Provides Vehicle, 209 HOTEL & 
MOTEL MGMT., Mar. 21, 1994, at 25, 2S (noting that securitization of hqtel receivables could result 
in a $1 billion capital infosion into the hotel industry by 1996). 
27. See Myth Becomes Reality: Taxi Cab Medallions Securitized, AssET SALES REP., Dec. 19, 
1994, at l. 
28. The collateral in this deal consisted of a portion of the difference between the interest mte on 
the underlying loans and coupons on the previously issued asset-backed security. See Jeanne Burke, 
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backed by health-care receivables,29 and securities backed by government­
contract receivables. 30 
In addition, new types of entities have been originating securitization 
transactions in recent years. Many banks, thrifts, and finance companies, 
at the urging of investment bankers, have transitioned from being 
"portfolio lenders " 31 to being substantial issuers of asset-backed 
securities.32 Similarly, business entities with poor credit ratings and those 
First USA Securitizes Excess Spread, PRIVATE PLACEMENT REP., June27, 1994, at4, available in 1994 
WL3272622. 
29. See New Prescription/or ABS Market, TREAsuRY MANAGER'S REP., Mar. 1, 1996, available 
in 1996 WL 7867346 (reporting that a pharmacy group pooled $500 million in pharmacy receivables 
and issued ABS). For a comprehensive discussion of health care receivable fmancing, see Cathy M. 
Kaplan,SecuritizationofNon-Tradiliolll1lAssets,inNEWDEVELOPMENTSINSECURITIZATION23l(PU 
Real Estate Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. N-385, 1992). 
30. See Kaplan, supra note 29, at 250-58. Other creative securitization products include the 
following: (1) The U.S. Postal Service, American Express, and Daiwa Corp. created a special-purpose 
corporation to sell bonds in the structured-finance markets backed by the money orders sent by Mexican 
inmtigrants to their families in Mexico. See Anne Schwimmer, Post Office, Amex Securitize Money 
Orders Sent to Merica: Daiwa Raises $100 Million in Unusual ABS Deal, INVESJMENT DEALERS' DIG., 
July 4, 1994, at 12. (2) Citicorp issued bonds backed by a cash stream ofmoney predicted to be spent 
by tourists in Jamaica. See id. The legal issue with respect to these securitized assets was whether a 
"money future" is deemed to be an "account" under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code. For 
a discussion of the unsettled nature of the law relating to securitization, ue infra Part V. (3) Harley­
Davidson, Inc., securitized $21 minion of motorcycle loan receivables in 1994 through a private place­
ment of debt securities. See Harley-Davidson Returns with Triple-A Deal, AssET SALES REP., June 
27, 1994, at 6, available in 1994 WL 3765508. (4) A relatively complex securitization of the cash 
flow proceeds from corporate jet sales subjected investors to the contingencies in the payment flow of 
the receivables and, thus, offered them high yields in exchange for increased risk. See John Hintze, 
Bombardier Drops Off-Balance Sheet Deal with Hot Spread, AssET SALES REP•• June 29, 1990, at 5. 
(5) The Pacific Lumber Co. has issued notes backed by the expected revenue from the sale of timber. 
See Structured F'lllfJJicing Techniques, supra note 5, at 539 (noting that this issuance is "[p]etbaps the 
most unusual transaction to date"). (6) David Bowie had bonds issued that were backed by future 
royalties from his old songs. See Andrew Fraser, Staid Prudential Racks with Ziggy, PORTLAND PRESS 
HERALD, Feb. 15, 1997. at 6D ("They allow Bowie to coUect $55 million up front instead of waiting 
for the royalty checks to trickle in over many years. They provide Prudential with a 7.9 percent return 
on its invesanent over 10 years-an even higher return than the 6.37 percent yield on the new 10-year 
Treasuzy note."); see also Woolley, supra note 9, at 64 (describing securitization as a "red hot 
financing technique," and listing new asset types securitized to include security alarm conttacts, student 
loans, mutual fund fees, delinquent child-support payments, royalty Streams from films, home 
improvement loans, and suggesting that "parking tickets and bridge tolls may be next"). 
31. A portfolio lender is a lender that makes loans and holds them in its own portfolios as assets 
to earn the interest paid by borrowers. See Robert I. Reich & Charles W. Sewright, Jr., The Bank 
Rate, in 1l!E AssET SECURITIZATION HANDBOOK, supra note 5, at 385. 
32. Although banks have historically sold loans to free up cash and increase their liquidity, fol­
lowing bank deregulation the sale ofentire loan portfolios accelerated. Deregulation increased competi­
tion among banks; as a result, banks had greater trouble anracting deposits to maintain the liquidity and 
reserve levels necessazy for active lending programs. This led banks to view more favorably the prac­
tice of selling their loans to raise cash for continued lending. See id. at 386. 1n 1985, Marine Midland 
Bank in partn~hipwith Salomon Brothers issued the first norunortgage receivable-backed securities. 
The Certificate ofAutomobile Receivables (CARS) grantor trust was created to issue securities in a pri­
vate placement backed by consumer automobile loans. Later that year, Valley National Bank together 
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entities who, because of high interest rates, are reluctant to borrow money 
conventionally from banks are increasingly turning to securitization as a 
way to secure capital at lower cost.33 
Recently, the ABS market was characterized by one market observer 
as one of "increased competition, greater volume and [one that is 
increasingly trading in] exotic asset classes. "34 The substantial volume of 
ABS issuances has been attributed to "an almost insatiable appetite for new 
offerings. "35 
This appetite has resulted in substantial profit being realized by many 
of the securitization transaction participants. 36 The list of participants 
includes the originator, the asset transferee, the rating agency or 
agencies,37 the financial institution or other type of insurer for the purpose 
of providing credit enhancement,38 an entity charged with the 
responsibility of servicing the credit,39 a trustee as representative of the 
security holders, counsel for the originator and underwriters, accountants, 
with First Boston issued securitized automotive receivable-backed securities to the public. Since 1985, 
billions of dollars in automotive loans and credit card receivables have been sold in stnlctured 
securitized r;ansactions. See id. at 388. 
33. The annual issuance ofsecurities backed by assets other than mortgages increased from slightly 
over $1 billion in 1985 to almost $43 billion by the end of 1990. See Franklin D. Dreyer, Address 
Before the Subcomntittee on Policy, Research and Insurance of the Committee on Banking, Finance 
and Urban Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives (July 31, 1991), in FED. REsERVE BULL., Sept. 1, 
1991, at 7, available in 1991 WI.. 2861665. According to Chase Securities, $111 billion in asset­
backed securities were sold on the public markets through September 30, 1996, and $7.5 billion ofABS 
were sold on the private market through that date. See Aaron Elstein, Merrill Sees Danger In Surging 
Growth ofAsset-Backed Market, AM. BANKER, OcL 2, 1996, at 24. Because of the increasing popular­
ity of stnlctured financing as an alternative to traditional commercial lending, banks, investment banks, 
and other financial Institutions---including Citicorp (the ground-breaker in issuing asset-backed 
commercial paper), Bankers Trust, First Boston Corp., Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, and Salomon 
Brothers-have developed expertise in stnlctured finance transactions and have created depanments 
specializing in securitizations. See Michael Liebowitz, Can Corporate America Securilize Itself, 
INvEsTMENT DEALERS' DIG., Jan. 27, 1992, at 14. 
34. Private Market Dotes on Exotic Asset Classes, INs. ACCT., Sept. 16, 1996, at 1, available in 
1996 WI.. 11827605. 
35. Elstein, supra note 33, at 24. 
36. See John C. Edmunds, Securities: The New World Wealth Machine, FOREIGN POL'Y, Fall 
1996, at 118, 118 (1996) (stating that securitization has become the most powerful engine of wealth 
creation in today's world economy). 
37. See infra note 52 and accompanying text. 
38. Credit enhancement devices include letters of credit, private insurance, guarantees, or other 
payment assurances. Credit enhancement is designed to ensure that payment will be made on the issued 
securities as they become due. if there is a payment shortfall on the underlying assets, the SPC draws 
upon the credit enhancement and pays investors from this draw. Rating agencies, in employing what 
they refer to as the "weak link policy," will not raCe asset-backed securities higher than the credit rating 
of the third-party provider of the credit enhancement. See William J. Curtin & Stephen H. Deckoff. 
Asset-Backed Securities: AnAttractiveAddition to the Low-Duration SeC/or ofthe F'txed Income Market, 
in THE HANDBOOK OF AssET-BACKED SECU!!ITIES, supra note 5. at 195, 204, 203~. 
39. See supra note 17. 
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the underwriters responsible for placing the ABS issuance, 40 the ABS 
traders, and the ABS investors. 41 The extent to which third parties exper­
ience corresponding negative effects from the proliferation of these transac­
tions is an issue not yet well explored. 
Although securitization can take many forms, this Article wiii focus 
on the most common model or prototype of securitization. Such a struc­
ture assumes that the originator is a corporation and the assets securitized 
are accounts receivable. Such a structure also assumes that the SPC is a 
corporate subsidiary of the originator formed for the exclusive purpose of 
purchasing the originator's pool of assets and then issuing securities backed 
by these assets in either the public or private markets. 42 
ill. Why Firms Securitize Assets 
Firms securitize their assets for the same reason firms borrow money: 
to raise money for either special projects or working capital. 43 Rational 
firms choosing to securitize their assets rather than use them as collateral 
for a secured loan conclude, on balance, that securitization's net benefits 
exceed the benefits of the possible financing alternatives. 44 These benefits 
include improving liquidity, increasing diversification of funding sources, 
lowering the effective interest rate, improving risk management, and 
achieving accounting-related advantages.45 Further, firms may securitize 
their assets because of the persuasive influence of professional advisors 
40. See Woolley, supra note 9, at 64 (asserting that, according to the head ofSilU!dard & Poor's 
New Assets group, Calvin R. Wong, "There is a huge invesnnent-banking comrnunii;Y going after 
[securitization] business and an insatiable demand from investors"). 
41. See RosENTHAL & OCAMPO, supra noteS, at 12-17. 
42. Variations on this protoi;Ype include: (1) the use of Multi-Seller Vehicles (MSVs), which are 
SPCs created specifically to purchase and fund receivables portfolios from a variecy oforiginators and 
are not subsidiaries of their originators (for bankruptcy-remote puipOses, the SPC may be a subsidiary 
of the invesnnent bank or underwriter); and (2) originators in the form ofpartnerships, limited liabilii;Y 
companies, banks, thrifts, or any other enticy holding eligible receivables. See generally The Lure of 
Multi-Seller Vehicles, CORP. FIN., Oct. 1994 (Supp.), at 6. 
43. See 1 SECURITIZATION OF FINANCIAL ASsETS, supra noteS, § 1.01, at 1·3 to -8 (suggesting 
that the general puipOse of securitization is to effect business financing, and descnoing more particular 
secondary goals as well). 
44. See Meredith S. Iackson,Leap ofFaith:Asset-BasedLending to Asset-Backed Securitkation-A 
Case Study, STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN., Winter 1996, at193 (discussing in the context of a case study 
some of the challenges faced by securitizing originators, as well as the potential benefits). 
4S. In a recent article entitled The Death ofliability, Professor Lynn LoPucki offered another 
reason firms may decide to securitize their assets: to judgment-proof themselves. Professor LoPucki 
characterized asset securitization as both a • substitute for borrowing and a powerful new strategy for 
judgment proofing," and described a model in which a coipOration sells its assets and distnl>ures them 
to its shareholders in the form ofdividends. Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death ofliability, 106 YALE L.J. 
1, 24 (1996), (footnote ontitted). The coipOration then leases back the assets and coJllinucs to operate 
as it did prior to the securitization, except that the corporation, now devoid of assets, is completely 
judgment proof. See id. at 2S·26. 
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who stand to benefit financially from an increasing number of securitization 
transactions. 
A. Trends in the Financial Industry 
In recent years, securitization has become quite trendy, 46 and trends 
in the financial industry are as influential as trends in other market sectors. 
Trends are driven by industry leaders, and in the financial services sector, 
the leaders have had significant power and influence. 47 When a firm is 
seeking financing, it will in most cases seek the advice of legal counsel and 
financial advisors. In many cases, these advisors counsel their clients to 
engage in types of financing schemes with which the advisors are most 
familiar at the moment and those that are the most profitable for the 
advisors.48 In this way, legal advisors are able to distinguish themselves 
46. See James C. Allen, lsi Union Card Issue Clears Way jar Mare Offerings, AM. BANKER, 
Man:h I, 1996, at 18 ("A successful credit card securitization by First Union Corp. last week has set 
the stage for a number ofcommercial banks looking to 1BP the asset-backed securities market as another 
funding tool."); The Card Bond Express Keeps Picking Up Steam, CREDIT CARD NEWS, Feb. 15, 1996, 
at I, available in 1996 WL 8385627 (noting that "almost nothing can dull the luster of securities 
backed by credit card receivables," because, despite an "uptick in delinquencies and challle offs, 1995 
proved to be another record breaking year, with securitizations totalling $43 billion, up 31% from 
$32.8 billion in 1994;" further, "most observers expect a repeat performance in 1996"); Frantlines: 
The Markets: ABS Issues Hit Record in 1995, PENSIONS & INVESn.!ENTS, Feb. 19, 1996, at 8 ("Asset 
backed securities issuance [in 1995] shattered the prior year's record. The public asset-backed market 
recorded total volume of $107.792 billion in 1995, a 42% increase from 1994's $15.925 billion."); 
Have Asset, Will Securitize, TREAsuRY MANAGER's REP., July7, 1995, available in 1995 WL6849505 
("Unheard of a decade ago, ABS emellled in the mid-1980s and now have became a familiar, almost 
humdrum form of finance •.••"). 
47. Allen, supra note 46, at 18 (quoting a senior banker with CS First Boston's asset securitization 
group who stated, "We expect to see an overall rise in volume of asset-backed securities by banks in 
!996"); rrrHartford Stays Bullish an ABS Opportunities, INS. Accr., Feb. 5, 1996, at 2, available 
in 1996 WL 5569096 (praising ABS as "sterling" investments). 
48. Securitization ttansactions have higher up-front expenses compared to RHS funding 
arrangements, and the bulk of these up-front transaction costs end up in the pockets of the deal 
professionals. Transaction costs include legal fees, underwriter fees, fees charged in connection with 
credit enhancement, rating agency fees, accounting fees, and fmancial advisory fees. How high the 
ttansaction costs are depends upon a number of factors, including the quality of the receivables to be 
securitized, the necessity of credit enhancement, the type of credit enhancement, the experience of the 
originator and the legal and fmancial advisors, the size of the proposed ttansaction, and the availability 
of funding alternatives. Rating agencies challle sizable fees to perform the diligence necessary to ralll 
a security issuance. 1n addition, because ABS are relatively new financial products, the market has 
demanded that they carcy a high credit rating. This means that credit enhancement must be a compo­
nent of the transaction, and credit enhancement can be very costly. The losses against which credit 
enhancement protects investors include default on the underlying receivables, returns for defective or 
damaged goods, discounts given by the originator for early payments, and carcying costs incurred in 
connection with late payments or delinquencies. The level of credit enhancement is usually based upon 
a historical ratio, in the range of three times the highest default rate over the past 12 months, or 5% 
ofthe face value of the assets. If the securitization does not have sufficient credit enhancement, inves­
tors musrbe compensated in the yield they receive on their investment. 
1n addition, accounting and legal fees for a structured-finance ttansaction can be significant 
l"Illely because of the complexity of their structure and the multitude of legal issues that must be 
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from those who might recommend more traditional and less profitable 
forms of financing. 
Because it is an extremely time-consuming and complex undertaking 
for legal and financial counselors to structure securitization transactions, 
once a firm Ius completed one transaction and has developed an expertise, 
the pieces are in place for that firm to participate in other similar 
transactions.49 This natural phenomenon has not only resulted in an 
increasing number of originators engaging in repeat securitizations, but it 
has also led to the proliferation of structured-finance boutique groups 
within large law firms, so structured finance legal departments, structured 
finance groups in investment banks,S1 and in the nationally recognized 
statistical-rating agencies (referred to herein as rating agencies or 
NRSROs).52 These "experts" have a significant influence upon potential 
addressed in !he documentation. For example, !he SPC must be formed, and boatds of directors must 
be put into place. Disclosure documents must be prepared, and !he transaction must be in compliance 
wilh !he governing body of law, which includes Article 9 of !he UCC, !he Securities Act of 1933 and 
!he Securities Exchange Act of 1934, !he Invesnnent Company Act of 1940, and !he Internal Revenue 
Code. The governing law is still evolving, and to successfully avoid legal pitfalls, a legal advisor must 
be fully familiar wilh the relevant starutes and legal issues. See infra Pan V (discussing the current 
unsettled state ofbolh starutory and caselaw in response to !he evolving market). As is the case with 
all public security issuances, underwriting fees, financial advisory fees, and Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) registration fees are also significant. These fees are not incuned when a company 
uses RHS bank financing to raise capital. See, e.g., Jonathan E. Keighley, Risks in Securitisation 
Transat:tions, in THE GLOBAL AssET BACKED SECURITIES MARKET, supra note 5, at 99, 100-02; 
Kenneth P. Morrison, Documeming the Asset-Backed Securities Transat:tion: Managing the Process 
Toward a Quality Outcome, in NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN SECURITIZATION 1993, at 281, 300-02 ( PLI 
Commercial Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 677, 1993) (explaining !he transaction costs 
inherent in an ABS and suggesting ways by which a lawyer can help a client reduce unexpected cost 
ovenuns); Watson &Joynt, supra now 17, at 234-35 (discussing !he functions and fees of the servicer 
and !he trustee). 
49. See Morrison, supra now 48, at287-88 (describing !he tension between !he complexity of these 
transactions and !he need to keep costs low). 
50. The WesUaw Legal Directory lists approximately 651aw firms who have identified lhemselves 
as having saucrured-finance expertise. Sean:h of WL, WLD (Nov. 23, 1997 ). Saucrured-finance 
legal work is best suited to laQ!e law firms due to !he many different areas of substantive expertise !he 
work requires, such as familiarity wilh !he Securities Act of 1933, the Internal Revenue Code, Article 
9 of the UCC, and !he Bankmptcy Code. 
51. Inves1ment banks include JP MoQ!an, MOQ!an Stanley, Salomon Brolhers, CS First Boston, 
and Oppenheimer. Chase Manhattan Bank and Manufacrurer Hanover Trust each have investment 
banking arms. The growlh in volume, total value, and complexity of !he securitization market can be 
attributed in pan to increased competition among financial advisors. Investment banks have been 
motivated by !he substantial underwriting fees and trading profits earned from securitization 
transactions. See Bryan, supra note 18, at 13-14 (noting !hat the expanded potential for revenue 
generated by ABS has provided strong incentives for invesnnent banks to become involved); Paresh 
Mashru & Mark Rhys, Asset-Backed Finance-Risk Controlfor Traders in Asset-Backed Securities, in 
THE GLOBAL AssET BACKED SECURITIES MARKET, supra noteS, at217, 217 (pointing out that finan­
cial advisors have recognized !hat !he increased interest-rate volatility and changing credit conditions 
inherent in ABS have improved the market's potential to create earnings, sparking heightened 
competition among advisors). 
52. There are six nationally recognized statistical-rating OQ!anizations that all have saucrured­
finance "groups" or "deparnnents": Moody's, <;tandatd & Poor's, Fitch Tnvestors, Duff & Phelps, 
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originators and the originators' willingness to utilize securitization as a 
funding and financing strategy. 53 
Furthermore, rating agencies have significant influence on the behav­
ior of a transaction originator's legal advisor and the scope of the legal 
opinion prepared in connection with a transaction. 54 The rating agencies' 
insistence on legal opinions that place the transaction in its most favorable 
light to market investors has led, in certain instances, to a "race to the 
bottom," with some law firms drawing conclusions in their opinions that 
are not substantiated by the present state of the law.55 In these times of 
increasing competition and drive for profits, firms with a hunger for lucra­
tive structured-finance clients may be swayed by the persuasive powers of 
meA Banking Analysis. and Thomas Bankwatch. The specialists who work in these deparonents 
conduct the research necessary to rate the ABS issuances. as well as to analyze the strucrure and narure 
ofeach proposed transaction. The designation ofa rating instirution as an NRSRO is made by the SEC 
Division of Market Regolation through the issuance of no-action letters. If a rating agency wishes the 
designation of NRSRO, it sends a letter to the SEC requesting that the SEC recommend no regulatory 
enforcement action against the rating agency if it designates itself an NRSRO. Formal standards for 
such a designation have not been developed; the SEC instead relies on the market acceptance of rating 
agencies using such designation. SeeNationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, Exchange 
Act Release Nos. 33-7085, 34-34616, 59 Fed. Reg. 46314, 46316 (Sept. 7, 1994) (noting that the 
Division of Market Regulation "believes that the single most important criterion is that the rating 
agency is in fact nationally recognized by the predominant users of ratings in the United States as an 
issuer of credible and reliable ratings"); Francis A. Bottini, Jr., Comment, An Examina!ion of the 
Cu"ent Status of Rating Agencies and Proposals for Limited Oversight of Such Agencies, 30 SAN 
DIEGo L. REv. 579, 611 (1993); see also Gregory Husisian, Note, What Standard of Care Should 
Govern the World's Shortest Editorials?: An Analysis ofBond Rating Agency Liability, 15 CORNELL 
L. REv. 411, 424-25 (1990) (noting the market impact of agency ratings and the hands-off approach 
to date by lawmakers and couns). 
53. See Note, A Canceptual Framework/or Imposing Statutory Underwriter Duties Involved in the 
Structuring ofPrivate lAbel Mortgage-Backed Securities, 70 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 779,789-90 (1996) 
(stating, in the mortgage-backed securities context, that compelilion in the ratings industiy may be 
leading to lower rating standards because, as economically self-interested market participants, issuers 
are motivated to use rating agencies that provide the most favorable rating, and thus, the lowering of 
rating standards by some rating agencies has had a positive impact on those agencies' market share); 
see also ROSENTIJAL & OCAMPO, supra note 5, at 13-17 (explaining that asset-backed securitization 
will lead to a more efficient financial-services industty and predicting that firms that capitalize on this 
new trend will benefit from the industty's evolution, while firms that lack skills or fail to adapt to the 
new industty strucrure will suffer). 
54. These types of legal opinions are known as "third-party opinions." In third-party opinions, 
attorneys draw conclusions with respect to specific legal issues, and these conclusions may only be 
relied upon by the addressee-not the public at large or even other participants in the transaction. See 
Tribar Opinion Comm., Special Report by The TriBar Opinion Committee: Opinions In the Bankruptcy 
Cantext: Rating Agency, Structured Financing. and Chapter II Transactions, 46 Bus. LAW. 717, 724 
(1991) [hereinafter TriBar Repon]. 
55. Historically,lawyers have notgiven legal opinions on bankruptcy law; even today, bankruptcy 
issues are carved out of the remedies opinion. See id. at 718. As securitization and other complex 
fmancing transactions have become more common, the market(that is, rating agencies) has increasingly 
begun to ·request that these kinds of opinions be issued by the transaction originator's counsel. See id. 
at 719-20; infra notes 260-63 and accompanying text for a more complete discussion of legal opinions 
delivered in connection with securitization transactions. 
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the rating agencies to offer a legal opinion that less hungry firms would not 
agree to deliver.56 The financial services industry and its counterpart, the 
legal community serving the financial services market, are motivated by 
profit, and profit often drives decisionmaking. As Part V will discuss, this 
does not always result in the greatest net benefit to the market. 
B. Improvement ofLiquidity 
All originators who securitize their assets enjoy an improvement in 
asset liquidity management. By definition, the process of securitization 
transforms future payments into instant cash, 57 and this transformation 
allows entities to recognize immediately the value of these assets for a vari­
ety of uses, including current business needs. 58 The sale of assets, even 
at a discount, 59 results in a lump sum cash payment to the originator. 
There are many positive consequences of a firm's increased 
liquidity.60 In the case of originators with trade creditors, enhanced 
liquidity may permit a more fluid cycling of inventory, thus increasing the 
chance that a firm may become able to pay its suppliers' invoices as they 
become due. 61 Because in many cases suppliers of inventory are 
56. q. Steven Brill, Ruining the Profession, AM. LAW., July-Aug. 1996, at 5 (challenging the 
contention that the public dissemination of large Jaw finn profits has Jed to the decline of 
professionalism among lawyers). 
51. The degree of liquidity, however, depends upon the degree ofcollateralization required ofthe 
asset-backed security. The transformation ofan asset worth $1000 into $1000 cash provides the issuer 
with maximum liquidity. More likely~ however, conservative rnting agencies as well as risk-averse 
investors would require that the asset value exceed the cash proceeds by certain specified percenrages. 
For example, in a !991 securitization of computer leases by Comdisco Receivables, Inc., the principal 
amount of the ABS sold represented 92% of the initial aggregate-<liscounted lease balance. S.e David 
L. Gold & Julie P. Schlueter, Credit Risks ond 1heir Analysis in Asset Securitization, in 1lJE GLOBAL 
AssET BACKED SECURITIES MARKET, supra note 5, at 153, 159-60 (discussing a transaction 
underwritten by Salomon Brothers that featured a particularly complex credit analysis). 
58. For companies with trade receivables, securitization can result in more efficient management 
of a finn's cash requirements and growth-related expenses. See Glenn B. McClelland, Jr. & James W. 
McDonald, Jr., Securitking Trade ondLease Receivables, in 1lJE AssET SECURITIZATION HANDBOOK, 
supra note 5, at123, 130. In the case of financial institutions, securitizing Joan portfolios and other 
receivables enables them to rerain the difference between the rate of return received upon the sale of 
the receivables and the interest rate paid by the fmancial institution's borrowers. See Bryan, supra note 
18, at 15. 
59. 	 For example, in a trade receivable-backed transaction, the SPC's 
purchase of receivables from the originator is generally [made) at a discount to reflect: 
[First, an] interest component for the expected payment period[; second, a] component for 
dilutions, such as rerurns and wananty claims, offsets, volume discounts, early payment 
credits and rebates[; and thitd, a) factor for expected losses. 
Securitizing R•ceivab/es in the U.S., CoRP. FIN., Oct. 1994 (Supp.), at 28, 29. In a credit cam 
receivable-backed transaction~ there is no discount for the interest component because a predetermined 
finance charge is established. ld. 
60•. See generally FEDERALREsERVEBANKOF N.Y., FUNDING AND LIQUIDfrY: RECENT CHANGES 
IN LIQUIDITY MANAGEMENT AT COMMERCIAL BANKS AND SECUR111ES FIRMS (1990). 
61. Fora discussion of the extent to which creditors are paid from the cash received by a business 
with a steady cash flow, see infra text accompan.nn2 nores J7n-78. 
610 Texas Law Review [Vol. 76:595 
unsecured trade creditors, this cash infusion may improve their chance of 
repayment.62 
The transformation of a future payment stream into immediate cash 
may further enable an originator to pursue a potentially profitable project 
or merely meet its regular obligations. Cash represents generalized pur­
chasing power and is needed by businesses to invest in research and 
development, to pay dividends to shareholders, and to engage in other 
long-term investments, 63 a need not always satisfied by a firm's erratic 
payment stream of receivables. These investments, in turn, may enable a 
firm to grow in profitability and, therefore, be in a better position to pay 
its creditors-including its unsecured creditors-when the firm's debts 
become due. Cash flow concerns are often paramount in management's 
mind, and the ability to readily transform assets into cash may provide a 
firm with a competitive advantage, both for long-term development plan­
ning and for short-term credit problem resolution. 64 
C. Diversification ofFunding Sources 
Even firms ordinarily able to get financing may be able to tap a new 
market of investors through securitization; individuals and institutional 
investors who would not ordinarily invest in an originator directly may be 
willing to invest in that originator's asset-backed securities. 65 This poten­
tial market expansion is important for rapidly growing firms that have 
exhausted their typical funding sources or whose typical funding sources 
are offering financing at prohibitively high rates. 66 
Moreover, a firm may find that due to the presence of restrictive cove­
nants in the documentation of existing financing arrangements, securiti­
zation is the only possible way for it to raise funds; a bad credit history or 
a lack of a financial track record has a limiting effect on alternative finan­
cing methods that rely on the firm's credit rating. 67 
62. Even when trade creditors are secured by a floating lien on their debtor's inventory, they are 
often vulnerable to inventory value fluctuations. If a debtor uses cash received upon the sale of 
inventory for purposes other than paying the inventory supplier orpurchasing additional inventory, the 
supplier may find itself without collateral, or with collateral valued at less than the amount of the credit 
extended. See LYNN M. LoPUCKI & EUZABETH WAl\REN, SECURED CREDIT; A SYSTEMS APPROACH 
199 (1995). 
63. See GEORGE W. GAWNGER & P. BASIL HEALY, l.JQUIDriY ANALYSIS AND MANAGEMENT 
41-42 (2d ed. 1991); WILLIAM L. MEGGINSON, CORPORATE FINANCE THEORY 29 (1997). 
64. See id. 
65. See Structured Financing Techniques, supra note 5, at 529-30 (explaining that funding 
resources can be structurally isolated and thereby protect investors from bankruptcy risk). CiticoiJl and 
Sears, Roebuck and Co. marketed their credit-card-backed securities to retail institutional investors. 
Chrysler Credit CoiJl. marketed its auto-loan-backed securities to money market mutual funds and 
medium term investors. See 1 SECUIIlT!ZATION OF FINANCIAL ASsETS, supra note 5, § 3.02[c]. 
66. See Structured Financing Techniques, supra note 5, at 529-30. 
67. See Barbara A. Nunemaker, CreditRalings on IntemoJional Asset-BackedSecurities, in ASsET 
SECUIUTIZATION, supra noteS at 134. 136-37. 
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Diversification of funding sources may also improve the originator's 
overall credit rating; a finn with a diversity of funding options generally 
has somewhat higher credit quality than a firm that solely utilizes com­
mercial lending financing sources. 68 Credit ratings reflect the likelihood 
that investors will be repaid their investment, plus interest, on time and on 
the tenns described in the transaction's offering documents, and provide 
investors with a means to compare a variety of investment products. The 
lower a security is rated, the higher risk it is deemed to be and thus the 
higher return paid. As such, lower rated securities result in more expen­
sive funding for their issuers.69 In some cases, a firm may find it finan­
cially prudent to engage in a securitization in order to improve its credit 
rating and then to return to the traditional commercial finance market as a 
better credit risk. 70 
D. Improved Risk Management 
Risk management is often a fundamental objective of securitizing 
finns.71 Unlike traditional lending arrangements, a successful securitiz­
ation is dependent upon investors' satisfaction with the quality of the assets 
backing the ABS, not the credit quality of the originator.72 
In a traditional lending arrangement, the same institution originates the 
loan, structures the tenns, bears the credit risk, provides the funds, and 
services the collection of principal and interest.73 As such, whatever risks 
the borrower offers are fully absorbed by the lender.74 These risks 
include the possibility that the value of the collateral will decline, the 
potential for nonpayment or late payment of the underlying collateral, the 
prospect of the borrower becoming subject to unexpected (or expected) 
liability, the uncertainty of interest rate fluctuation, any fallibility 
associated with the borrower's previous borrowing record, the uncertainty 
associated with a limited borrowing history, and the potential of 
borrower's bankruptcy.75 These risks are commonly referred to as "event 
68. See Goldbe~g et al., supra note 5, at 49 (outlining the approach taken by Moody's Investor 
Service to assess the impact of securitization on the general credit qualily of originators). 
69. See id. 
70. See id. 
71. See ROSENTHAL & OCAMPO, supra note 5, at 12 (descn'bing how credit securitization can lead 
to a more efficient financial-services indusby). 
72. See id. ("Investors in asset-backed securities are SIIUCIUrally protected from the event risk that 
the originator's credit quality may deleriorate. "). 
73. See id. at 6-13. 
74. See id.; Rosenthal & Ocampo, supra nore 5, at 33. 
75. There are some securitization strucbues, however, that provide for the originator to absorb 
the first loss tranche, up to a specified level. This is most often the case when the originalor is per· 
forming the servicing function. The theory behind this struclUre is that, in connection with its per· 
fonnancc of the account servicing, the originator has direct contact with the receivables borrower and. 
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risks. "76 Secured lenders address the issue of risk by reviewing the 
debtor's likelihood of default and evaluating the borrower's character, 
repayment capacity, and economic and financial projections for the entire 
term of the loan.77 This may involve the ongoing monitoring of the 
debtor's business behavior and practices. 
The ABS investors, in contrast to secured lenders, do not bear all of 
the risks associated with the originator and its business and instead rely 
upon risk-containing measures that are made a part of the transaction.78 
For example, credit enhancement allows the party providing the letter of 
credit or guaranty to bear a portion of the risk of nonpayment or late 
payment, in exchange for a fee.79 In addition, when an originator secur­
itizes its highest quality assets it minimizes the ABS investors' risk. 
Conversely, the risk exposure of the firm's other creditors is heightened by 
this asset division.80 Furthermore, because there are no unknown or 
uncertain events in the future that could alter the quality of the ABS inves­
tors' investment, the investors are not subject to the vagaries of the origi­
nator's business behavior, and their risk exposure is limited to the obvious 
risks associated with the assets in the pool. 81 
Finally, securitization, as a risk-contained method of financing, has 
proven to be a useful strategy for firms which have filed for bankruptcy 
under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code82 and who need to raise post­
petition funds.83 After the originator in bankruptcy structures its 
securitization, it must file a motion with the bankruptcy court pursuant to 
as such, is in the best position to evaluate the risk of and absmb this fitst loss. See Rosenthal & 
Ocampo. supra note 5, at 34. 
76. Nicholas Millan!, The Management and Transfer ofCredit, Liquidity and Contingency Risks, 
in THE GLOBAL AssEr BACKED SECilRITIES MARKET, supra note 5, at 127, 127 (defming event risks 
as "the risk that the rating of the pany which has assumed the credit and liquidity risks may have its 
own credit stams lowered, thereby leading to an overall reduction in the rating on the security"). 
77. See DUANE B. GRADDY Er AL., COMMERCIAL BANKING AND THE FINANCIAL SERVICES 
INDUSTRY256-59 (1985). In addition, asset qualicy risk can be addressed by segmenting the assets into 
tranches with common risk characteristics and then marl<eting them to appropriate investots. Those 
market participants willing to absorb, for example, a higher risk of default, late payment, or 
prepayment can be offered a class of ABS with a higher yield than that offered by ABS with a lower 
risk of default. See ROSENTHAL & OCAMPO, supra note 5, at 13. 
78. See ROSENTHAL & OCAMPO, supra noteS, at 13. 
79. See supra note 38. 
80. See infra Pan IV. 
81. Because many originatots tend to extend credit within cenain limited geographic areas, 
economic downmrns or declines in such areas often impact originatots' fmancial health (as well as cash 
flow) in significant ways. See Interview with Susan A. Papacostas, President of Nika Prescription 
Services (Dec. 13, 1996) (on file with the Texas Law Review). 
82. 11 u.s.c. §§ 1101-1129 (1994). 
83. Since 1990, three depattment store companies in Chapter II (Federated Corporation, Caner 
Hawley Hale, and P.A. Bergner & Co.) have securitized their credit can! receivables following their 
filing for relief from creditots' claims under Chapter 11. See generally Glover, supra noteS, at 612­
13. 
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section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code84 requesting court approval of the 
sale of the pool of assets to a special purpose corporation. 115 In addition, 
the originator must file a motion under section 364 of the Bankruptcy 
Code86 describing in detail the proposed transaction, and outlining any 
and all expected benefits to the debtor and the estate.87 Because the bank­
ruptcy court confirms at the outset of the transaction the soundness and 
efficacy of the transaction's structure, including the evaluation that the 
transfer of assets from the originator to the SPC is a "true sale" 88 and that 
the SPC and the originator will not be substantively consolidated, 89 the 
risk that a court will avoid the asset transfer on these bases is reduced. 90 
E. Funding at More Favorable Rates 
Because securitizing originators can better manage event risks, securi­
tization enables most firms to fund their operations at a lower effective 
interest rate than through a secured borrowing arrangement. 91 RHS fund­
ing can be very costly if a firm has a large quantity of debt on its books, 
little or no financing track record or financial history, or lacks exposure to 
a broad base of investors.92 
An originator can obtain this lower effective rate because the capital 
markets do not consider its creditworthiness in pricing the rate of return for 
the securitization of a firm's receivables. Rather, the quality of the 
underlying assets determines the rate. 93 In cases where the originator's 
credit rating is deficient, the capital markets (meaning the rating agencies) 
may give a higher credit rating to the asset-backed securities issued by the 
SPC than to the securities issued by the originator directly.94 This 
84. See 11 U.S.C. app. Rule 4001(a)(1)(1994)(requiring that a motion to condition the use, sale, 
or lease of property shall be made in accordance with Rule 9014, which provides adverse parties with 
notice and a hearing). 
8S. See Glover, supra noteS, at 63S. 
86. See 11 U.S.C. § 364 (governing a re01ganizing company's right to obtain credit and grant 
liens on assets). 
87. See Glover, supra noteS, at 63S. 
88. See infra section N(D)(1). 
89. See infra section N(D)(2). 
90. See generally discussion infra subpart N(D). 
91. The traditional credit system in this counay is very expensive. It is estimated that the cost of 
borrowing funds from a typical regulated financial instirution must include the cost of required reserves, 
FDIC insurance, equity costs, loan loss reserves, and operating costs. See Lowell L. Bryan, 
Conclusion: Asset SecuritizJJJk>n's Role in a Better Financial World, in THE ASsEr SECUR111ZATION 
HANDBOOK, supra note S, at S49, SSO; Goldberg et at., supra note S, at SO (stating that asset 
securitization has become popular because, among other reasons, it is less expensive lhan traditional 
financing methods). 
92. See Liebowitz, supra note 33, at 14 (discussing securitization as an attractive financing 
alternative For below invesbnent grade companies). · 
93. See Overvitw ofStructured FliiQIIcings, CREDITREvlEW, Oct 2S, 1993, at 3, 3. 
94. When a rating agency rates a traditional corporate security issuance, agency analysts evaluate 
the financial condition and performance of a comn:::.nv. a.c:c:P:c;c;: ~e qualito• '::f ~.~n3gementand its impact 
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translates into a lower effective interest rate. Because the quality of the 
asset-backed security issued depends upon the quality of the payment 
stream of the underlying assets, it is the character and quality of the assets 
that are under the rating agencies' intense scrutiny. 95 
The diminished possibility that ABS investors will be affected by the 
originator's potential for bankruptcy also improves the chance that the mar­
kets will view an originator's ABS more favorably than its direct debt 
issuances. Ideally, securitization transactions are structured so that the 
securitized assets are "bankruptcy remote. "96 In such a case, if the integ­
rity of the transaction's structure is not compromised, 97 the assets trans­
ferred by the originator to the SPC and used to back the asset-backed secu­
rities will be deemed not to be part of the originator's bankruptcy estate 
should the originator fold. 98 Thus, because of the severance of the credit 
risk to the originator from the credit of the ABS and because of the 
bankruptcy-remote nature of the transaction's structure, smaller, less 
established, or more financially debilitated firms may be able to fund them­
selves through a securitization on net terms similar to those offered to 
larger, more established and financially sound firms. 99 This in tum may 
enable certain firms to expand at a more rapid pace by utilizing a less 
expensive source of funds for operations and long-term development. 
E Accounting-Related Advantages 
Securitization further allows a firm to isolate a pool of financial assets 
and match them with liabilities with similar maturities, tenor, and 
price. 100 If a firm decides to take advantage of this financing option as 
part of its overall financing strategy, it reduces the necessity to hedge its 
funding obligations to eliminate a mismatch in asset and liability term and 
interest rate. 101 This arrangement may prove to be advantageous to 
upon the company's perfonnance, and offer an educated guess with respect to the company's future 
prospects. See Legalities in Rating Mongage-Backed Securilies, CREDITREviEW, Oct. 25, 1993, at 9, 
9-11. 
95. See id. at 11-12. 
96. Assets are "bankruptcy remote" when they are held by an entity that is unlikely to become 
insolvent or subject to creditots' claims. See id. at 10; discussion infra notes 205-ll? and accompanying 
text. Professor Matshall Tracht in his anicle suggesting a reconsideration of the enforceability of 
bankroptcy waiver.;, referred to securitization as "[t]he most important development in limiting 
bankroptcy access." Marshall E. Trncht, Contractual Bankruptcy Waivers: Reconciling Theory, 
Practice, and Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 301, 310, 310-11 (1997). 
97. This, however, is a very big "if. • For a discussion of the possible equitable cliallenges to the 
structure of securitization transactions, see infra subpatt N(D). 
98. See discussion infra notes 205-07 and accompanying text. 
99. For any firm with less than a double-A credit rnting, the interest savings by securitizing, as 
compared with traditional conunerciallending, may be significant. See Bryan, supra note 91, at 550. 
100. See Goldberg et al., supra note 5, at 49. 
101. This means that for floating-rate obligations, once assets are securitized, the originator no 
longer has to worry about a future asset/liability mismatch. See id. 
615 1998] 	 Asset Securitization 
customers and other creditors because the credit risk of the securitized asset 
pool is segregated from the rest of the firm's assets, thus decreasing the 
risk of interest rate fluctuation and a resulting disruption in the firm's cash 
flow. 102 
A related advantage to securitization is its treatment under the account­
ing rules as compared with other forms of financing. Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles ( GAAP), 103 established by the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB), are the body of rules applicable to 
many securitizing firms. 104 Pursuant to the Statement of Financial 
Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 77,105 a transfer of assets in connec­
tion with a structured finance transaction will be treated as a sale for 
accounting purposes if the transfer is made without "recourse." 106 This 
type of transfer is known as an off-balance sheet sale and offers a firm 
enormous flexibility in raising capital, without risking a violation of 
102. See id. 
103. The Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) outlines !he conventions, rules, and 
procedures used in accounting practice. See Robert W. Berliner, Audit Reports, in ACCOUNTANTS' 
LIABILITY 1992: AUDlTING FOR LAWYERS 41, 44 ( PU Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook 
Series No. 440, 1992). GAAP includes bolh broad general guidelines as well as detailed practices and 
procedures. See id. 
104. The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) is a standards institute recognized by !he 
SEC and !he American Institute of Certified Public Accountants; it also works closely wilh !he Federal 
Reserve Board. Its mission is to develop accounting standards for business, industry, and fmance. 
Insured depository institutions such as national banks and savings associations are subject to more 
restrictive regulatocy account principles (RAP). As a standards body, !he FASB has no enforcement 
aulhority. Enforcement is in !he hands of !he SEC for nonbanking companies. The Federal Reserve 
Board, !he Office of !he Comptroller of !he Currency, and !he Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC) have lhe aulhority to enforce FASB pronouncements wilh respect to banks. See generally 
DIMITRIS N. CHORAFAS & HEtNRJCH SrEINMANN, OFF-BALANCE FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS 129-34 
(1994). 
105. See REPoRTING BY TRANSFERORS FOR TRANSFERS OF RECEIVABLES WITH RECOURSE, 
Statement of Fmancial Accounting Standards No. 77 (Financial Accounting Standards Bd. 1983). 
106. 	 The FASB defines recourse as: 
The right of a transferee of receivables to receive payment from !he transferor of !hose 
receivables for: 
(a) failure of !he debtors to pay when due, 
(b) !he effects of prepayments, or 
(c) adjusnnents resulting from defects in lhe eligibility of !he transferred 
receivables. 
/d. § 12. 
A transfer wilh recourse is a transfer in which a seller agrees 10 repurchase any of !he underlying 
loans !hat go into default or olherwise agrees 10 compensate !he buyer for losses on defaulting loans. 
A transfer wilhout recourse is one in which an originator surrenders control of !he future economic 
benefits of !he assets. Because sales of receivables wilh recourse have many of !he same characteristics 
as loans collateralized by receivables, SFAS No. 77 outlines !he circumstances under which a transfer 
of receivables wilh recourse should be treated for accounting purposes as a loan, ralher !han a sale. 
See Raymond T. Sloane, Jr. & Thomas A. Tranfaglia, Jr., Accounting for Asset-Backed Transactions, 
in THE HANDBOOK OF Ass'IT-BACKED SECURmES, supra note 5, at 79, 85-87 (st.ting !hat SFAS No. 
77 provides guidance on whelher 10 treat a particular transaction involving receivables as a sale or Joan, 
and explaining !he lhree conditions listed in !he standard). 
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covenants and restrictions potentially found in its other financing 
documents. 107 
The three elements required of an asset sale under SFAS No. 77 are 
(1) the surrender of economic control and future benefit of the assets, 108 
(2) strictly limited recourse by the SPC to the originator, 109 and (3) the 
existence of recourse provisions to the originator that are subject to reason­
able estimation. no SFAS No. 77 allows for off-balance-sheet treatment 
of the sale of receivables if these specific criteria are met.m This bene­
fits a firm by improving its financial ratios, allowing it to stay within the 
ratios found in the firm's other loan document covenants, or to simply 
enable it to channel scarce capital to its business segments that may be in 
need.n2 
N. Securitization Viewed from the Unsecured Creditor's Perspective 
As outlined above, securitization offers clear economic and financial 
benefits to originators, ABS investors, and other transaction participants. 
Rational economic actors will engage in securitization transactions only if 
they believe that the net benefits of this choice exceed the net benefits of 
the next most favorable financing alternative. The current volume of ABS 
issuances113 suggests that the parties making the decision to securitize are 
concluding that securitization's net benefits do indeed exceed the benefits 
of the alternatives. There is, however, another relevant perspective from 
which to evaluate the economic impact of securitization: that of the 
I07. It should be noted that if the receivables are sold and the originator retains the servicing role, 
the servicing fee must be within nonnaJ market range. If there is a variation from the nonnal range, 
the sales price of the receivables must be adjusted to provide for a nonnal servicing fee for each 
subsequent servicing period. See ACCOUNTING FOR CERTAIN MORTGAGE BANKING ACTIVITIES, 
Statement ofFinancial Accounting Standards No. 65, § 2 (Fmancial Accounting Standards Bd. 1982). 
This adjustment ensures that the transferor does not reduce the amount of loss or increase the gain 
recorded in the reponing sale period thereby leaving the originator recourse through a back door 
ammgement. See Sloane & Tranfaglia, supra note 106, ar 97. 
108. If the transferor bas the option to repurchase the receivables at a later date, then she bas not 
surrendered control. See Sloane & Tranfaglia, supra note 106, at 86. 
109. The transferor may retain a reversionary interest in the receivables if lhe interest is minor or 
relatively insignificant. See id. 
I 10. This may be difficult if the transferor does not have sufficient experience with the type of 
receivables at issue to be able to make a reasonable estimate of the bad debt loss. See id. 
111. If the originator is a regulated financial institution subject to RAP, it is subject to the capital 
adequacy standards, which were adopted by the Basle Committee on Banking Regulations and which 
the federal bank regulators follow. See 2 SECURITIZATION OF FINANCIAL AssETS, supra note 5, 
§ 13.03 (discussing the adoption of risk-based capital guidelines for regulating financial institutions). 
Securitization is a particularly attractive financing method to such institutions because once an originator 
removes an asset pool and a corresponding financing from its balance sheet, it will not have to maintain 
capital on its balance sheet against the related asset. See Rosenthal & Ocampo, supra note 5, at 90-95 
(discussing the benefits of securitization). 
112. See Sloane & Tranfaglia, supra note 106, at 87. 
113. See supra note 33. 
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securitizing firm's unsecured creditors. The position an unsecured creditor 
finds itself in when its debtor has securitized some or all of its assets is 
analogous to the subordinate position afforded an unsecured creditor when 
its debtor has provided assets as security to another creditor. In both 
cases, the debtor's assets are earmarked and removed from the pool of 
assets available to unsecured creditors. In the event of a debtor's default 
or insolvency, unsecured creditors have a subordinate interest in such pre­
viously identified assets; in the absence of an avoidance of the transfer of 
or lien on these assets, they become unavailable to satisfy the unsecured 
creditors' claims. 114 
The obvious parallel between the plight of unsecured creditors when 
a debtor offers its assets as collateral for a loan and when the same debtor 
securitizes such assets begs consideration of the issue of securitization's 
efficiency. The ongoing debate concerning secured credit's efficiency, 
refreshed by the current Article 9 revision process, 115 provides a useful 
framework for the discussion and analysis of the economic efficiency of 
securitization transactions. 116 
114. For a secured creditor to have !he risht to enforce its claim of a priority interest in an identi­
fied asset against thin! parties with claims on !he same asset, !he creditor must perfect its security 
interest by filing a financing statement in !he appropriate state office. See U.C.C. § 9-304(12)(1994). 
ln !he case of money and instruments, perfection can only be accomplished by possession. See id. ln 
addition, § 9-102 requires !he filing of a notice in !he public reconls in connection with !he sale of 
accounts (and chattel paper) in !he same way debtors file notices with respect to !he grant of collateral. 
The putpOSe of !he filing requirement is to provide notice to !he public and to !he debtor's other 
creditors of !he sta!lls of !he ttansferrcd assets taken as collateral or sold. If creditors perfect !heir 
security interests, security agreements commonly provide !hat !he lender has a right to declare a default 
if !here is an interruption in payment. This declaration will, in most cases, entitle !he lender, if she 
has adequately secured and perfected her interest pursuant to !he provisions of Article 9, to priority 
over all of !he debtor's unsecured creditors as well as priority over subsequent judgment creditors and 
secured parties with competing claimS to !he same collateral. See U.C.C. §§ 9-302, 9-304, 9-502(1) 
(1994); see also JAMES]. WHITE & ROBERTS. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE§ 22-1 to 
-14 (4th ed. 199S) (discussing !he creation, perfection, and enforcement of Article 9 interests). 
11S. ln 1972, !he Official Text of Article 9 of !he UCC was revised and adopted by vir!Ually all 
of !he American states. Prior to Article 9's sta!lltory scheme, various bodies of substantive law 
governed pre.Code security devices. See Wli1TE & SUMMERS, supra note 114, at § 21-1. 
116. The risks assumed by a potential acquirer of an orisinator parallel !he risks assumed by 
unsecured creditors of a securitizing originator. A potential acquiring company will be primarily 
focusing upon its tar&et's business value and !he offering price. An acquirer, however, may not be 
fully aware of bow to evaluate a company with a securitized portfolio of assets. As such, any potential 
adjustments to income !hat might occur ifany of !he securitized assets loss or prepayment assumptions 
rum out to be false are going to be of great concern. Thus, !he extent to which risk is retained by !he 
originator and acquired by !he acquirer will be a fuodamenta! issue to !he acquiring company. The four 
primary issues pertaining to retained risk include recourse risk, prepayment risk, interest rate risk, and 
!he risk !hat !he servicing arrangements are inadequate. An acquirer will most lllcely request 
indemnification from the originator against this type of furure harm. See generally Kathryn A. Cassidy, 
Securiliunion Trade-Ojfs-How Deal Slructure Can Influence the Future Value of Your Company or 
Portfolio, in THE GLOBAL A5SIIT BACKED SECURITIES MARKEr, supra note 5, at 227, 227 (identifying 
six areas of risk in such acquisitions, and stressing the need to consider the impact of securitization 
strucrure on furore flexibility and company valuation). 
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A. 	 Secured Credit's Efficiency and Equitable Justifications, as Applied to 
the Securitization Model 
One of the most frequently cited advantages to securitization is that it 
provides a firm with financing at a less expensive effective interest rate 
than the firm could obtain through a direct secured lending 
arrangement. 117 As stated above, this lower effective financing rate can 
be attributed, in large part, to securitization's prototypical bankruptcy­
remote structure, in which the assets transferred are removed from the pur­
view of the originator's trustee in bankruptcy.118 Indeed, neither aca­
demic commentators nor transaction participants have offered an apology 
for the fact that the financial advantages gained by an originator from the 
movement of these assets beyond the reach of its general creditors are 
among the driving forces behind the proliferation of the number and types 
of originators securitizing assets. 119 
Once the bankruptcy risk is effectively eliminated from the transaction, 
the sale of the assets can return a relatively high price to the originator. 
This price is analogous to the lower interest rate charged by secured cred­
itors who have identified and earmarked a secondary source of repayment 
in the event of a debtor default (commonly known as collateral), as com­
pared to the higher interest rate charged by WlSecured creditors who have 
no such payment back-up arrangement. 120 In a secured lending context, 
in the event of a debtor's liquidation, it is the secured creditors who have 
priority of payment over the unsecured creditors, precisely because of the 
presence of the earmarked collateral. 121 
This priority arrangement forms the basis for one of the fundamental 
premises of Article 9 and the Bankruptcy Code; in the event of a debtor's 
liquidation, secured lenders get paid from their collateral (or its equivalent 
in value) before unsecured creditors. 122 Unsecured creditors must be 
117. 	 See supra subpart III(E). 
118. 	 See supra text accompanying note 205. 
119. See ROSENTIIAL & OCAMPO, supra note 5, at 8-23 (summarizing the benefits of securitization 
of credit). See generally 111E EMERGED AND EMERGING NEW UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (ALI­
ABA Course ofSrudy, Dec. 12-14, 1996); Schwarcz, Structured FiJUmce, supra note 5, at 613-18; see 
also Tracht, supra note 96, at 310-11. 
120. 	 The interest rate charged is a factor of the nonpayment risk. When a lender perfects a 
security interest in collateral in cmmection with a loan. it has increased its chance of repayment, either 
directly by the debtor, or from the value of the collateral. The equation P {probability) x L (loss 
suffered from default) illustrates the concept. The loan loss value, L, will be offset by the chance, P, 
that collateral will be used to satisfy the debt. See Alan Schwartz, Security Interests and Bankruptcy 
Priorities: A Review of Cu"ent Theories, 10 J. LEGAL SI1JD. I, 8 (1981). See generally WEIR M. 
BROWN, BANK LENDING TO BUSINESS BORROWERS: lNTERESr RATES AND U.S. MONIITARY POUCY 
09~. 	 . 
121. 	 See 11 U.S.C. § 726 (1994). 
122. 	See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 114, § 25-10, at 919-20. 
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satisfied with a pro rata share of whatever is left over. 123 
Notwithstanding the endurance of this accepted commercial practice, 
whether secured creditors ought to continue to have priority over the 
subordinated claims of general unsecured creditors has been and continues 
to be a topic of dispute among academics and commercial 
practitioners. 124 Indeed, the recent Article 9 revision process has 
renewed the enthusiasm for this discussion and has resulted in placing the 
question of secured creditor priority at the top of the revision committee's 
discussion list. 125 
The essence of this discussion is the question of whether secured credit 
is efficient and whether secured claims' priority status in bankruptcy results 
in an inequitable outcome. Implicit in this question is the issue of whether 
secured creditors are realizing gains at the expense of unsecured creditors 
in a way that challenges accepted principles of efficiency and equity. 
In their seminal article written in 1979, Professors Thomas H. Jackson 
and Anthony T. Kronman argued that the legal rules allowing creditors to 
take security for loans are economically efficient. 126 They rest their con­
clusion on two arguments. First, they argued that unsecured creditors are 
compensated for their subordinated status by being paid an interest rate 
premium. IZ1 Second, they contended that even in the absence of a legal 
regime providing for secured credit, creditors would establish a parallel 
priority scheme because of the market advantages inherently available for 
riskier unsecured loans. 128 
Professor Alan Schwartz challenged this conclusion and its underlying 
assumptions in a 1981 article. 129 Professor Schwartz took issue with the 
123. See id. 
124. See generally Symposium on the Revision ofAnicle 9 ofthe Uniform Commercial Code, 80 
VA. L. REv. 1783 (1994); see aL<o.Memorandum from Professor Elizabeth Warren, Harvard Law 
School, to the Council of the American Law Instimte (Apr. 25, 1996) (on file with the Texas Law 
Review) (slating that she had initiated her draft ofa proposed amendment to Anicle 9 which would "set 
aside ••• assets for unsecured creditors" following "an extensive debate over the efforts of the current 
Article 9 drafting committee to extend the reach of security interests to lock up all the property of a 
debtor"). 
125. See Anicle 9 Reporter's Scatement of Policy Issues for the NCCUSL 1996 Annual Meeting 
(June 17, 1996) (on file with the Texas Law Review). Some of the issues set forth in the scatement 
include: (I) whether "the revised Anicle 9 [should) continue to facililate and promote the creation and 
enforcement of security interests"; (2) whether "the revised Anicle 9 [should] retain its [current] 
priority scheme under which perfected security interests are senior to the rights of lien creditors and 
unperfected security interests are junior to those rights"; (3) whether "the revised Article 9 [should] 
subordinate, in whole or in pan, perfected security interests to the rights of some or all classes of 
unsecured creditors"; and (4) whether "the revised Article 9 [should) subordinate the rights of lien 
creditors to unperfected security interests." Id.; see Lucian Acye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The 
Uneasy Case for the Priority ofSecured Claims in Bankruptcy, lOS YALE L.J. 857 (1996). 
·126. See Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman, Secured Fmancing and Priorities Among 
Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143, 1157 (1979). 
127. See id. at 1148. 
128. See id. at 1157. 
129. See Schwartz, supranote•f10: 
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conclusion of secured credit's efficiency130 and outlined the difficulties 
with the "conventional efficiency story" offered to explain secured 
debt. 131 He suggested that the savings gained by debtors borrowing from 
some creditors on a secured basis are offset by the premiums demanded by 
unsecured creditors for their heightened risk of noncollection. He further 
questioned whether one can conclude that security is efficient without iden­
tifying a reduction in social cost and explored the issue of whether the 
aggregate benefits of security equal or exceed its aggregate costs.132 
Unable either to identify the reduced costs or to effectively quantify bene­
fits of a system of security, Schwartz concluded that the efficiency of 
secured debt was unproven.133 
Since the publication of Professor Schwartz's article, many academics 
have addressed the efficiency of secured transactions. Some have con­
cluded that secured credit's efficiency is unproven, or at least 
problematic, 134 and others have sought to substantiate their contention of 
efficiency by cataloging a roster of justifications for its continued 
existence. 135 The justifications offered for the persistence of secured 
130. See id. at 7. Professor Schwartz's position is essentially a statement of the Miller-Modigliani 
irrelevance theorem~ which provides that, under ideal conditions, a firm should be indifferent to its 
capital structure; the level of invesbnent made by a f1m1 is unaffected by the type of security used to 
finance the invesbnent. See Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller. The Cost ofCopital, Corporation 
Finance and The Theory ofInvestment, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 261. 288-93 (1958). Professor Schwanz 
demonstrated that the Miller-Modigliani theory ofindifference can be applied to a f1m1's mix of secured 
and unsecured debt. See Schwartz, supra note 120, at 7-8. 
131. Professor Schwanz observed three fundamental difficulties with the efficiency explanations 
for the existence of secured debt: (1) the explanations fail to accurately predict the effects of the 
absence or presence of security (for example. the effects security has on firm debt-monitoring. the type 
of signal security sends, or the benefits to a firm of interest rates that are staggered over time); (2) the 
explanations fail to explain why security is used by debtors. rather than alternatives; and (3) the 
explanations do not prove that secured debt's social gains exceed its social costs. See Schwanz. supra 
note 120. at 7-29. 
132. This is a slightly different formulation than the defmition of efficiency known as "Pareto 
efficiency." so named after the Italian economist Vilfredo Pareto. A situation is said to be Pareto 
efficient or Pareto optimal if there is no change from that situation which can make someone better off 
without making someone else worse off. See, e.g •• A. MITCHELL POUNSKY. AN INTRODUCTION TO 
LAW AND ECONOMICS 7 n.4 (1983). 
133. See Schwartz. supra note 120. at 37 ("[N]o plausible showing that secured debt actually 
increases welfare exists."). 
134. See Bebchuk & Fried. supra note 125. at 857. 
135. See Barry E. Adler. An Equity-Agency Solution to the Bankruptcy-Priority PuWe. 22 J. 
LEGAL STuD. 73 (1993) (contending that the priority secured credit enjoys over unsecured credit is 
beneficial because it encourages more scrutiny by unsecured creditors); Richard L. Barnes. The 
Efficiency Justifications for Secured Transactions: Foxes with Soxes and Other Fanciful Stllff, 42 KAN. 
L. REV. 13, 15-16 (1993) (describing attempts by legal scholars to provide economic justifications for 
secured credit); James W. Bowers. Whither What Hils the Fan?: Murphy's Law, Bankruptcy Theory 
~the Elementary Economics ofLoss Distribution. 26 GA. L. REV. 2?, 36-37 (1991) (arguing that 
secured and unsecured credit options give creditors choices in demonstrating their preferences. thus 
increasing the incentive to contract); F.H. Buckley. The Bankruptcy Priority PuWe, 72 VA. L. REV. 
1393, 1395-96 (1986) (noting that security grants reduce both screening costs and incentive costs of 
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credit include the potential for secured credit to (1) protect against asset 
wasting or dissipation, 136 (2) signal that a debtor with secured credit is 
a good credit risk, 137 (3) reduce the total costs of monitoring the debtor's 
business behavior,138 and (4) generally increase the availability of 
credit. 139 
The claim of securitization's efficiency is less substantiated than the 
same claim with respect to secured credit. Although many of the same jus­
tifications for secured credit's continued existence have been used to justify 
and explain the increasing number of securitization transactions, these jus­
tifications do not fully or accurately explain securitization's place in the 
credit market}40 
B. Challenges to the Efficiency of Securitization 
1. Securitization's FJjiciency Is Unproven.-On its face, securitization 
appears to be a creative, albeit complex, way of reducing a firm's effective 
interest rate while offering it positive strategic advantages. In a hypo­
thetical vacuum where the only parties' interests to be considered are those 
of the originator and the ABS investors, the fact that an increasing number 
of firms are securitizing assets to meet the market's "insatiable" 
demand141 for ABS suggests that the economic benefits exceed the costs 
for these parties. This conclusion assumes that parties are acting 
crediiOrs, in tum increasing value 10 the firm); Saul Levmore, Monitors and Freeriders in Commercial 
and Corporate S.nings, 92 YALE LJ. 49, 68·72 (1982) (arsuing that secured credi10rs may conlribute 
10 reduce the freerider problem among shareholders, helping lower a firm's capital cosJs); Randal C. 
Picker, S.curiry Interests, Misbehavior, and Common Pools, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 645, 646 (1992) 
(arguing that "secured credit is a sensible response to the problem of crediiOr misbehavior"); Alan 
Schwanz, 1he Continuing Puzzle ofSecured Debt, 37 VAND. L. REv. 1051 (1984) (arguing that such 
efficiencies can not be known with assurance); Robert E. Scott, A Relational 1heory of Secured 
F'mancing, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 901, 970 (1986) (contending that a debtor-creditor relational model for 
understanding secured transactions enhances the argument that such mechanisms can increase finn 
value); Paul M. Shupack, Solving the Puzzle of Secured Transactions, 41 RUTGERS L. REV. 1067, 
1073-83 (1989) (describing attempiS to justi!Y the efficiency of secured credit); George G. Triantis, 
Secured Debt Und.r Conditions of/mpeifect InformaJion, 21 J. LEGAL STuD. 225 (1992) (noting the 
need to examine information imperfections in debt markeiS in order to evaluate various efficiency 
theories); James J. White, E;//icieney JuslijicalionsfOr Personal Property Security, 37 V AND. L. REv. 
473 (1984) (outlining the general efficiency justifications, and challenging the assumptions regarding 
differential risk aversion as an efficiency justification). See generally, Symposium, supra note 124. 
136. See White, supra note 135, at 487-89. 
137. See id. at 476-77. 
138. See Jackson & Kmnman, supra note 126, at 1149-61 (analyzing the impact of monitoring 
allocation among parties and outlining fac10rs which influence crediiOrs' desire and ability to monitor); 
Levmore, supra note 135, at55-57 (arsuing that a secured crediiOr's motivation 10 monitor would solve 
the freerider problem) . 
. 139. See Homer Kripke, Law and Economics: Measuring the Economi_c I;fficieney ofCommercial 
Law in a Vacuum ofFact, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 929, 941-46 (1985). 
140. s-. generally supra note 5. 
141. See generally supra note 33. 
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with sufficient rationality to accurately assess the costs and benefits 
to them. 
When securitization's third-party distributional effects are taken into 
account, a firm may be securitizing assets even when the transaction results 
in economic inefficiencies. When firm managers pursue investments and 
financing strategies that increase expected creditor losses more than such 
strategies increase expected shareholder return, such investments are 
inefficient. 142 The dissonance between what decisions are good for the 
firm, versus what is good for the firm's creditors, results in an inefficient 
enrichment of shareholders at the expense of creditors. 143 
To illustrate, suppose a firm has $100 in assets and $100 in liabilities. 
Upon liquidation, the firm's creditors would get paid in full and its share­
holders would be left with nothing. The firm knows of an investment 
opportunity that will cost $100 and will return $200 if successful, but zero 
if unsuccessful. There is a one-in-two chance of success or failure. 
Should the firm make this investment? From the creditors' 
perspective, it should not. If the investment succeeds, the firm creditors 
will get no more than $100, but if the investment does not succeed, the 
creditors will be left with nothing. However, from the standpoint of the 
firm (that is, its shareholders), it should make the investment. If the 
investment loses, it is the creditors that bear the loss. Because the firm is 
insolvent anyway, the shareholders lose nothing if the firm loses its 
investment, but if the investment pays off, it is they, not the creditors, who 
reap the benefit. 144 
Furthermore, an originator's ability to divert value from its unsecured 
creditors to its ABS investors results in costs to unsecured creditors who 
fail to adjust to and adapt their behaviors to their heightened post­
securitization risk. To the extent a creditor can understand and predict the 
effect securitization will have on its chance of repayment, both in the 
absence of and in bankruptcy, it can negotiate terms to reflect this risk. If 
the originator did not bargain with its unsecured creditors prior to the 
securitization, either because the creditors are involuntary or otherwise 
142. See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 125, at 873. 
143. See George G. Triantis, A Free-Cash-Flow Theory ofSecured Debt and Creditor Priorities, 
80 VA. L. REv. 2155, 2155 (1994) ("The premise of agency theozy is that self-interested managers 
make the decisions ofa corporation, and these decisions may enrich the managers or their shareholders 
at the expense of the firm's creditors."). 
144. Another example makes the same point, but more dramatically. A firm makes an invesnnent 
of $100 at a Las Vegas gaming table, and the $100 is put on a number that has a one-in-a-hundred 
chance of coming up. This invesnnent also has an expected value of $100 (a I% chance of making 
$10,000 and a 99% percent chance of making nothing). So what would the debtor and creditors say 
about this "invesnnent proposal"? The rational debtor-shareholder-originator's response should be 
identical to the creditors. See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD & THOMAS H. JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS AND 
MATERIALS ON BANKRUPTCY 372-74 (2d ed. !990). 
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nonadjusting,145 a transfer of value from the creditor to the firm's share­
holders will result. As is the case with secured credit, it is primarily these 
nonadjusting creditors that are subject to the greatest economic costs when 
a firm securitizes. Securitization may result in a transfer of value from 
these nonadjusting creditors, and to the extent there is no corresponding 
adjustment in the cost of unsecured credit, the shareholders of the securitiz­
ing firm have captured such value. 
Even if one can assume perfect information and consent on the part of 
unsecured creditors and other third parties with claims against securitizing 
originators, 146 the conclusion that securitization is an efficient way for a 
firm to finance its operations and thus ought to be encouraged remains 
unproven. 
2. Securitimtion's Justijications.-In the absence of bankruptcy, 
secured credit results in a number of benefits to a debtor and its other cred­
itors that support and enhance the efficient outcome of the secured credit 
transaction. These benefits relate to a secured party's ability to control 
what has been referred to as "debtor misbehavior" and have been used to 
justify secured credit's prominent position in our commercial economy. 
These justifications include the potential for secured credit resulting in: (1) 
protection against asset wasting or dissipation,l47 (2) the provision of a 
signal that a debtor with secured credit is a good credit risk, 148 (3) a 
reduction in the total costs of monitoring the debtor's business 
behavior,l49 and (4) a general increase in the availability of credit}50 
These controls on a debtor's post-financing behavior, however, are not 
available to a firm's unsecured creditors when the firm engages in a 
securitization. 
a. Securitization prevents a debtor from wasting assets.-When 
an asset transfer is characterized as a transfer of collateral for a loan (and 
thus a transfer made in connection with a secured financing), the originator 
145. See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 125, at 869-70. Nonadjusting creditors include ton 
claimants; government tax and regulatol}' agencies; creditors with claims so small it is not prnctical to 
seek infonnation about the debtor on ao ongoing basis or adjust !coding terms accordingly; and 
unsecured creditors who extend credit on fixed terms. foreclosing the opponunity for adjustments in 
the future. See id. at 870. Such nonadjusting creditors are also known as involuntuy and voluntacy 
uninformed creditors. For a discussion of implied consent by these creditors, see infra subpan N(C). 
146. For a discussion regarding the assumption of perfect information and consent, see infra 
subpan N(C). 
147. S<e White, supra note 135, at 487-89. 
148. Seeid. at 476-77. 
149. See Jackson & Kronman, supra note 126, at 1149-61; Levmore, supra note 135, at SS-57. 
ISO. Su Kripke, supra note 139, at 941 (arguing that in most ttansactions involving secured 
credit, the credit. could not have been obtained without grnnting security). 
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with title to the assets pledges them to a lender as collateral, but retains an 
ownership interest in them. 151 In such a case, the debtor who enjoys the 
secured credit extended by its lender no longer has the freedom to do what 
it wants with its encumbered assets, notwithstanding its retention of title to 
them.152 The debtor is commonly precluded by agreement from giving 
away, selling, or wasting these assets. 153 
In contrast, the objective of a securitizing originator is to remove, 
through a sale, cenain assets of the originator from its ownership and 
control. Once removed, neither contract nor statute requires the originator 
to preserve these assets or their value, and upon their sale, the securitized 
assets become the property of the purchaser. The originator is not required 
or motivated to preserve the consideration received from the asset sale; as 
stated above, it is free to spend this cash any way it chooses-or to simply 
squander it. 154 
In addition, asset purchasers, in contrast to lenders, have no interest 
in contractually prohibiting an originator from inefficient 
decisionmaking-which may include both imprudent business decisions and 
the wasting of non-securitized assets. Lenders may, and indeed often do, 
outline a set of behaviors foreclosed to the debtor because of their potential 
for adverse distributional consequences. These behaviors may include 
restrictions against encumbrances on the transfer of certain assets, restric­
tions on certain investment activity, restrictions on the creation of certain 
security interests, and even a prohibition against a change in the debtor's 
business policies, practices, or type of industry. 155 These restrictions 
serve as a check on a borrower's post-credit extension behavior and protect 
the interests of the borrower's unsecured creditors. Post-securitization, 
there is no party with sufficient interest in the originator to control any 
aspect of its ongoing behavior. 
Moreover, a further objective of a securitizing originator is to remove 
its securitized assets from its potential bankruptcy estate. Indeed, that is 
what a bankruptcy-remote transactional structure is designed to do-transfer 
151. Iflhe bonoweruses its assets as collateral for a loan, lhe lender may make a single advance 
against a pool of current and after-acquired accounts or may extend a line of credit to lhe bonower up 
to a specified amount. See generally WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 114, at 756 (introducing lhe 
concept of attachment by a creditor). 
152. Constraints wilh respect to collateral are generally imposed upon lhe debtor by contract. See 
LoPUCK! & WARREN, supra note 62, at 255-56 (discussing lhe types of contracrual default provisions 
included in security agreements). 
153. Exceptions to lhis rule include lhc ability 10 substiblte collateral and lhe ability 10 take a 
securit;y interest in assets lhat regularly rum over in lhe ordinary course of lhe debiOr's business, such 
as inven10ry and accounts. See LoPUCK! & WARREN, supra note 62, at 195-99 (discussing securit;y 
interests tied to debiOr assets which have changing components but stability of identit;y and collateral 
value). · 
154. See supra section IV(B}(1). 
155. SeeBebchuk & Fried, supra note 125, at 879 (discussing lhe ways lhat covenants can be used 
to conlrOI inefficient behav;nY'' 
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the assets to an entity that is not required to participate in the debtor's 
bankruptcy. The fundamental difference in a bankruptcy context between 
a secured financing and a securitization is that a secured creditor, by 
statute, is a necessary party to the debtor's bankruptcy, 156 whereas securi­
tization participants (meaning the SPC as asset transferee and the ABS 
investors) have as their goal the establishment of a remote position from 
the bankrupt originator. 157 In such a case, if the asset transfer is upheld 
by the court, the asset transferee (the SPC) is not subject to the reach of 
the automatic stay, and the payment source of the ABS (the securitized 
assets) is effectively separated from the bankruptcy estate ofthe originator. 158 
156. Bankruptcy constrains both debtors and creditors from altering their rights in the collaternl. 
All property in which the debtor has an interest at the time of the bankruptcy fding is no longer deemed 
to be the debtor's but becomes pan of the estate that is created automatically upon the debtor's bank­
ruptcy fding. This includes the debtor's interest in property encumbered by a security interest as well 
as unencumbered property. The trustee is charged with the responsibility ofpresetving and protecting 
the value of the debtor's finite and often limited estate for the benefit of the debtor's unsecured 
creditors. Upon bankruptcy fding, secured creditors become necessaty parties to their debtor's 
bankruptcy. The automatic stay(§ 362 of the Bankruptcy Code) comes into effect immediately upon 
the filing for bankruptcy and precludes all creditors, including secured creditors, from demanding pay­
ment from the debtor and from taking possession of, selling, leasing, or otherwise disposing of col­
lateral until the bankruptcy process is complete and the debtor is discharged. Unless the stay is lifted, 
a secured party is constrained from simply exiting the debtor's bankruptcy without being forced to par­
ticipate fully in the process. Participation means that, in many instances, a secured creditor must wait 
out the duration of the bankruptcy process before it can claim its collateral. The trustee engages in an 
independent examination of the claim ofthe creditor's secured status. Following such examination. the 
trustee may discover that the ostensible secured party's "priority lien" in the collateral was not 
adequately created or perfected. Even ifproperly perfected, the trustee may fmd that this collateral has 
increased or decreased in value, or is subject to the conflicting claims of another putpOned secured 
creditor. If the creation or perfection of the security interest is flawed or if it is determined that a 
competing claimant to that particular collaternl has priority, the creditor is no longer deemed to be 
adequately secured. The identified collaternl is then either "earmarked" for the other party with 
priority security or it is returned to the estate without a priority claim on it and becomes available for 
pro rata distnbution to the debtor's general unsecured creditors. During the period of lime that a 
secured creditor has a claim on assets, whether or not it is ultimately determined to be properly 
perfected, the debtor is prohibited from wasting such assets. See II U.S.C. §§ 362(d)(l)-(2), 363 
(1994); DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY, supra note 6, § 3-1 to -3, -II to -13. 
157. The asset purchaser, unlike the secured creditor, is not a "party in interest" in the securitizing 
debtor's bankruptcy estate. Section 1109(b} of the Bankruptcy Code defines "party in interest" to 
include "the debtor, the trustee, a creditors' comminee, an equity security holders' committee, a 
creditor, an equity security holder, or any indenture trustee." II U.S.C. § 1109(b) (1994); see In re 
Manin Paint Stores, 199 B.R. 258,264 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996) (stating that "party in interest" for 
purposes of lifting an automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1994) includes only the debtor and its 
creditors (citing In re Comcoach Cotp., 698 F.2d 571, 573 (2d Cir. 1983) (stating that, for standing 
putpOses, "party in interest" is resetved to one that is able to seek legal redress under applicable 
substantive law)}}, aff'd sub nom. Southern Blvd., Inc. v. Manin Paint Stores (In re Manin Paint 
Stores), 2rr7 B.R. 57 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
158. This is not to say that assets sold in a securitization or any other context may never be 
returned to the bankruptcy estate ofthe originator. The Bankruptcy Code gives the trustee powers that 
allow it, under cenain defined cin:umstances, to bring back into the debtor's estate property that may 
have been previously transferred to a third party that is outside the control and possession of the debtor. 
Section. 544 of the Bankruptcy Code confers on the trustee all the rights. under Slate law of a 
hypothetical creditor with a liollnOillall<lhe-prope!ljl.o£.tleedebtm2s ,s.,.-;1-U:JtS.C. § 544. The 
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b. Securitization provides a signal to third parties with respect 
to the credit risk ofthe originator.-Another justification commonly offered 
for secured debt is that it provides a signal to unsecured creditors of deb­
tor's prospects. 159 According to this "signaling" explanation, secured 
credit allows unsecured creditors to extend credit at a reduced interest rate 
because such debtor is a better risk than other debtors without secured 
credit.160 
avoidance of a transfer under § 544(a) does not happen automatically upon the request of a party in 
interest or upon a motion to confitm a plan uoder Chapter II, but must be the subject of an advetsary 
proceeding. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 7087. The Advisory Committee Notes to Part VII of the 
Bankruptcy Rules state that "[p]roceedings to which the rules in Part VII apply directly include those 
brought to avoid transfers by the debtor under§§ 544,545, 547, 548 and 549 of the Code." FED. R. 
BANKR. P. 7001 advisory committee note. Transferees must be served with a complaint, a summons, 
and a notice of trial, and the burden is shifted to the trustee to defeat the prima facie evidence presented 
by the transferee that the transfer should not be avoided. II U.S.C. §§ 362(g), 547(g); 11 U.S.C. 
app. Rule 7004. Thus, a party in interest must affirmatively challenge the transferee's claim of interest 
in the identified assets. If at the time the trustee exercises its avoiding powers under § 544(a) the assets 
have been transferred to a third party (such as an SPC), § 550 of the Bankruptcy Code gives the trustee 
the power to recover the assets for the benefit of the estate. Section 550 reads: 
(a) 	 Except as otherwise provided in this section, to the extent that a transfer is avoided 
under section 544 . . . the trustee may recover? for the benefit of the estate? the 
property transferred, or, if the court so orders, the value of the property, from 
(1) 	 the initial transferee of such transfer or the entity for whose benefit such 
transfer was made; or 
(2) any immediate or mediate transferee of such initial transferee. 

11 u.s.c. § 550. 

Once the assets are recovered, they come back into the fold of the estate and are available for 
pro rata distribution to the debtor's unsecured creditors. The relevant state law is UCC § 9-301(1)(b), 
which provides: 
(1) 	 Except as otherwise provided in subsection (2), an unperfected security interest is 
subordinate to the rights of ... 
(b) 	 a person who becomes a lien creditor before the security interest is 
perfected. 
U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(b) (1994). This blending of state and federal bankruptcy law allows the trustee to 
take priority over any and all unperfected security interests. Thus, once a bankruptcy petition is med, 
the failure of a creditor or transferee to comply with the relevant requirements of Article 9 gives the 
trustee priority in the property subject to the interests of the creditor-transferee. See 11 U.S.C. § 544. 
The discussion in Part V of this Article examines the courts' confusion with respect to this issue. 
As such, the transferee of assets who has failed to perfect or maintain its security interest under 
the tertns of Article 9 competes with the trustee for a priority position with respect to the particular 
assets at issue. This means that if the transferee of securitized accounts does not perfect the transfer 
in accordance with the rule set forth in UCC § 9-102 by an appropriate ming in compliance with the 
provisions of UCC § 9-203, its interest may be voided by the trustee. Section 9-102, outlining the 
transactions to which Article 9 applies, states that the provisions of Article 9 apply to any sale of 
accounts or chattel paper. See U.C.C. §§ 9-102, 9-203; WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 114, § 21-1 
to -3. 
159. See Jackson & Kronman, supra note 126, at 1161, 1149-61 (arguing that "it is to the benefit 
ofall concerned that monitoring burdens be shifted to those creditors who are able to bear them at least 
cost"); see also White, supra note 135, at 476-77 (stating that such justification conflicts with the 
common understanding of security that the greater the risk; the greater the need for security). 
160. But see Schwartz, supra note 120, at 17,14-21 (challengingtheconclusionthatsecured credit 
sends a signal that the borrower is a good risk because debtors who are good credit risks need not give 
collateral, and thus security is. at ®st ~_~~bien· ....,.~.. c:oiO'nal). 
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Whatever the merits of this explanation for secured credit, 161 the 
signal broadcasted when an entity securitizes its assets should not be read 
the same way as the secured credit signal. As stated previously, the 
current market of originators is largely comprised of firms with low credit 
ratings, those with little or no borrowing track records, and entities with 
a lack of exposure to a diversity of investors.162 Indeed, it is because of 
these qualities that many of the newest securitization market originators 
have turned to structured finance. If the market demands (and rating agen­
cies and investors do) that the originators securitize only their highest qual­
ity assets, then the prevailing signal to unsecured creditors is not that the 
originator is a good risk-and therefore unsecured creditors should charge 
a discounted interest rate-but that the originator's highest quality assets 
have been sold-with only "junk" remaining from which the unsecured 
creditors can satisfy their claims. 
Moreover, unsecured creditors may not have access to sufficient infor­
mation to read the broadcasted signal; the adequacy of disclosure of the 
quality of securitized assets has been called into question in recent 
years. 163 In response to the market's concerns, the SEC is considering 
revising its disclosure standards for certain ABS issuances. 164 The secur­
itization signal is a difficult one to read and, as such, the interest rates 
charged by the unsecured creditors are not an accurate reflection of the 
risks being borne. 
c. Securiti<Ption reduces monitoring costs to creditor.r.-Theorists 
posit two distinct models of monitoring by secured creditors: (I) secured 
creditors monitor the assets encumbered by the security interest, or (2) they 
monitor the debtor's entire business to determine the probability of 
default. 165 Monitoring may serve either as a private good, having no 
161. See While. supra note 135. at477. 476-77 (challenging the signaling explanation on the basis 
that. because security "impedes the debtor's possibility for subsequent bonowing. minimizes its 
maneuvering room on the verge of default. and gives greater power to the creditor upon default." the 
grant of security is a greater burden to a high risk debtor than it is to a low risk one). 
162. See supra Part II. 
163. The Public Securities Association ( PSA). a Wall Street ttade group. suggested in a letter to 
the SEC that the existing disclosure rules "stand in the way of disseminating useful information to 
investors." PSA Urges Disclosure Overhaul. COM. MORTGAGE ALERT, Nov. ll. 1996. at 7, 7, 
available in 1996 WL 7983320. Specifically. the PSA is concerned that ABS investors should have 
at least 48 hours before the securities are sold to review infOimation with respect to the underlying 
assets. A further issue raised by the PSA is that "many new issuers have entered the securitization 
market with little or no operating histocy ," and as such. this fact ought to be disclosed. Aaron Elstein. 
SEC Considers Increasing Disclosure on Asset-Backeds. AM. BANKER. Oct. 10. 1996. at 20. 
164. See Elstein. supra note 163. 
165. See Jackson & Kronman, supra note 126, at ll~1 (positing that the burdens of monitoring 
debtors should be shifted to those creditors who are able to bear them at the least cost); Levmore, supra 
note 135. at 53 (arguing that large commercial lenders are in a better position to police a debtor for 
risky behavior). 
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direct effect upon the firm's other creditors, or it may result in a public 
good, where the other creditors of the debtor (and often the unsecured 
creditors) reap the benefit of the monitor's diligence. 166 Monitoring may 
have positive consequences for creditors: the monitor takes on the role of 
a "joint venturer" of the debtor, attuning its radar to the issue of creditor 
repayment.167 Alternatively, monitoring may inflict negative externalities 
on interested third parties. For example, a creditor's monitoring of a 
debtor may allow the creditor to detect an imminent default more quickly 
and thereby give that creditor the advance information and opportunity to 
seize the debtor's assets first. 168 
If purchasers of securitized assets monitor at all, they do so in the 
form of short-term private monitoring. The asset purchaser's concern in 
the course of its pre-securitization diligence is with the quality of the assets 
sold and the corresponding credit enhancement. Beyond this initial 
diligence, there is no reason for ongoing monitoring of the originator's 
business behavior. 169 
In contrast, one of the primary concerns of unsecured creditors is the 
debtor's post-credit-extension behavior. They want to ensure that the 
debtor refrains from engaging in any behavior riskier than the behavior 
engaged in when their initial bargain was struck.170 If the securitized 
assets are moved from the originator's purview to a bankruptcy-remote 
entity, ultimate purchasers of the ABS have no continuing incentive to 
monitor the debtor for risky behavior. As a result, the originator's unse­
cured creditors are left with one of two alternatives: (1) to maintain their 
lending relationship with the debtor in the absence of monitoring, or (2) to 
monitor the debtor themselves. 171 
A debtor-creditor relationship in the absence of monitoring is a risky 
one; the less information available to the creditor, the higher the risk that 
166. See Levmore, supra note 135, at 53·54. 
167. See id. at 54-55 (stating that credit agencies that collect and report information with respect 
to a debtor's lending histoty are common in the world of commercial fmance). These credit agencies, 
however, do not report whether and to what extent a fmn bas securitized a portion of its assets. 
168. See Picker, supra note 135, at 657. 
169. See supra text accompanying notes 96-99 (discussing the diminished possibility that the 
purchaser of securitized assets will be involved in the originator's bankruptcy). 
170. Debtors and creditors have different motivations following the extension ofcredit. Post credit 
extension, a creditor is interested in decreasing the risk of the loan, thereby increasing its effective 
interest rate. The debtor, by conttast, has the incentive to engage in riskier behavior, thus retroactively 
decreasing the effective interest rate charged. See BAIRD & JACKSON, supra note 144, at 373. This 
incentive has been referred to as the phenomenon of "the threat of debtor misbehavior. • Jackson & 
Kronman, supra note 126, at 1150, 1149-50; see also Schwanz, supra note 120, at 9-10 (discussing 
debtor pursuit of higher-risk projects after making loans, thereby reducing retroactively the loans' 
effective interest rates). 
171. The degree to which unsecured creditors will ·monitor the debtor depends upon their 
perception of the "risk that the debtor will misbehave." Jackson & Kronman, supra note 126, at 1151, 
1150-51. 
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the creditor will be unable to preempt a catastrophic event that leads to 
default. 172 Furthermore, monitoring by an unsecured creditor is expen­
sive and should result in a higher interest rate charged for the credit; 
correspondingly, a relationship in the absence of monitoring should require 
higher interest costs. 173 Because, however, unsecured creditors of securi­
tizing firms are not operating in a world of perfect information, 174 they 
may not lmow or understand the extent to which the debtor is being mon­
itored and, as such, they may find themselves in either a position of bear­
ing higher risk or higher expenses than if their debtor used its assets as 
collateral for a secured loan. 
d. Securitization results in a general increase in the availability 
of credit (and is this a good thing?).-Securitization, with its focus on the 
quality of the assets to be securitized and not the general credit quality of 
the originator, may, in some circumstances, make credit more available to 
an increasing number and variety of entities.175 Securitization may be the 
only way for a particular originator to raise money. As a result, securitiz­
ation may benefit a securitizing entity's unsecured creditors by increasing 
the overall liquidity of the borrowing party. 176 If securitization results 
in the improvement of the financial health of the originator and thus signals 
the continuation of the originator, securitization should give comfort to 
those unsecured creditors who rely on the cash flow of their debtor's 
business-the so-called "cash-flow surfers. " 177 Once the originator's 
assets are sold (securitized), the originator is "awash with cash." 178 
Arguably, the unsecured then have a fur better chance of getting paid. 179 
This justification, however, rests upon a fundamental assumption: that 
the cash that results from the liquidated assets is used to pay unsecured 
172. See id. at 1150. 
173. See id. at 1149-50. 
174. Su supra section ffi(B)(3). 
175. Su GeoQ!e J. Bentson, 1he Future ofAsset Sea.ritization: 1he Benefits and Costs ofBreoking 
up the Bank, in THE GLOBAL AssEr BACKED SECURITIES MARKET, supra note 5, at 3, 4-6. 
176. See supra subpart ffi(B). 
177. This term originated in Professor Lynn M. LoPucki's article, 1he Unsecured Creditor's 
Bargain. In this article, Professor LoPucki describes two types ofunsccured lending: (I) "asset-based" 
unsecured lending, and (2) "cash-flow surfing. • Lynn M. LoPucki, 1he Unsecured Credilor's 
Bargain, 80 VA. L. REv. 1887, 1891 (1994). Asset-based unsecured lending is "functionally 
indistinguishable from secured lending, • in that unsecured creditors rely upon the unencumbered assets 
of the borrower for their rccovezy in the event of liquidation. Id. at 1924, 1924-31. In contrast, 
unsecured creditors arc cash-flow surfers when they rely upon the debtor's cash flow for repayment. 
See id. at 1931-47. 
178. See Paul M. Shupack, 1he Politics of Article 9: On Boundaries and Dtjinitions: A 
Commentary on Dean Baird, 80 VA. L. REv. 2273, 2298 (1994). 
179. q: LoPucki, supra note 177, at 1938 (explaining that unsecured creditors expect to be paid 
from the debtor's bank account). 
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creditors. Although the originator may choose to channel the cash result­
ing from this increase in liquidity to repay unsecured creditors, it may 
instead spend the cash on inventory that fails to tum over, or on projects 
that do not succeed or do not increase the firm's profitability. What an 
originator chooses to do with an increase in its liquidity is determinative 
of whether such an increase is a benefit or a detriment to its unsecured 
creditors. Because investors have no incentive to monitor an originator 
once the asset transfer is complete, there are even fewer controls on a 
firm's post-securitization behavior than there are on a firm's post-secured­
credit behavior. 180 
This justification for securitization raises the question of whether the 
common welfare is improved by the enhancement of a firm's ability to 
raise cash in the public markets, even though that firm has an unproven 
credit performance or low credit rating. Arguably, firms that have been 
unable to establish a borrowing track record based upon the traditional 
credit profile have one or more indicia that flag them as a credit risk. 
Firms that are a high credit risk are significantly more likely to end up in 
bankruptcy.181 If securitization enables these high-risk firms to transfer 
their highest quality assets to a third party and provides no corresponding 
controls on the consideration for this transfer, upon bankruptcy, the 
unsecured creditors are left with a smaller residual pool of assets to 
share. 182 
Furthermore, as a greater number of financially marginal parties enter 
the securitization market, an increasing number of poorly structured trans­
actions occur because of haste, volume, or simple ineptitude}83 To the 
extent there is a heightened risk factor for the unsecured creditors of 
originators with "well structured" securitization transactions, there is an 
even greater risk for an unsecured creditor of an originator with a· struc­
tured financing destined to collapse. 
The high volume of ABS issuances in recent years has led at least one 
commentator to observe that investors have been so eager to invest in them 
that they have not diligently required that the assets or the company behind 
them "prove their reliability." 184 If the securitized assets are not of high 
180. See supra subsection fV(B)(2)(c) for a discussion of originator monitoring. 
181. See TEREsA A. SUWVAN ET AL., AS WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY AND 
CONSUMER CREDIT IN AMERICA 282-92 (1989) (descn"bing the Joan losses that commercial lenders 
suffer when they extend credit to small businesses). 
182. The decline in consumer credit qualii;Y has inc,.,ased the risk ofpayment delinquencies. The 
"new generation of assers ""' piggybacking on the reputation of traditional asset-backed securities as 
safe inveslmenrs, but many of them have little or no track "'cord. • Woolley, supra note 9, at 64. 
183. See Elstein, supra note 33 ("Sam Tillinghast, managing diRCtor of SuDAmerica Corporate 
Finance •.• said •.. that as mo"' parlies seek to enter the securitization market, they ""' increasingly 
failing to structure deals properly."). 
184. /d. 
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quality or if they do not have sufficient credit enhancement or if the deal 
is structured so that the originator is to absorb the first loss up to a speci­
fied level, I&S the originator's remaining assets will be further drained, 
leaving even fewer assets in its residual pool. 
C. Consent as an Implicit Assumption 
The implicit assumption supporting each of these justifications for 
secured credit, as well as for the proliferation of securitization transactions, 
is that unsecured creditors consented to their status. This implied consent 
suggests that unsecured creditors (1) have agreed to whatever consequences 
the law attaches to their credit extension, and (2) have contracted with per­
fect information. 186 
This "bargain model" of secured credit was originally articulated by 
Professor Thomas Jackson. 187 His theory "view[s] bankruptcy as a 
system designed to mirror the agreement one would expect the creditors to 
form among themselves were they able to negotiate such an agreement 
from an ex ante position."188 The bargain model is based on the idea 
that the pre-bankruptcy position of creditors should be altered in bank­
ruptcy only when such an alteration maximizes the net repayment of assets 
as a collective. 189 Th the extent that the failure of a debtor's business is 
anticipated by the creditors' pre-bankruptcy bargain, allowances and 
adjustments were made at the time of the bargain. 190 It is the job of the 
bankruptcy laws to provide the omitted terms of the bargain for those 
parties who had no opportunity to participate in the bankruptcy 
process-the unsecured creditors. 191 
185. See Rosenthal & Ocampo, supra note 5, at 35 (noting that a successful securitization lowers 
the cost of lending by reducing a portion of the needed equity capital and funding yield premiums). 
186. See generally Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policymaking in an /mpeifect World, 92 MICH. 
L. REv. 336 (1993) (outlining and comprehensively analyzing various theories ofbusiness bankruptcy­
policy objectives). 
187. Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors' Bargain, 
91 YALE L.J. 857, 860 (1982). The "bargain model" is a shift from the conveyance model of secured 
credit which is a property based theozy. The conveyance model views security as a grant of property 
that leaves the debtor with the use and ownership of the collateral, but without the ability to commit 
the property to unsecured creditors. See Steve Knippenberg, The Polilics ofArticle 9: The Unsecured 
Creditor's Bargain: An Essay in Reply, Reprisal, or Support?, 80 VA. L. REv. 1967, 1968 (1994). 
188. See Jackson, supra note 187, at 860. 
189. See Thomas H. Jackson & Robert E. Scott, On the Nature ofBankruptcy: An Essay on 
Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditors' Bargain, 15 VA. L. REv. ISS, 155-56 (1989) ("[P]rebankruptcy 
entitlements should be impaired in bankruptcy only when necessazy to maximize net asset disttibutions 
to the creditors as a group ••.•"). 
190. See id. at 160-61 (explaining that creditors consider the risk of insolvency, both when 
deciding whether to take a security interest and when deciding the terms of the security interest). 
191. Cf. id. at !58 (asserting that a "primary objective" ofbankruptcy Jaw is to regulate "conflicts 
among different groups having separate claims against a debtor's assets and income stream"). 
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Professor Lynn LoPucki forcefully challenged the assumption of con­
sent in a recent article advocating the reordering of the priority scheme for 
certain specified creditors. 192 In The Unsecured Creditor's Bargain, 193 
LoPucki contends that secured debt facilitates the exploitation of involun­
tary creditors, as well as voluntary but uninformed creditors, by imposing 
on them a bargain to which they have provided no "meaningful 
consent." 194 He argues that involuntary creditors, such as tort victims 
and environmental claimholders, 195 have no opportunity to negotiate their 
subordinate status and therefore cannot charge an interest rate that offsets 
their heightened risk of non-payment in the event of a debtor's 
insolvency.196 He further argues that uninformed voluntary creditors 
(those participants in the credit markets who miscalculate their likelihood 
of recovery from an insolvent debtor) also fuil to negotiate an interest rate 
premium.197 LoPucki proposes that security interests be subordinated to 
the claims of these voluntary uninformed and involuntary unsecured 
creditors. 198 
The bargain model, when used to explain an unsecured creditor's sub­
ordinate position after its debtor securitizes its valuable assets, is likewise 
based upon fulse assumptions. Neither involuntary nor voluntary unin­
formed unsecured creditors have the information or the opportunity to 
make ex ante adjustments in their bargain to reflect their actual risk. The 
interest rate charged does not reflect the heightened risk they are subject 
to because of the asset securitization. 
Furthermore, although most voluntary uninformed unsecured creditors 
are probably aware that their debtor has the option to incur secured debt, 
they are less likely to be fumiliar enough with the structural intricacies of 
securitization transactions to ask the right questions and understand the 
implications of securitization.199 Because of the complex nature of 
192. See LoPucki, supra note 177. 
193. ld. 
194. See id. at 1890-9!. 
195. Other involuntaiy creditors include insurance claimants; children and fanner spouses; airline 
ticket holders; and victims of securities and other fiauds, including antitrust violations, unfair 
competition, and patent and IIlldemark infringements. See id. at 1896. 
196. See id. at 1893. 
197. See id. at 1916, 1936. These unsecured creditors are often IIlldc creditors or consumers, both 
of whom are less sophisticated, Jess informed, and have less clout in the credit markets than the most 
common secured lenders-that is, money center banks and finance companies. See SuwvAN ET AL., 
supra note 181, at 287-88, 293. 
198. See LoPucki, supra note 177, at 1963-64. But see Susan Block-Lieb, The Unsecured 
Creditor's Bargain: A Reply, 80 VA. L. REv. 1989, 1991 (1994) {challenging LoPucki's conclusion that 
the subordination of secured debt to involuntaty debt is the most effective means of internalizing the 
risk of exposure to claims brought by involuntaiy creditors)·. 
199. Indeed, commentators have often noted that many ABS investors do not understand the risks 
involved in securitization IIllnsactions. See supra notes 9-116; see also Frederick Dannen, 1he Failed 
Promise ofAsset-Backed Securities. INSITIUTJONAL lNvEsroR, Oct. 1DAQ •t 260. 
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securitization, even these unsecured creditors may not know how to eval­
uate a finn with a securitized portfolio. They may not be equipped to 
effectively analyze the extent to which risk is retained by the securitizing 
finn or to understand how to quantify the finn's loss and prepayment 
assumptions. Securitization documentation is considerably more complex 
than the documents customarily prepared in connection with secured 
lending, and the party conducting the diligence must be alert to the issues 
of hidden liabilities, unacceptable operational constraints, and the various 
economic, operational, and reporting obligations incurred. 200 
Finally, the unsecured creditor must be prepared to respond to any 
representations, warranties, and covenants found in the securitization doc­
umentation that unduly restrict the finn's future ability to operate in a way 
that benefits the creditor. The creditor should also be wary of any alter­
ation in assumptions made at the time of the securitization that adversely 
affects it. The unsecured creditor needs to know whether the transaction 
will interfere with its contractual relationship with the debtor-originator 
and, if so, whether the parties can make a correction in a previously neg­
otiated interest rate. It is not at all clear, however, that the information 
sought by even the most tenacious unsecured creditor will be discoverable 
or comprehensible.201 As such, it is unrealistic to assume that full 
information and consent have informed the interest rate charged by these 
largely uninformed or involuntary unsecured creditors. 
To illustrate the extent to which unsecured creditors are excluded from 
the pre-bankruptcy bargaining process, suppose the securitizing finn is a 
consumer retailer and the receivables securitized are credit card accounts. 
The consumer goods customer's purchases that result in accounts receivable 
are purchased with service contracts or repair or replacement warranties, 
200. For a discussion of the challenges facing parties that attempt to examine a securitizing 
originator's portfolio of assets, see supra nole 116. 
201. The fmancialliler.~ture has proudly proclaimed that securitization is advantageous because 
a securitizing firm is not required to disclose to the public information about its business to the same 
exlent it is n:quired to do so in connection with a direct public offering. Wben an originator securitizes 
its assets, securities are issued by the affllialed SPC, r.~ther than directly by the issuer. Because the 
substantive information relevant to the market includes (I) the asset pool's quality, (2) the presence and 
nature ofany credit enhancement, (3) the tranSaction's sttucture, (4) an analysis of the entity providing 
the servicing of these assets, and (5) the nature of the SPC itself, the amount and type of information 
that needs to be disclosed is not of the same type and magnitude as would be the case if the originator 
were the direc• security issuer; the complete business and financial histocy of the originator does not 
have to be included in the security disclosure documents. Although the public disclosure that is 
required for a public issuance ofABS is far greater than that n:quired for a privalely secured financing, 
it does not rise to the level required of a firm that is directly issuing securities in the public markets. 
This type of abbrevialed disclosure is less expensive, less time-<:onsuming to complele and assemble, 
and does not require a firm to n:vcal itself for fuU public scrutiny. From the peiSpective of the 
originator, this may prove to be a valuable advantage. See Barmat, supra nole 16, at 5 (noting that 
nondisclosure is one of the compelling reasons to securitize assets). 
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and these customers are entitled to their money back or an exchange if the 
goods are defective. 
If a portion of these credit card accounts are sold (securitized), and 
therefore not available to satisfy the warranty claims of the originator's 
customers,202 the purchase risks of the customers are increased and their 
unsecured claims against the firm will be more difficult to satisfy. As a 
result, consumers who purchase goods from firms that securitize a portion 
of their assets are more likely to become unpaid unsecured creditors than 
consumers who purchase from firms that have only secured credit. As 
such, the securitizing firms should charge these consumers/potential unse­
cured creditors lower prices. 203 
If the consumers/potential unsecured creditors are unaware of the 
retailer's securitization, the prices they are willing to pay for the goods of 
securitizing firms will be unaffected by the securitization. The consumers 
(and other unsecured creditors with claims against this retailer) will conse­
quently pay higher prices than they should pay and the securitizing firm 
will enjoy the transactional inefficiency surplus, at the expense of the 
unknowing or involuntary unsecured claimants.204 
If a securitizing firm ultimately declares bankruptcy, uninformed and 
involuntary unsecured creditors may find themselves in an even less advan­
tageous position. Unless the integrity of the transaction's structure is 
challenged,205 a securitizing firm is transferring assets out of its potential 
bankruptcy estate and consequently, in the event of a bankruptcy, these 
assets are not available to the firm's unsecured creditors. As such, the 
asset purchasers are not motivated to aid the firm in preserving the value 
of the estate. Not surprisingly, the securitizing firm's unsecured creditors 
are assuming a risk of nonpayment, as a result of the securitization, that is 
arguably greater than the risk unsecured creditors experience when their 
debtor borrows money on a secured basis. 
In contrast, in a secured lending arrangement, if the debtor enters 
bankruptcy, the collateralized assets remain in the debtor's estate and the 
debtor gets the benefit (the upside potential) of any increase in value of a 
collateralized asset during the pendency of the bankruptcy proceeding. 206 
202. Presumably, the credit can! accounts receivable sold (securitized) will be the highest quality 
pool, leaving those accounts of the less credit-worthy debtors behind for the benefit of that originator's 
general creditors in the event of a bankruptcy. See Gold & Schlueter, supra note 57, at !54-56 
(outlining the asset-risk analysis conducted by rating agencies to identify and minimize potential credit­
related problems). 
203. These lower prices are the product-market equivalent of the higher interest rates that 
unsecured creditors should charge to a firm that securitizes assets (or issues secured debt). 
204. This illustration has its origin in Schwartz, supra note 120, at 16-18 (illustrating the failure 
of secured debt, though not securitization, to adequately signal risks to creditors). 
205. See infra subpan IV(D). 
206. The secured creditors, if overcollateralized, are entitled to interest and contracted-for costs 
pursuant to Bankruptcy Code § 506(b) to the extent of any sutplus v'!lue in the collateral. See 11 
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The secured creditor is required to participate in the debtor's bankruptcy 
and is motivated to encourage the preservation of the estate; in the event 
of a decrease in the value of the collateral, the estate may be the pool from 
which it receives a portion of its recovery. 207 The secured creditor may 
not just walk away from the debtor in bankruptcy with its collateral-it is 
constrained by the automatic stay imposed at the time of the bankruptcy 
filing, and the debtor has use of the collateral during the pendency of the 
bankruptcy if the stay is not lifted. 208 Thus, the relationship established 
between the debtor and the secured lender survives the debtor's 
bankruptcy, which has the potential to benefit the unsecured creditors. 
Because of the different relationship ABS purchasers have with their 
financing seeking originator, the interest rates charged the securitizing orig­
inator by its unsecured creditors should be higher than those charged to 
debtors whose other funding comes from secured credit. If the unsecured 
interest rate does indeed reflect the risk differential, then one can conclude 
that securitization, pursuant to the analysis laid out by Jackson and 
Kronman, is indeed efficient. This analysis, however, rests upon the 
fundamental assumption of perfect information and fully informed consent 
by the unsecured creditors. This assumption, subject to considerable chal­
lenge when applied to secured credit, is even less reliable when a firm with 
unsecured creditors is securitizing assets. 
U.S.C. § 506(b) (1994). If. during !he pendency of !he bankruptcy, the collateral inc.,ases in value 
in excess of the obligation owed to the secuROd party, that value is available for the benefit of the 
debtor's unsecuROd eROditors. See ll U.S.C. § 506(a)-(b). 
207. Pursuant to Bankruptcy Code § 506(a), a claim is secuROd to the extent of the value of the 
collateral and is unsecuROd as to any deficiency in the collateral. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(b). An 
undersecuROd claim is thus bifurcated into a secu"'d and unsecu"'d claim. The portion of the claim that 
is unsecuROd is mated the same as any other unsecuROd claim. See id. § 506(a). 
208. Section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code oudines the types and kinds of activities engaged in by 
cROditors that must be halted once bankruptcy is declaROd. See I 1 U .S.C. § 362 (listing several activi­
ties that a"' stayed once a bankruptcy petition is filed, including: judicial and administrative actions 
against the debtor that could have been commenced befo"' bankruptcy, enforcement of judgments 
against the debtor, actions to obtain possession of property ofthe estate, and actions to create or perfect 
any lien against the property of the estate). Pursuant to the automatic-stay provision, all collection 
efforts by cROditors must stop automatically upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition. See id. § 362(a). 
Furthermo.,, the stay freezes the cROditors' state-law relationships among themselves and maintains the 
priority positions in effect upon filing. See id. CROditors are also Stayed from pursuing any and all 
legal and administrative actions against the debtor and his property, including any action undertaken 
to create or enforce a lien. See id. This means that secuROd cROditors may not enforce their security 
inte.,sts by levying upon property in which they have a security inte.,st. See id. The stay with respect 
to the collateral of a particular cROditor. however, may be lifted by a court following an application for 
relief from the stay pursuant to§ 362(d). Section 362(d) sets out two separate grounds for relief from 
the stay. First, a court will lift the stay if the cROditor. successfully claims that it lacks "adequate 
protection. • Id. § 362(d). The second ground is relied upon when the debtor has no equity in the 
property, and such property is not necessary for an effective reoQ!anization. See id. 
636 Texas Law Review [Vol. 76:595 
D. Equitable Challenges to Securitiltltion TTansactions 
The best that may be concluded in the absence of empirical evidence 
is that the justifications for securitization are unpersuasive and unproven. 
Securitized transactions may be efficient, or they may be inefficient, with 
unsecured creditors subject to effects which are in many circumstances 
more detrimental than those effects they are subject to when their borrower 
uses its assets as collateral for a secured loan. 
Unsecured creditors of securitizing originators may be exposed to the 
further risk that a bankruptcy court, in scrutinizing a structured finance 
transaction, will reverse the asset transfer in the exercise of its equitable 
discretion. The ensuing litigation will be expensive, time consuming, and, 
until there has been a full resolution of this issue, will lead to even greater 
uncertainty in the credit markets. 
Bankruptcy courts' equitable powers were codified in section 105(a) 
of the Bankruptcy Code. 209 That section authorizes a court to "issue any 
order . . . necessary or appropriate to carry out provisions of this 
title. "210 Notwithstanding the apparent breadth of this Code language, 
the Supreme Court has taken a narrow view of its equitable powers under 
the Code.211 In the last Supreme Court case decided under the 
Bankruptcy Act, Butner v. United States, 212 the Court addressed the 
question of whether applicable state law or a "federal rule of equity" 
should be applied in deciding which party had the right to rents collected 
during bankruptcy.213 The Court distinguished between bankruptcy 
courts' powers as courts of equity and their equitable interpretation of the 
Bankruptcy Act and recognized the importance of the courts' equity powers 
in dealing with "particular, individualized problems. "214 The Court, 
however, made clear its hostility to a purely equitable interpretation of the 
Code in refusing to adopt a uniform federal rule on the basis of "undefined 
considerations of equity. " 215 
209. See 11 U.S.C. § 10S(a). 
210. /d. 
211. Bankruptcy courts we~e mo~e liberal in the use of their equiiable powers under the 
Bankruptcy Act. Their broad use of equiiable interpielations of the Act evolved from the efforts of 
judges to fill in the gaps left by the language of the slatute. The Bankruptcy Act, which had not been 
amended in many years, did not reflect the conunercial Iealities of the day. As such, judges we~e left 
to use their equiiable disc~etion to further the underlying goals of bankruptcy. See Adam James 
Wiensch, Note, The Supreme Court, Textualism, and the Treatment ofPre-Bankruptcy Cade Law, 79 
GEO. LJ. 1831, 1860 (1991). 
212. 440 U.S. 48 (1979). Butner was decided with reference to the provisions of the Bankruptcy 
Act, but after Cong~ess's enactment of the Bankruptcy Code. 
213. /d. at 49. 
214. /d. at S6, SS-S6. 

21S. /d. at S6. 
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In NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco,216 the Supreme Court decided the 
issue of whether collective bargaining agreements were covered by section 
365(a) by looking to the plain meaning of the language of the Code. 217 
The Court refused to consider the equitable, public-policy arguments advo­
cating for collective bargaining agreements' exemption from this section 
offered by the National Labor Relations Board and the union. 218 The 
Court admonished bankruptcy courts to limit the use of their equitable 
powers by requiring a written finding on the record if the "equities" 
weighed in favor of the rejection of collective bargaining agreements. 219 
The Supreme Court further refined the contours of its view of the 
equitable powers of bankruptcy courts in Norwest Bank Worthington v. 
Ahlers.m In Ahlers, the Court was faced with the question of whether 
a claim for an exception to the absolute priority rule, supported by both 
pre-Code practice and a variety of equitable justifications, should be 
allowed.221 The Court dismissed the equitable arguments offered by the 
debtor and expressly stated, "[W]hatever equitable powers remain in the 
bankruptcy courts must and can only be exercised within the confines of 
the Bankruptcy Code. "222 
216. 465 u.s. 513 (1984). 
217. See id. at 521-23. 
218. See id. at 525, 524-27. The Coun unanimously concluded !hat collective bargaining agree­
ments were covered by § 365(a) of the Bankruptcy Code because, "by its tenns[, it] includes all 
executory contracts except those expressly exempted. • ]d. at 521. The Coun observed that Congress 
had expressly exempted collective bargaining agreements from other sections ofthe Code, thus indicat­
ing its intent to include them under the language of§ 365(a). See id. at 522. The Coun's reading of 
the Code in this case can be characterized as "teXrualism" because it strictly focused on the language 
and strucrure of the Code, ignoring the public policy implications (and arguably the third-party effects) 
of its interpretation. See Peter H. Carroll, ill, literalism: The United States Supreme Coun's 
Methodology for Statutory Construction in Bankruptcy Coses, 25 ST. MARY'S LJ. 143 (1993); Carlos 
J. Cuevas, Pliblic Values and the Bankruptcy Code, 12 BANKR. DEVS. J. 645, 645-46 (1996); Walter 
A. Effross, Grammarians at the Gate: The Rehnquist Coun's Evolving "Plllin Meaning• Approach to 
Bankruptcy Jurisprudence, 23 SETON HALL L. REV. 1636, 1638-39 (1993); Roben K. Rasmussen, A 
Study ofthe Costs and Benefits ofTextualism: The Supreme Coun's Bankruptcy Coses, 71 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 535, 565 (1993); Charles Jordan Tabb & Roben M. Lawless, Of Commas, Gerunds, and 
Conjunctions: The Bankruptcy Jurisprudence ofthe Rehnquist Coun, 42 SYRACUSE L. REV. 823, 825 
(1991) (all acknowledging that textualism is a primary method of interpreting the Bankruptcy Code and 
is one used extensively by the Supreme Coun). 
219. See Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 527. The Coun stated, "The Bankruptcy Code does notauthorize 
freewheeling consideration of every conceivable equily, but rather only how the equities relate to the 
success of the reorganization. • ld. It is interesting to note that organized labor successfully lobbied 
for the legislative repeal of this decision. See 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (1994) (prohibiting the unilateral 
rejection of a collective bargaining agreement by a trustee, requiring first a coun hearing and ruling); 
H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 98-882 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 576 (containing several state­
ments from congressional leaders who reference organized labor). 
220. 485 u.s. 197 (1988). 
221. See id. at 199. The debtors in Ahlers were farmers who promised to contribute their "labor, 
experience, and expertise• to the reorganization of their farm in rerum for retaining an equicy interest 
in it. The Coun rejected this unenforceable promise and held that there was not a permissible 
exception to the plain statutory language of the absolute priorily rule. See id. at 203.C5. 
222. Id. at 206. 
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It is clear from this line of cases that bankruptcy courts do not have 
unbridled equitable powers under section 105(a). Courts do, however, 
have the power to scrutinize asset transfers and the circumstances sur­
rounding such transfers. Such scrutinization may lead a court to conclude 
(1) that the circumstances suggest that the asset transfer ought to be rechar­
acterized as a transfer of collateral in connection with a secured loan, 
rather than an asset sale; (2) that, because "economic prejudice caused by 
continued entity separateness outweighs the potential prejudice that 
accompanies consolidation, "223 the assets and liabilities of the SPC should 
be substantively consolidated for bankruptcy purposes with the assets and 
liabilities of the originator; or (3) that the asset transfer, in unjustly dimin­
ishing the debtor/originator's bankruptcy estate, falls within the prohibi­
tions of fraudulent transfer law.224 
If courts adopt any of these bases for concluding that securitization 
transfers should be undone when the originator is in bankruptcy, further 
harm will be done to the originator's unsecured creditors. 
1. When the Equities Suggest that Assets- Transferred Are Really 
Disguised Collateral for a Secured Loan.-If a transaction under the bank­
ruptcy trustee's scrutiny involves the retention of some measure of 
recourse, risk, or control by the originator in connection with the asset 
transfer,225 the trustee can make the argument that the transfer of assets 
was a transfer of collateral for a loan, rather than a sale of assets.226 
Historically, courts have exercised some latitude in determining whether or 
not a certain asset transfer was a sale or a transfer of collateral for a 
loan.227 
223. J. Stephen Gilben, Note, Substantive Consolidation in Bankroptcy: A Primer, 43 V AND. L. 
REv. 207, 208 (1990); see also Christopher W. Frost, Organizational Form, Misappropriation Risk, 
and the Substantive Consolidation of Corporate Groups, 44 HAsTINGS L.J. 449, 449-51 (1993) 
(discussing the effects of substantive consolidation). 
224. See infra sections IV(D)(2}·(3). 
225. If the value of the collateral is less than the debtor's outstanding obligations to the lender, 
a lender with recourse may sue the debtor personally on the note, seeking full payment. See ROBERT 
W. HAMILTON, FUNDAMENTALS OF MODERN BUSINESS 9 (1989). For a discussion of recourse and 
retained risk, see supra notes 75, 77, 106. 
226. See, e.g., Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Grover (In re Woodson Co.), 813 F.2d 266, 271-72 
(9th Cir. 1987) (concluding that, because the investor retained a degree of risk in connection with a 
!Iansfer and the interest rate charged was tied to prevailing borrowing rates, the !Iansfer was a loan, 
rather than a sale). 
227. See id.; see also Robert D. Aicher & William J. Fellerbof, CharacterizPtion ofa Transfer 
ofReceivables as a Sale or Secured Loan upon the Bankruptcy ofthe Transferor, 65 AM. BANKR. LJ. 
181, 183, 182-84 (1991) ("[A] bankruptcy court's conclusion that a tl3nsfer is indeed a secured loan 
may depend on the context in which the court examines the issue."); Thomas E. Plank, 1he True Sale 
ofLoans and the Role ofRecourse, 14 GEO. MAsoN L. REV. 287. 290 (1991) ("[C]ourts do not rely 
upon any universally accepted set of factors in detertnining whether a purported sale is a true sale or 
merely a transfer as security for a secondary Joan."); Peter L. Mancini, Note, Bankruptcy and the UCC 
as Applied to Securitization: Characterizing a Mon~aveLoan Transfer f!S n Sale or a Secured Loan, 
. - - s 
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Whether a particular asset transfer is a true sale or a secured loan is 
not governed by a bright-line test. 228 Parties may intend one 
characterization, but the facts and circumstances of the transfer may 
suggest another.229 Courts faced with "true sale versus secured loan" 
questions have made reference to a number of relevant factors, the pres­
ence of a critical mass of which would suggest a true sale. These factors 
include the intent of the parties as evidenced by their writings, 230 the 
absence of recourse to the asset seller,231 the presence of a residual inter­
est to be retained by the originator, 232 the sale price set at fair market 
value by independent appraisers,233 the assumption of the bene.fits and 
burdens of ownership by the purchaser,234 and the acquisition of domin­
ion and control over the assets by the acquirer. 235 Many securitization 
73 B.U. L. REv. 873. 877, 877-82 (1993){"The UCC ••. does not establish ••• relevant guidelines 
to detennine whether the parties intended a particular ttansfer to represent a loan with a security interest 
or a sale."). 
228. See Aicher & Fellerbof, supra note 227, at 182-84. 
229. See, e.g., Castle Rock Indus. Bank v. S.O.A.W. Enters., Inc. (In re S.O.A.W. Enters., 
Inc.), 32 B.R. 279,283 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1983) (stating that even though the participation agreement 
in a loan-participation anangement discussed the "'sale of a participation?" the arrangement should be 
considered a loan because, in reality, it contemplated the making of a loan to be secured by collateral); 
Boerner v. Colwell Co., 577 P.2d 200, 204-05 (Cal. 1978) (postulating that the substance, not the 
form, of the ttansaction dictated whether the ttansfer of construction conttacts constituted bona fide 
credit sales rather than usurious loans). 
230. See, e.g., Hatoff v. Lemons & Assocs. (In re Lemons & Assocs.), 67 B.R. 198, 209-10 
(Bankr. D. Nev. 1986) (basing its decision on the weight of objective manifestations of the parties' 
intent to consummate a sale transaction, including executed agreements and other documentary 
evidence). 
231. See, e.g., Major's Furniture Mart, luc. v. Castle Credit Cmp., 602 F.2d 538, 542-44 (3d 
Cir. 1979) (noting that the absence of recourse to the seller is one of several relevant factors in 
detennining the existence of a uue sale). 
232. See, e.g.,ln re Evergreen Valley Resort, Inc., 23 B.R. 659, 661 (Bankr. D. Me. 1982) ("A 
security interest is indicated where the assignee retains a right to a deficiency on the debt ...."); First 
Nat'! Bank v. Hurricane Elkhorn Coal Corp. ll (In re Hurricane Elkhorn Coal Corp. ll), 19 B.R. 609, 
614-15 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1982) (determining that because assignments ofaccounts receivable did not 
divest the debtor of all interest in the receivables, the assignments were given as security for a bank 
loan), ajf'd in part and rev'd in part, 32 B.R. 737 (W.D. Ky. 1983), ajf'd, 763 F.2d 188 (6th Cir. 
!985); Credit Alliance Corp. v. Nixon Mach. Co. (In re Nixon Mach. Co.), 6 B.R. 847, 850 ( Bankr. 
E.D. Tenn. 1980) ("A Chapter 11 ..• debtor's property generally is anything in which it has an 
interest."). 
233. S.e, e.g.,/nreCoronetCapital Co.,l42B.R. 78,80 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992){stating that 
a discrepancy between the interest rate due on the underlying note and the interest rate specified in the 
participation is a factor indicating an intention to create a loan rather than a participation). 
234. See, e.g., Federated Dept. Stores, Inc. v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 500, 514-15 (!968) 
(holding that because the taxpayer was required to pay an indexed interest rate on the exact amount of 
the outstanding balance in connection with the ttansfer ofaccounts, and was further required to pledge 
future accounts when an account the taxpayer characterized as sold became delinquent, such ttansfer 
was deemed to be a secured loan), ajf'd, 426 F.2d 417 (6th Cir. 1970). 
235. Courts have identified the following additional factors in determining whether a ttansfcr is 
a true sale or secured loan: 
a. whether the transaction covers specifically identified receivables, rather than an 
interest in a pooJ of receivables; 
b. whether notice ofllh8>llllll&blc of the receivableds-given<tolllmaoammt debtors; 
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transactions, however, combine indicia of both a true sale and a secured 
loan, which makes a court's ultimate decision an exercise in the weighing 
and balancing of these factors. 236 
Further confusing courts and complicating the true sale analysis is the 
fact that an asset transfer may constitute a sale for accounting purposes and 
yet not be deemed to be a sale pursuant to the equities of bankruptcy.237 
If certain specified indicia of recourse are present, 238 then the transaction 
is considered a sale under the FASB rules. Bankruptcy courts, however, 
have historically taken a broader view, giving consideration to a long list 
of factors, including but not limited to, the presence of recourse when 
analyzing the sale versus loan issue.239 Bankruptcy courts, however, 
have applied the "true sale" factors inconsistently. 
Those transaction participants who exercise their creativity and 
develop new types of securitization structures offer a further challenge to 
c. whether the purchase price of the receivables is computed with reference to the 
expected life of the receivables. rather than by means of some interest-like monthly 
payment program. A purchase ofassets at a fixed discount. which covers projected 
funding costs, is more like a sale than a purchase based on a floating rate, which 
is typically found in commercial loans; 
d. whether the purchaser has no ability to alter the terms of a sale after the closing 
and the originator has no right to receive any SUI]llus collections of transferred 
assets; 
e. whether the related books and records are transferred and delivered to the 
purchaser. This may not be the case. however. if the originator contracts to 
service the receivables. 
See Dewhirst v. Cin"bank (In re Contractors Equip. Supply Co.), 861 F.2d 241, 245 (9th Cir. 1988); 
Glover, supra note 5, at 621; Peter H. Wei!, Bankruptcy Issues for the Secured Creditor, in AssET­
BASED LENDING INCLUDING COMMERCIAL FINANCE AND ACQUISfTION FINANCING 1991, at 421, 424­
26 ( PLI Commerical Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 563, 1991). 
236. See, e.g., Major's Furniture, 602 F.2d at 544 (characterizing the legally relevant question 
as "whether the nature of the recourse, and the true nalllre of the transaction, are such that the legal 
rights and economic consequences of the agreement bear a greater similarity to a financing transaction 
or to a sale" (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted)). 
237. Rules promulgated by the FASB have stated that a transaction should be treated as a true sale 
rather than a secured loan for accounting pUIJlOSes if the following factors are present: "The transferor 
surrenders control of the furore economic benefits embodied in the receivables ..•• The transferor's 
obligation under the recourse provisions can be reasonably estimated • • • . The transferee cannot 
require the transferor to repurchase the receivables ·except pursuant to the recourse provisions. • 
ORIGINAL PRONOUNCEMENTS: ACCOUNTING SrANDARDS AS OF JUNE 1, 1990, Statement of Financial 
Accounting Standards No. 77, at 755, 756-57 (Financial Accounting Standards Bd. 1990). Bankruptey 
courts, however, at times have nsed their equitable discretion to conclude that, notwithstanding the 
presence ofseveral substantive indicia that an asset transfer was a true sale, the bankruptey court should 
also consider the equities of the matter when construing the transfer. See, e.g., Hatoff v. Lemons & 
Assocs. (In re Lemons & Assocs.), 67 B.R. 198, 210-13 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1986) (weighing the sale 
versus loan indicia, and concluding that the transfer was in fact a sale); see also supra note 106 and 
accompanying text. 
238. See supra note 106 (defining a "transfer with recourse"). 
239. See supra rext accompanying notes 216-25 (explaining how courts scrutinize and define asset 
transfers). 
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trustees who are inherently suspicious of this type of financing. 240 This 
kind of financial creativity may provide the impetus for a court, already 
uncomfortable about securitization's potential for circumventing the bank­
ruptcy process, to recharacterize the asset transfer as a transfer of collateral 
due to the presence of recourse. 
Incontrovertibly, this discretion allows bankruptcy judges the latitude 
to agree with a trustee who argues that securitization transactions are 
nothing more than extravagant and embellished security interests designed 
to circumvent the bankruptcy process, and to conclude that, notwithstand­
ing the presence of certain "true sale" indicia, the asset transfer should be 
deemed to be a secured loan. If a court is persuaded that securitization 
financing is tantamount to a disguised secured financing transaction, it is 
likely to look through the transaction's form and take steps to protect the 
debtor's unsecured creditors from the effects of the complete removal of 
valuable assets from the debtor's bankruptcy estate. 241 
Dlustrative of the uncertainty that reigns with respect to this issue is 
the common reluctance on the part of legal advisors to definitively con­
clude that a specific asset transfer is a true sale. 242 As stated previously, 
240. For example, Professor Steven L. Schwarcz suggesiS a strucrure that theoretically enables an 
originator to receive both the benefit of the upside potential of securitized asseiS as well as shielding 
the asset investors from the effeciS of the originator's bankruptcy. See Schwarcz, Alchemy, supra note 
5, at 135-36. Professor Schwarcz explains in his article how selling receivables to an SPC, which in 
rum transfers iiS receivables to an independent SPC, can best protect the originator's asseiS: 
[ T]he originator first sells receivables to a wholly owned SP[C] in a transaction that 
constirutes a true sale for bankruptcy purposes and thus achieves bankruptcy protection. 
The wholly owned SP[C] then transfers iiS receivables to an independent SP[C] in a 
transaction that constirutes a sale for accounting purposes but not necessarily for 
bankruptcy purposes. The independent SP[C] issues securities in the capital markeiS to 
fund the transfer. After the independent SP[C] pays off the securities, it can reconvey the 
remaining receivables and collections to the wholly owned SP[C] without impairing the 
accounting characterization as a sale. The wholly owned SP[C] is then merged into the 
originator, or alternatively, the remaining receivables and collections are transferred back 
to the originator as dividends. This SU11crure thus allows the originator to realize the 
value of excess receivables and collections created by the original overcollateralization. 
/d. at 142. 
241. UCC § 9-102(1)(b) requires that, subject to certain exceptions, Article 9 will "apply to any 
sale of accouniS or chattel paper. • U.C.C. § 9-102(1)(b) (1994). Section 9-302 requires that 
purchasers of accouniS file a financing statement to perfect their interest in such accouniS. See id. § 9­
302(1). If the purchaser fails to file and, thus, fails to perfect iiS interest, upon the debtor's bankruptcy 
the trustee may avoid the asset transfer and rerum the asset to the debtor's bankruptcy estate. See id. 
§§ 9-102, 9-302; supra note 158. 
242. Historically, legal advisors would not give opinions with respect to bankruptcy issues, due 
to the equitable discretion afforded bankruptcy couriS. As an increasing number of strucrured finance 
transactions came to market in the 1980s, rating agencies began to require legal opinions on certain 
bankruptcy issues that affected their rating process. See TriBar Report, supra note 54. at 718-20. See 
generally George W. Bermant, 7he Role ofthe Opinion ofCounsel: A Tentative Reevaluation. 49 CAL. 
Sr. BJ. 132 (1974) (discussing the need for accurate legal opinions to characterize transactions); Scott 
FitzGibbon & Donald W. Glazer, Legal Opinions in Corporate Transactions: 7he Opinion on 
Agreementsand/nstroments, 12 J. CORP. L. 657 (1987) (arguing that standard bankruptcy-qualification 
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rating agencies responsible for evaluating the credit of the ABS put a spe­
cial demand upon originator's counsel to opine that a transaction is struc­
tured so that the purchasers of the ABS are isolated from the potential 
bankruptcy of the originators. w As such it has become common practice 
for law firms to deliver reasoned legal opinions as to the bankruptcy­
remote nature of the transaction's structure.244 Investors may not recog­
nize the subtle, yet significant distinction between a "bankruptcy-remote" 
structure and one that is "bankruptcy-proof" -which is to say, invulnerable 
to the possibility of bankruptcy.245 
In addition, rating agencies may require that the transaction's structure 
provide for a form of recourse to the originator2"6 or the requirement of 
credit enhancement, 247 and in such cases, it is even more difficult to 
deliver the "true sale" opinion. This fact, coupled with rating agencies' 
insistence upon "clean" opinions,248 has led in some instances to an 
ethical race to the bottom, with those firms hungrier for lucrative struc­
tured finance deals expressing a greater willingness to offer unqualified 
opinions, even in the face of legal uncertainty. 249 Although more prudent 
clauses in legal opinions should not prevent attorneys from advising clients about the reasonably 
foreseeable bankruptcy implications of a ttansaction); Robert J. Harter, Jr. & Kenneth N. Klee, The 
Impact ofthe New Bankruptcy Code on the "Bankruptcy Out" in Legal Opinion.s, 48 FORDHAM L. REv. 
277 (1979) (discussing the effect of an enforceability opinion on a "bankruptcy out"); Special Comm. 
on Legal Opinions in Commercial Transactions, N.Y. County Lawyers' Ass'n in Cooperation with 
Corp. Law Comm., Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. and Corp. Law Comm. of the Banking, 
Corp., and Bus. Law Section, N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, Legal Opinion.s to Third Parties: An EDsier Path, 
34 Bus. LAW. 1891 (1979) [hereinafter Legal Opinion.s] (discussing the importance of legal opinions 
in corporate practice and advising how such opinions should be written). 
243. Opinion negotiations between a rating agency and counsel to the securilizing originator have 
as their central theme the struggle between the rating agency's desire to be able to hold the opining 
counsel liable in the event a court concludes that the transaction was not "bankruptcy proof," and the 
opining counsel's desire to insulate and protect itself from liability for false and misleading statements. 
See Legalities in Rating Mortgage-Backed Securities, CREDITREviEW, Oct. 25, 1993, at 9, 9-11 (noting 
that Standard & Poor's often attempts to reduce bankruptcy concerns by securing legal opinions from 
counsel for "bankruptcy-remote" subsidiary companies that the subsidiary will not be consolidated 
should the parent corporation become insolvent); Bottini, supra note 52, at 61 I; TriBar Report, supra 
note 54, at 735-37 (arguing that in order to make lawyers willing to offer bankruptcy opinions, courts 
should recognize the inherent uncertainties of bankruptcy equity power and hold opining counsel liable 
only for negligence); Husisian, supra note 52, at 421. 
244. See TriBar Report, supra note 54, at 721, 734. 
245. See Dannen, supra note 199, at 261. In three well known cases, SPCs ftled for voluntary 
bankruptcy, notwithstanding their bankruptcy-remote strucrure. See In re P.A. Bergner& Co. Holding 
Co., 187 B.R. 964 (Bankr. E.D. Wise. 1995); In re Buckhead Am. Corp., 161 B.R. 11 (Bankr. D. 
Del. 1993); In re Towers Fin. Corp., No. 93-41558 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. fded Mar. 26, 1993). 
246. See Curtin & Deckoff, supra note 38, at 204. 
247. See Rosenthal & Ocampo, supra note 5, at 39. 
248. A "clean opinion" is one that draws unqualified conclusions. TriBar Report, supra note 54, 
at 721. 
249. It is very difficult to impose malpractice liability on a law finn based upon the delivery of 
a legal opinion if there is even a semblance of reasoning supporting the conclusions reached. Cf. 
Richard E. Mendales, Looking Under the Rock: Disclosure ofBankruptcy Issues Under the Securities 
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law firms have been willing to opine as to the efficacy of the transaction's 
structure, they have more cautiously qualified their conclusions and out­
lined the assumptions upon which their opinions are based. 250 
The foregoing illustrates how vulnerable an asset transfer can be when 
the transferor becomes a debtor in banlauptcy. Once banlauptcy is 
declared, an aggressive trustee will be looking for any weakness in the pro­
cess or structure and any inequity in the effects of the asset transfer to bol­
ster its assertion that equitable principles demand a reversion of the trans­
ferred assets to the debtor's banlauptcy estate. As the securitization of 
lower quality assets by marginal originators becomes more common, 
securitization market participants must be prepared for courts to denounce 
such creative structures and take steps to unwind these transactions. 
2. The Equitable Doctrine ofSubstantive Consolidation. -Substantive 
consolidation is an equitable doctrine that involves the pooling of two or 
more entities' assets and results in the claims of one of the entity's credi­
tors being treated as claims against the common fund. 251 A court may 
Laws, 51 OHIO Sr. LJ. 731, 715 (1996) ("It is difficult, but not impossible, to impose liability upon 
attorneys for legal opinions."). During securitization's infancy, the "law" relii:d upon by ttansaction 
advisors may be the lastttansaction's documentation; participants in the fmancial markets have become 
very adept at relying upon previously created structures. The portfolio of securitization transactions 
successfully brought to the market becomes the "common law" relied upon by future parties. Such a 
transaction strucrure may suffice during the period where no coun or legislature has stated otherwise. 
Su Telephone Interview with Professor Richard E. Mendales, University of Miami School of Law 
(Aug. 28, 1996) (on file with the Texas Law Review); see also Thomas P. Hourican, Overview of 
Rating Agency Criteria for Asset-Backed Transactions, in THE HANDBOOK OF AssET-BACKED 
SECURmES, supra note 5, at 34 (stating that "[o]utside counsel to the seller should provide an 
unqualified opinion indicating that the transfer • • . is sufficient to remove the receivables from the 
seller's estate for puiposes of Section 541 of the [Bankruptcy] [C]ode and that Section 362(a) would 
not apply ••• in the event of the seller's bankruptcy"). 
250. Opinions laden with foundational assumptions are known as "reasoned opinions." A 
reasoned, "true sale" legal opinion applies the various true sale factors to the transaction at hand and 
draws a qualified conclusion that the transfer is a true sale rather than a secured fmancing. See TriBar 
Repon, supra note 54, at 721, 734. In a 1983 article, Moody's made a distinction between reasoned 
opinions-in which the basis for reaching a conclusion is oudined in the opinion-and "unqualified" 
or "unequivocal" opinions-in which, in Moody's view, the "risk attendant to the issue opined on has 
in the opinion of such lawyer been 'substantially eliminated.'" TriBar Repon, supra note 54, at 734 
(quoting Moody's Approach to Rating Bank-Supponed Debt Securities, 15 MOODY'S BOND SURVEY 
3979, 3980 (1983)). The TriBar Opinion Committee found Moody's distinction between reasoned 
opinions and unqualified opinions to be "unacceptably simplistic." TriBar Repon, supra note 54, at 
734-35. The Repon by the Special Committee on Legal Opinions in Commercial Transactions takes 
the position that no opinion should be drawn so broadly that the lawyer becomes generally responsible 
for the legal or business risks inherent in a transaction. See Legal Opinions, supra note 242, at 1895. 
Further, the Repon by the Special Committee makes clear that it is inappropriate to seek an 
"unqualified opinion on an uncenain or disputed legal principle. An opinion cannot change the facts 
or the state of the law." !d.; see TriBar Repon, supra note 54, at 726-27, 135. 
251. In one of the early cases outlining tiie contours of the substantive-consolidation doctrine, the 
Second Circuit upheld the lower coun's consolidation ofa liquidating debtor and its non bankrupt affil­
iates because the affiliates were mere "instrumentalities of the bankrupt with no separate existence of 
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decide to substantively consolidate a securitizing originator and its related 
SPC if it appears that the two entities are perceived by the market as one 
entity and the equities of the interest of the firms' creditors are best served 
by a consolidation.252 As one conunentator noted, the trend in recent 
years has been for courts to be more willing to order a substantive consoli­
dation of assets for economically integrated affiliated entities, when such 
an order will aid in the rehabilitation of the debtor and facilitate the admin­
istration of the bankruptcy estate. 253 
their own," and because adherence •to the separate corporate entities theory would result in an injustice 
to the bankrupt's creditors.• Soviero v. Franklin Nat'! Bank, 328 F.2d 446, 448 (2d Cir. 1964). 
Another court bas identified seven factors that should be considered in deciding whether a subslantive 
consolidation of assets should be ordered. See In re Vecco Constr. Indus., 4 B.R. 407, 410 (Bankr. 
E.D. Va. 1980). These factors are: (I) "the presence or absence of consolidated financial slatements, • 
(2) "the unity of interests and ownership between the various corporate entities, • (3) "the existence 
of parent and inter-corporate guarantees on loans, • (4) "the degree of difficulty in segregating and 
ascerlaining individual assets and liabilities, • (S) "the transfer of assets without formal observance of 
corporate formalities, • (6) "the commingling of assets and business functions," and (7) "the 
profilabHity of consolidation at a single physical location." Id.; see also Eastgroup Properties v. 
Southern Motel Ass'n, 935 F.2d 245, 249 (lith Cir. 1991) (holding that consolidation is appropriate 
when the entities are subslantially identical and when the equities favor the consolidation); In re 
Augie/Restivo Banking Co., 860 F.2d 515, 520 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that consolidation was 
inappropriate when the debtors had little in common); In re Auto-Train Corp., 810 F.2d 270, 279-80 
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that a creditor's reliance was sufficient to make consolidation improper, 
when the creditor had relied upon public manifeslations that a subsidiary's assets, liabilities, and 
operations were separate from those of the parent); In re Food Fair, Jne., 10 B.R. 123, 126 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 1981) (applying the In re Vecco factors as a formula and not relying on the weighing and 
balancing of equilable considerations); Joy Flowers Conti, An Analytical Model for Substantive 
Consolidation ofBankruptcy C'a.!es, 38 Bus. LAw. 855, 862 (1983) {proposing an analytical model for 
determining whether or not to apply subslantive consolidation in a bankruptcy case); Frost, supra note 
223 (discussing how bankruptcy courts use the doctrine of subslantive consolidation to disregard the 
separation between commonly owned corporations); Timothy J. Hogan, Substantive Consolidation: 
Observations and Suggestions, 1986 ANN. SURV. BANKR. L. 63 (describing the evolution and scope 
of"the doctrine of subslantive consolidation); Jonathan M. Landers, A Unified Approach to Parent, 
Subsidiary, and Affiliate Questions in Bankruptcy, 42 U. CHI. L. REv. 589 (1975) (discussing the 
problems arising when a corporation affiliated with another corporation becomes bankrupt); W'J!liam 
H. Thornton, The Continuing Presumption Against Substantive Consolidation" !OS BANKING L.J. 448, 
458 (1988) (analyzing the presumption against subslantive consolidation and concluding that 
"[s]ubslantive consolidation should only be ordered over creditor opposition if the proponent has 
successfully borne the burden ofproving either that ntisrepresenlarion has Iaken place or that the affairs 
of the entities concerned are a hopeless bash"). 
252. A bankruptcy court ordered the subslantive consolidation of an SPC and an originator on the 
basis of the court's facrual findings, which included its conclusion that the transfer involved the com­
mingling of bank accounts, the payment of all expenses from one joint account, an enlangled relation­
ship among the parties, and the reliance by creditors on the credit of the consolidated debtors. See In 
re Buckhead Am. Corp., 161 B.R. 11, 13-15 (Bankr. D. Del. 1993). Consistent with the standard 
announced in the leading subslantive consolidation cases, the court Slated that the benefit of consol­
idation outweighed the prejudice that would result. See id. at 3. 
253. See Pml.UP I. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS, PROBLEMS IN TilE 
BANKRIJPTCYOR REORGANIZATION OF PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS, INCLUDING TilE LAW 
OF CORPORATE GUARANTIES § 10.10.5 (1985 & Supp. 1994). Further factors courts have considered 
in recent opinions include: (I) the degree of econontic integration of the components of corporate 
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Courts have looked to Section lOS(a) of the Bankruptcy Code as the 
source of their equitable powers to order a substantive consolidation. 254 
Consistent with the language in Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 
however, they have narrowly exercised these powers and have in certain 
instances expressed a reluctance to consolidate affiliated corporations 
because of the risk of injury to certain of the parties' other creditors.255 
Only when it appears that the two entities being considered for consolida­
tion have actually been functioning as one entity, and the determination to 
consolidate will not unfairly prejudice creditors of the debtor, will a court 
make this ruling. 256 
There is authority, albeit limited, to support the consolidation of a 
nondebtor (an SPC) into the bankruptcy case of a debtor (the 
originator).257 In such cases where courts have ordered a substantive 
consolidation, the courts have found either that the affiliated nondebtor was 
groups and their common conduct of a unital}' business, see, e.g., In re Drexel Burnham Lambert 
Group, Inc., 138 B.R. 723,741-44 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992); In re IRCC Inc., 105 B.R. 237, 241-42 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989); Holywell Cotp. v. Bank of N.Y., 59 B.R. 340,347 (S.D. fla. 1986); In 
re Tun:ad, 45 B.R. 658 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1985), ajj'd, 59 B.R. 973 (N.D. Okla. 1986); (2) to what 
degtee the creditor relied on the credit of the entetprise, see, e.g., Eastgroup Properties, 935 F.2d at 
251; In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc., 138 B.R. 723, 744 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. !985); (3) 
whether the new entity intermingled formerly separate accounts, su, e.g., Drabvkin v. Midland Ross 
Cotp. (In re Auto Train Cotp.}, 810 F.2d 270,276 (D.C. Cir. 1987); ChemicalBankN.Y. Trust Co. 
v. Kheel (In re Seatrade Cotp.}, 369 F.2d 845, 847 (2d Cir. 1966); In re Murray Indus., 119 B.R. 
820, 831 (Bankr. M.D. fla. 1990); (4) whether the new entity intermingled formerly separate assets, 
see, e.g., In re Balcer & Getty Fin. Servs., Inc., 78 B.R. 139, 142 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987); In re 
Richton Int'l Cotp., 12 B.R. 555, 558 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981); and (5) the guidance provided by veil­
piercing jurisprudence, see, e.g., FDIC v. Colonial Realty Co., 966 F.2d 57, 60-61 (2d Cir. 1992). 
254. See, e.g., Colonial Realty, 966 F.2d at 59, 61; see also In ,. Richton Int'l Cotp., 12 B.R. 
555, 557 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
255. See, e.g., Drabvkin, 810 F.2d at 277-78 (denying trustee's nunc pro tunc consolidation of 
a subs!dial}''s assets into the parent's bankruptcy estate because it would be dettimental to the creditor's 
reliance); Kheel, 369 F.2d at 848 ("Equality among creditors who bave lawfully bargained for different 
treatment is not equity ..• , and the argument for equality has a specially hollow ring when made by 
the United Stares whose priority over other creditors will necessarily be enbanced by baving the assets 
of all these cotparations thrown into hotchpot."); In re DRW Property Co., 54 B.R. 489, 497 (Bankr. 
N.D. Tex. 1985) (refusing to order a consolidalion of assets among affiliated entities because the 
potential harm to creditors outweighed the benefits of substantive consolidation); In re Snider Bros., 
Inc., 18 B.R. 230, 238-39 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1982) (denying a substantive consolidation request by 
unsecured-creditors committees for six cotparate debtors). See generally Frost, supra note 223, at 449 
(presenting an economic analysis of substantive consolidation and limited liability in bankruptcies 
involving affiliated cotparations). 
256. BLUMBERG, supra note 253, § 10.1.6. 
257. See, e.g., Bracaglia v. Manzo (In re United Stairs Cotp.), 176 B.R. 359, 369 (Bankr. 
D.N.J. 1995) (allowing substantial consolidation of a nondebtorafter applying a balancing of equities 
test); In re 1438 Meridian Place, N.W., Inc., IS B.R. 89, 96-97 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1981) (relying on 
traditional veil-piercing jurisprudence in reaching its decision to consolidate a debtor with a nondebtor); 
see also Patrick C. Sargent, Bankruptcy Remote Finance Subsidiaries: The Substantive Consolidation 
Issue, 44 Bus. LAW. 1223, 1233-36 (1989) {discussing consolidation of a debtor with a nondebtor 
affiliate). But see Raslavich v. 1m S. Davis Storage Co., (In re 1m S. Davis, Co.), No. 92-142595, 
1993 WL 384501, at *6 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. SepL 22, 1993) (holding that consolidating a debtor and 
nondebtor violates the BankruPII!!I-~s.n:quiRIIIJimiS.for.CIIIIImeneing minvolumaty case). 
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the "alter ego" of the debtor, or that elements of fraud existed in the rela­
tionship between the parties. 258 
Because of the substantial implications the risk of substantive consol­
idation has on the market for asset -backed securities, 259 rating agencies, 
in addition to requiring "true sale" opinions, require that counsel for secu­
ritization originators represent that all steps have been taken to minimize 
the chance that a court will substantively consolidate the originator and its 
affiliated SPC.260 Counsel, however, find it much more difficult to 
deliver this kind of opinion because of the opinion's forward-looking 
perspective.261 The TriBar Opinion Committee has described a substan­
tive consolidation opinion as an 
opinion as to a discretionary, equitable judgment to be made in the 
future, in the context of the congressional goal of promoting 
reorganizations, with respect to the interplay of filets, circumstances, 
relationships, and other considerations, some of which may exist at 
the time the opinion is rendered and some of which may arise in the 
future. 262 
Because of the nature of the equitable jurisdiction bankruptcy courts have, 
opining counsel traditionally include a litany of qualifications and assump­
tions in their opinions in order to avoid potential misunderstandings con­
cerning the definitive nature of any conclusions drawn.263 These opinion 
258. See In re 1438MeridianPlace, N.W.,lnc., 15 B.R. 89, 'Y1 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1981) (deciding 
to substantively consolidate nondebtor aff'~iates with a debtor because such nondebtors were the alter 
egos of the debtor's shareholders); Sampsell v. Imperial Paper & Color Corp., 313 U.S. 215 (1941) 
(basing its decision to substantively consolidate a debtor and its aff'~iated nondebtor on the presence 
offraud); Mark L. Prager & Jonathan A. Backman, Pursuing Alter-Ego liability Against Non-Bankrupt 
Third Parnes: Structuring a Comprehensive Conceptual Framework, 35 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 657, 706 
(1991) (arguing that substantive consolidation provides a "more coherent and equitable method for 
dealing with excessively entangled entities" than does the alter ego doctrine). But cf. Baker Ostrin, A 
Proposal to Limit the Availability of Substantive Consolidation of Solvent Entities with Bankrupt 
Affiliates, 91 COM. LJ. 351, 363 (1986) (suggesting that the remedy of subSlalltive consolidation be 
limited to cases in which there has been a fraudulent representation). 
259. In the absence of complete credit enhancement or over-collateralization, the rerum of the 
transferred assets into the estate of the debtor means that such assets are subject to the claims of the 
debtor's unsecured creditors. See supra note 158. This liability clearly diminishes the security and 
value of the purchasers' investment in the ABS. 
260. Rating agencies are going to be fundamentally concerned with the risk that a coun will bring 
a solvent, affiliated SPC into its parent's bankruptcy proceeding. See Sa11:ent, supra note 257, at 1233­
34. 
261. 	See TriBar Report, supra note 54, at 727. 
262. 	ld. 
263. 	 According to the TriBar Report, opining counsel should: 
(i) 	 state[] that subSlalltive consolidation is an equitable doctrine, that relevant facts may 
arise in the furure, and tha.t couns have accorded different degrees of imponance 
to different facrual matters; 
(ii) 	 assume[] that the entities involved will act in accordance with limitations designed 
to promote separateness drafted into the rel~vant documents; 
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guidelines make clear how difficult it is for legal counsel to draw definitive 
conclusions when the issue concerned is an equitable matter. 
3. The Application of a Quasi-Fraudulent Conveyance Analysis.­
Section 548(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides authority for a trustee to 
challenge a transfer of assets that was actually fraudulent or constructively 
fraudulent.264 Section 548, as well as state fraudulent transfer 
statutes,265 sets out very clear conditions under which a transfer can be 
avoided.266 Specifically, transfers that run afoul of fraudulent 
conveyance law are those made with the "actual intent to hinder, delay, or 
defraud any entity to which the debtor was" indebted, "or became" 
indebted "on or after the date that such transfer was made. "1ST In 
addition, trustees may avoid transfers that are made for less than reason­
ably equivalent value, and made when the debtor, irrespective of its 
intention, (1) becomes insolvent, (2) was engaged in business with unrea­
sonably small capital, or (3) intended to incur debts that would be beyond 
its ability to pay. 268 
(iii) 	 assume[] a number of objective facts which have been drafted into the documents 
to support separateness; 
(iv) 	 assume[] certain subjective or conclusocy facts, such as the newly-created entity bas 
"sufficient employees" and will not be bound by business decisions of the parent 
without independent approval by the newly-created entity pUISUant to its own 
corporate governance procedures; 
(v) 	 assume[] the absence ofany factors inconsistent with the other express assumptions; 
aod 
{vi) qualif[y] the opinion by staling that there is no case directly on point and that there 
are uncertainties in rendering a substantive consolidation opinion. 
ld. at 726-27. 
264. 	See 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1994). 
265. In addition, § 544(b) of the Bankruptcy Code incorporates stare fraudulent transfer law aod 
authorizes the trustee to avoid any transfers by the debtor that an unsecured creditor with an allowable 
claim under§ 502(e) of the Bankruptcy Code could avoid under state fraudulent transfer law. See id. 
§ 544(b). 
266. 	The modem fraudulent transfer statutes were derived from the Statute of Elizabeth, 13 Eiiz. 
c.5 (1571). The statute applied to conveyances made with the intent to "dclaye hynder or defraude 
Creditors and others of theyr juste aod lawfuii Actions Suites [aod] Debtes." /d. At present, thirty-six 
states aod the Disnict of Columbia have adopted the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act {UFTA), see 
7A U.L.A. 209 (Supp. 1997), and its precursor, the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act (UFCA), 
is in effect in five states. See 1A U.L.A. 159 (Supp. 1997). Both statutes are considered to be 
codifications of cases applying the Statute of Eiizabeth. Section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code empowers 
a bankruptcy trustee to avoid a transfer of a debtor's property, or any obligation incurred by the 
transfer, that was fraudulently made or incurred under certain defined circumstances within one year 
prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition. See 11 U.S.C. § 548. See generally Douglas G. Baird 
& Thomas H. Jackson, Fraudulent Conveyance Law and Its Proper Domain, 38 VAND. L. REv. 829 
(1985) (analyzing fradulent conveyance as a species of contract law); Michael L. Cook & Richard E. 
Mendales, 7he Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act: An Introductory Critique, 62 AM. BANKR. L.J. 87 
(1988) {comparing the UFTA to the UFCA aod the Bankruptcy Code). 
267. 	 11 U.S.C. § 548{a)(l). 
268. Section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code allows a trustee to avoid transfers that occurred within 
one year of bankruptcy, id. § ~S(llY.''aili!'tlre-UP'l'Xefenl!ra!lY'lillo~arellllli'rs'i j'l%riod of four years 
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To the extent securitization transactions involve actual fraud, trustees 
can avoid the asset transfer based upon the clear language of section 548 
of the Bankruptcy Code. It is worth noting, however, that the harm faced 
by the originator's unsecured creditors as a result of the fraud is not neces­
sarily attributable to securitization as a method of financing, but to the 
originator's fraudulent behavior. Such fraud could occur in a secured 
credit context as well. Moreover, if there is less than reasonably equiv­
alent value exchanged at a time when the originator is in a precarious 
financial condition, the trustee has a clear basis for avoiding an asset trans­
fer as a constructive fraudulent conveyance. Market forces provide a 
check, however, on whether the securitized assets transferred to the SPC 
are in exchange for "reasonably equivalent value," 269 and even low qual­
ity assets transferred in exchange for a deeply discounted amount would 
probably survive the scrutiny of a court under a constructive fraudulent 
conveyance challenge. 270 Indeed, due to the scrutiny imposed by rating 
agencies, credit enhancers, and the various other market participants, secu­
ritization may present fewer opportunities for self-dealing than alternative 
financing methods. 
As stated previously, the movement of assets away from the reach of 
the originator's unsecured creditors is central to securitization's structure. 
In fact, it is the transaction's bankruptcy-remote feature that has attracted 
this year's market to invest over one-hundred billion dollars in asset-backed 
securities.271 This removal of valuable assets from the reach of the origi­
nator's unsecured creditors is the type of harm the fraudulent conveyance 
doctrine is designed to address. 212 The debate in recent years concerning 
the proper limits of fraudulent transfer law has been in the context of cer­
tain modern day transactions that have resulted in an unjust diminution of 
the debtor's bankruptcy estate.273 Because courts have applied the 
from the tr.msfer in which to commence an avoidance suit. UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER Acr § 9 
& cmt., 7A U.L.A. 666 (1985). If the tnlnsfer occurred more than a year before the petition, the 
trustee may be able to avoid it by using state law pursuant to § 544(b), even though it cannot avoid it 
under§ 548. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(b). 
269. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(A). 
270. This is particularly ttue when asset-backed securities are sold in the public markets. 
271. See supra note 46. 
272. In an article examining the disclosure of bankruptcy issues under the securities laws, 
Professor Mendales observed that substantive consolidation and recharacterization of ttue sales as 
secured loans "collapses analytically" into the fraudulent conveyance model. Mendales, supra note 
249, at 783, 782-83. 
273. See, e.g., Bai!d & Jackson, supra note 266 (arguing that fraudulent conveyance Jaws should 
not be used to protect debtors in foreclosure sales because such efforts might be counterproductive); 
David Gray Carlson, Leveraged Buyouts in Bankruptcy, 20 GA. L. REv. 73 (1985) (discussing the 
impact of six different leveraged-buyout tn!DSaction sttucrures on bankruptcy estates); Emily L. 
Sherwin, Creditors' Rights Against Panicipants in a Leveraged Buyout, 72 MINN. L. REv. 449 (1988) 
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fraudulent conveyance doctrine to challenge transfers made in connection 
with leveraged buy-outs, 774 there is a precedent for expansion of this 
doctrine.775 Furthermore, securitization results in an increase in a firm's 
unsecured creditor's overall post-lending risk-another evil fraudulent 
transfer law addresses. 
To illustrate, when unsecured creditors lend money, they do so at an 
interest rate that reflects the debtor's level of risk at the time of lending. 
Once the debtor receives the unsecured credit, it then has an incentive to 
engage in risky behavior with the promise of not only great rewards but 
also the corresponding chance of losing it all. In many instances, 
unsecured creditors have neither the knowledge nor the money to bargain 
for an interest rate that reflects a change in behavior. Insolvent firms are 
especially motivated to gamble in this way because, in the event of 
liquidation, the firm owners receive nothing; if the firm does reap a profit, 
however, it is the owners-not the creditors-who receive the windfall.276 
When this risky behavior is financed by a firm securitizing its highest 
quality assets, the unsecured creditors may find themselves in an even 
worse position. They remain subject to securitization's negative 
externalities777 and have a lower chance of repayment upon liquidation, 
without having been paid an interest rate that reflects this risk. At a 
(analyzing !he ways couns have approached creditors' rights in !he context of LBOs financed either by 
independent lenders or by selling shareholders); Jack F. Williams, Revisiting the Proper limits of 
Fraudulent Transfer Law, 8 BANKR. DEVS. J. 55 (1991) (discussing !he limits of ftaudulent transfer 
law while professing to remain faithful to its basic principles). 
274. S.e, e.g., United States v. Tabor Coun Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288 (3d Cir. 1986). But 
see Kupett v. Wolf, 845 F.2d 842, 847-49 (9th Cir. 1988) (refusing to find a ftaudulent conveyance 
in !he instance of the sale of a debtor corporation m a leveraged buyout); Mellon Bank v. Metro 
Communications, Inc. (In re Metro Communications, Inc.), 95 B.R. 921, 932 ( Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989) 
(asserting that !he banktuptcy starute prohibiting ftaudulent transfers applies to leveraged buyouts), 
amended 135 B.R. 17 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989) and aff'd in pan and rev'd in pan, 135 B.R. 15 (W.D. 
Pa.), rev'd, 945 F.2d 635 (3d Cir. 1991); Wieboldt Stores, Inc. v. Schonenstein, 94 B.R. 488, 500 
(Bankr. N.D. DI. 1988) ("Although ••• ftaudulent conveyance laws generally are applicable to 
[leveraged-buyout] ttansactions, a debtor cannot use these laws to avoid any and all [such 
ttansactions]. ");Ohio Corrugating Co. v. DPAC, Inc., 91 B.R. 430,439-40 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988) 
(detennining !hat !he plaintiffs failed to show a ftaudulent conveyance because !hey did not prove !hat 
!he defendant was insolvent at !he time ofthe leveraged buyout). See generally Baird & Jackson, supra 
note 266, at 850-54; Carlson, supra note 273, at 73; Sherwin, supra note 273, at 449. 
275. Professors Baird and Jackson argued in Fraudulent Conveyance Law and its ProperDomain 
that "using the ftaudulent conveyance remedy to undo bad deals ... can be justified only if its benefits 
are greater than !he costs of the unceltainty such a rule brings." Baird & Jackson, supra note 266, at 
838. "Fraudulent conveyance law should never apply to anns-lenglh ttansactions, even if it appears 
after the fact that !he debtor's actions injured !he creditors." !d. at 854. 
276. BAIRD & JACKSON, supra note 144, at 373. 
277. Securitization's negative externalities include !he diminished chance for repayment, even in 
!he absence ofliquidation, because !he ~rm securitized its highest quality assets; the complete severance 
of !he securitized assets from !he bankruptcy estate of !he debtor firm; !he absence of debtor 
monitoring; and !he debtor's freedom to waste !he consideration it gained from the sale of its assets. 
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rrununum, a coun might find that the securitization transaction did not 
serve to advance the creditors' collective interests. 278 
Is there a place within the domain of fraudulent conveyance law for 
the avoidance of a transaction that is designed to manipulate a debtor's 
assets so as to move them from the reach of its unsecured creditors? Is it 
a fuiling of fraudulent transfer law not to provide a cause of action to 
address such a harm? Is there room within bankruptcy couns' narrowly 
circumscribed equitable powers for an extension of the fraudulent transfer 
doctrine? Will such a pragmatic judgment survive appellate review?279 
If not, should there be a legislative response to this identified harm? In the 
coming years, as the asset-backed securities market continues its expansion, 
couns and legislatures may increasingly be persuaded that the answer to 
these questions is "yes," and we may see the evolutionary development of 
what may be characterized as quasi-fraudulent conveyance jurisprudence. 
V. The Unsettled Nature of the Law Relating to Structured Finance 
As more securitizations come to the market, the extent to which the 
present state of the law does not neatly fit this transaction is becoming 
increasingly clear.280 One illustration involves the threshold issue of 
whether interests in asset pools are "securities" under the Securities Act of 
1933 (the 1933 Actf81 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the 
278. The diminished incentive and opportunity for the monitoring of the debtor may. however, 
provide in some cases greater opportunity forfraudulentbehavior. See Hilary Rosenberg, The Amazing 
Towers Financial Affair, lNS1TIUilONAL INVESTOR, June 1994, at 126. 
279. Equity, in a bankruptcy context, can be viewed as a form of legal p13gmatism. Legal 
p12gmatism has been described as "a theory of law that asserts that 'judges do and should make 
whatever decisions seem to them best for the community7 S future•. not counting any fonn of consistency 
with the past as valuable for its own sake.'" Steven D. Smith, The Pursuit ofPragmatism, 100 YALE 
L.J. 409, 413 (1990) (quoting RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 95 (1986)). If bankruptcy courts 
exercise p12gmatic judgments in their review of securitized asset transfers, they could rely upon their 
equitable powers ro reach a just result. 
280. For example, the securitization of pools of assets is in pan governed by the Invesanent 
Company Act of 1940; issues remain open under this Act. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 80a (1994 & 
Supp. 1995). The 1940 Act requires that an entity principally engaged in owning or holding 
"securities" must register with the SEC as an "invesanent company," unless one of the statutory 
exemptions applies. ld. at§ 80a-3(a)(3). Because of the burdensome nature of registration under the 
1940 Act, securitization participants gene131ly seek to have the transaction fall within one of the 
statutory exemptions. Until recently. however, securitization transactions did not fit neatly into the 
categories of invesanent companies outlined in the 1940 Act because of the statute's focus on the types 
of assets securitized, rather than on the economic principles underlying the transaction. As a result, 
similar types of securilizations were treated differently under the 1940 Act, depending upon the types 
of assets transferred by the originator. See generally Invesanent Company Act Rules, 17 C.F.R. § 270 
(1996); 1 FRANKEL, supra note 5, § 3.15.2. 
281. The 1933 Act imposes standards of disclosure and requires the filing of a registration · 
statement with the SEC in connection with any public offering ofnon-.:xempt securities. See Securities 
Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1994). 
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1934 Act). 282 Notwithstanding the developed jurisprudence in this area, 
the issue has not yet been definitively resolved. Courts and the SEC have 
tried to fit asset-backed instruments into the definition of "security" found 
in section 2(1) of the 1933 Act, but because securitization involves the par­
tial metamorphosis of an obligation from a contract to a form of personal 
property, the current securities-related jurisprudence does not fully resolve 
the ambiguity. 283 Courts have reached conflicting resolutions of this 
question, often in response to arguments focusing upon different attributes 
of the interests at issue. 284 While the current, prevailing view is that 
282. The 1934 Act imposes standards of disclosure aod liability for cenain types of fraudulent 
statements or omissions. as well as registration and ongoing reporting requirements for certain publicly 
held issuers. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1994). 
283. See 2 FRANKEL, supra note 5, § 9.16 to -.17.2. Professor Frankel explains that the policies 
of both contract and property Jaw include creating cenainty and predictability to reduce the panics' 
planning and transaction costs, but the rules under contract aod property have different focuses. 
Contract Jaw focuses on the panics to the contract and their specific agreement, whereas property Jaw 
focuses upon a bundle of rights held by panicipants in the market. The different emphasis under these 
respective classifications can potentially result in different rules. See id.; see also Jay M. Feinman, 
The Jurisprudence ofClassification, 41 STAN. L. REv. 661, 673 (1989) ("Classification is a shaping 
and developing of traditional systematic conceptions and traditional systematic categories in order to 
organize the bndy of legal precepts so that they may be: (I) [s]taled effectively with a minimum of 
repetition, overlapping, and potential conflict, (2) administered effectively, (3) taught effectively, and 
(4) developed effectively for new situations." (quoting Roscoe Pound, Classification ofLaw, 37 HARV. 
L. REv. 933,944 (1924))); Tamar Frankel, The Legal Infrastructure ofMarkets: The Role ofContract 
and Property Law, 73 B.U. L. REv. 389, 392 & n.l3 (1993) (descnbing the contract prototype as a 
relationship consisting of promises enforceable by Jaw and the property prototype as a relationship 
between a person wi!h property rights and olher people, with rights ranging from the right to entJy and 
use of the property to entitlements to exclude o!hers from the property). 
284. The SEC said in Union Home Loans, Exchange Act Release No. 19,346, [1982-1983 
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) , 83,308, at 85,681 (Dec. 16, 1982), !hat whether a 
mongage-backed security is a security ora conunercial Joan depends upon whether it falls within§ 2(1) 
of the 1933 Act's definition of "invesanent contracts." Id. at 85,682 (citing SEC v. C.M. Joiner 
Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344,353 (1943)). Section2(1) of the 1933 Actdefmes the tenn security to 
include "'certificates ofinterest orparticipation in any profit-sharing agreement," "investment contract." 
and, "in general, any interest or insnument conunonly known as a 'security.'" Securities Act of 1933 
§ 2{1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(l) (1994). The defmition of security announced in SECv. W.J. Howey Co., 
328 U.S. 293 (1946). focuses on invesanent contracts. Id. at 297-301. The Coun in United Housing 
Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975), discussed the "risk capital test," id. at 857 n.24, 
but declined to adopt the test, stating that risk-capital would not apply to this case even if they had 
adopted iL The Forman Coun also examined the "economic realities" test, describing it as a "basic 
principle test that has guided all of the Coun's decisions in this area." Id. at 848, 848-51. Both W.J. 
Howey and Forman have provided lower courts with some guidance. For example, one district coun 
has held that mongage-backed securities are not invesanent contracts because !hey do not meet the 
Howey test. See In re Epic Mongage lns. Litig., 701 F. Supp. 1192, 1248 (E.D. Va. 1988) (setting 
forth the four elements of the Howey test), off'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. Foremost Guar. 
Corp. v. Meritor Sav. Bank, 910 F.2d 118 (4!h Cir. 1990); see also In re National Mongage Equity 
Corp. Mongage Pool Cenificates Sec. Litig., 723 F. Supp. 497, 501-05 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (deciding 
that mongage-backed cenificates were not invesanent contracts under the Howey test and, therefore, 
not securities). The National Mongage conn based its findings on the fact (1) that the investors were 
investing in loans, not in the business of the issuer; (2) that there was no conunon-enterprise risk; (3) 
that there was a recourse provision in !he invesanent contract; and (4) that the investors did not rely 
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ABS are securities, especially when ABS investors are not individually 
negotiating their investment, as is the case when ABS are offered in the 
public markets, courts continue to rely upon a facts-and-circumstances 
analysis.285 
In addition to securities-related issues, these transactions implicate 
multifarious issues in many other areas of the law,2&> and yet few struc­
tured finance transactions have been examined by courts. As such, the 
market has not had the benefit of courts' studied analyses of these transac­
tions and their effects upon various market participants.287 In a hurried 
effort to keep up with the evolving market, there have been numerous stat­
utory revisions and new rulemaking in recent years, all designed to address 
on the efforts of others for profitabililty, other than poltfolio selection prior to the investtnent. Id. at 
503-{)5. 
285. The party arguing that the instrumems are not securities has the burden of demonstrating that 
the investors are active lenders and not passive investors. Ultimately, the resolution of the issue is fact 
specific and factors such as the documentation of the arrangement between the parties, the nature of 
the panics' negotiations, whether the particular investors needed the protection of the securities acts, 
and whether the investor was acting as a "lender" or was purchasing the instrument as a passive 
investor are factors courts consider in reaching their decisions. See I FRANKEL, supra note 5, § 1.1. 
But see Resolution Trust Corp. v. Stone, 998 F.2d !534, 1538-40 (lOth Cir. 1993)(holding that pools 
of automobile-loan receivables sold to financial institutions were not securities under the !933 Act 
definition). See generally Park McGinty, What Is a Security?, !993 WIS. L. REv. !033, !103.06 
(discussing the question of whether or not ABS are securities). 
286. 	 Professor Frankel succinctly made this point when she wrote: 
The legal issues that securitization raises touch on almost every legal area: banking and 
bankruptcy, securities acts and the Uniform Commercial Code, contract, property, and 
fiduciary iaw. The law of securitization cannot focus on lypes of instruments, 
transactions, institutions, laws, or principles because it touches on all of these. 
Securitization is a process. 
I FRANKEL, supra note 5, at x!Vii. 
287. The market has not fully understood the nature of ABS, and trading prices for ABS have, 
in some circumstances, reflected this confusion. Investors insist upon a triple-A credit rating (and as 
such. credit enhancement is almost always an element of the transaction). and according to one 
observer, ABS trade like a "weak- or ntiddling-A security." The observation has been made by one 
Wall Street participant that an "A• rated originator can raise funds in the bond market fifteen to twenty 
basis points less than through a securitization. See Dannen, supra note 199, at261. 
Furthermore, even the regulatory bodies may not understand the nature of the product they 
regulate. For example, the California Departtnent of Corporations recently began enforcing an 
unpublished policy whereby they reject any asset-backed securities registration application unless the 
securities are backed by third-party credit enhancement equal to at least 13% of the outstanding prin­
cipal balance, notwithstanding the rating of the securities and the fact that the California Department 
of Corporations allows an exemption for evidences of indebtedness (which does not include pass­
through securities) rated in the top four rating categories. See Rodney S. Dayan, Cu"t/11 Legal 
Developments in Securilkation, in NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN SECU1U11ZATION 7, 24-26 ( PLI Comm. 
Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. A-677, 1993). Thus, investtnent-grade ABS structured 
as pass-througbs are subject to registration under Califontia's blue sky laws and will be approved only 
with a 13% credit enhancement arrangement in place. Not surprisingly, pricing for these highly rated 
securities does not reflect the costs incurred by the issuer in obtaining an "AA • or "AAA • rating, and 
as such, securitization can be quite an expensive funding method. Accordingly, this funding strategy 
may not be appropriate for every company to which it is being marketed. See id. 
653 1998] Asset Securitization 
the unique issues raised by securitizations.288 Because of the complexity 
and ambiguity of these transactions, and uncertainties and gaps in the law 
relating to securitization, 289 many courts examining a collapsed structured 
288. For example, in 1992, lhe SEC proposed a new rule under lhe 1940 Act for lhe purpose of 
excluding certain issuers !hat pool income-producing assets and issue securities backed by !hose assets 
from lhedefinitionof"investmentcompany." ThenewRule3a-7, adopted in November 1992, perntits 
strucblred fmancings to publicly offer securities in lhe United Star:s wilhout regisr:ring under lhe 1940 
Act and complying wilh lhe 1940 Act's substantive conditions if lhe financing meets specified 
conditions. These requirements include !hat issuers must (1) issue primarily fixed-income securities, 
wilh payments based upon cash flow derived from !he pooled assets; (2) offer oniy higbly mt:d fixed­
income securities to lhe public; (3) hold substantially all of lhe fmancing's assets, wilh limited 
exceptions, until marurity; and (4) deposit assets, cash flows, and olher property not needed for lhe 
fmancing's opemtions in a segregated account maintained by an independent trust:e. InvCSbnent 
Company Act of 1940, 17 C.F.R. § 270.3a-7 (1997 ). The stated purpose of Rule 3a-7 is to remove 
"an unnecessacy and unint:nded barrier to !he use of strucblred financings in all sectors of lhe 
economy, including lhe small business seetor." See 51 Fed. Reg. 56,248 (1992). 
Moreover, tax law reganling securitizing entities has been undergoing revision. Recently, lhe 
Small Business Job Prot:ction Act of 1996 created a new tax entity for usc in securitization 
transactions. known as lhc "financial asset securitization investment trust" or "FASIT." Small Business 
Job Pror:ction Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1621, 110 Stat. 1755, 1858-68 (codified at 26 
U.S.C.A. §§ 860H, 8601, 860K, 860L (West Supp. 1997)). A FASIT is a pass-lhrough vehicle, 
which means !hat all income, gain deduction, loss, and credit pass-lhrough to lhe holder of!he FASIT's 
ownership inr:rest. The impebiS behind !his new creation is to make it easier for lenders to pool assets 
and to issue to !he public debt secured by such assets at a lowercostlhan under previous law. Entities 
wiU not be able to elect FASIT stabiS until !he Seprember I, 1997 effective date. See Willys H. 
Schneider, FASrrs Provide N.:w Flexibility, Challenges, AssET SALES REP., Sept. 30, 1996, at I, 
available in 1996 WL 5618245. Thomas Humphreys and John Fernando bave notcd !hat: 
From a tax standpoint, lhe primacy concern [in a strucblred financing] is wilh the tax 
treatment of lhe [SPC] . 
• • • First, and most important, !he [SPC] cannot pay a corporare level tax, i.e., it must 
be "transparent" from a tax srandpoint . 
• • • A second concern is timing and chamct:r of lhe income to lhe Investor and !he 
[SPC] • 
• • • A lhinl concern is timing and chamcrer of income (or loss) to the [originator]. 
ThomasA. Humphreys &John C. Fernando, Tax Treatment ofSirucJUredFinance Transactions 1025, 
1030 ( PU Tax Law & Estar: Planning Course Handbook Series No. 393, 1994). 
Additionally, the Office of lhe Comptroller of the Currency recently issued new asset 
securitization guidelines. These guidelines "focus on lhe need for bankers to understand fully !he risks 
involved in securitization and to take sr:ps to manage !hose risks effectively." OCC Issues Asset 
Securitiztztion Guidelines, O.C.C. News Release 96-104 (Sept. 25, 1996), available in 1996 WL 
539961. 
Finally, Congress introduced a bill known as the Business, Commercial, and Community 
Development Secondacy Market Development Act, which acconling to its billing, was designed to 
"prom or: economic growth and credit formation by facilitating lhe development ofa secondacy market 
for business, commercial, and community development debt and equity investments." H.R. 2600, 
103nl Cong. (1993). The Community Development Banking and Financial Instibltions Act of 1994, 
12 U.S.C.S. § 4701 (Law. Co-op. 1997 ), incorpomtcd lhe substance of thar bill through provisions 
relaxing capital requirements and other regulations for privare sector market loans for small businesses. 
S.e Alternative Lenders Get Assistance, SO CONG. Q. ALMANAC 100, 102 (1994). 
289. Bank credit can! issuer-; are vulnemble to exttaonlinacy losses in the event !hat their 
securitized credit card accounts are sold with recourse. If these accounts are not paid, they may be 
rerurned to the bank's balance sheets. Because no capital is required to be set aside to cover such 
losses, these banks will be exposed to large loan losses. "A prime reason for securitization on the pan 
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financing transaction may not completely appreciate the full measure of 
issues before them. Moreover, due to the inadequacy of the information 
surrounding these transactions, the parties participating in the public and 
private debt markets, including the unsecured creditors of the world, are 
not making their decisions with the benefit of full information.290 
Even questions with respect to the most fundamental issues involved 
in securitization persist among market participants as well as courts. As 
recently as 1992, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 
in Octagon Gas Systems, Inc. v. Rimmefl91 addressed the question of 
whether the property claimed by a sale transferee was part of the trans­
feror's bankruptcy estate and thus subject to the interests of the creditors 
of the transferor's estate. Octagon involved a series of transactions result­
ing in the transfer of an interest in the proceeds of certain gas sales made 
by Poll Gas Systems, Inc. (Octagon's predecessor in interest).292 
Following the filing of debtor Poll Gas System's bankruptcy petition, the 
court was asked to determine whether the interest in the proceeds was 
property of Poll's Chapter 11 bankruptcy estate?93 
The Tenth Circuit misunderstood the nature of the bankrupt debtor's 
asset transfer and took issue with the lower courts'294 summary rejection 
of card issuers is to reduce their capital and loan-loss reserve requirements," said George Salem, senior 
vice-president ofGerard Klauer Mattison. Brian Caplen, Financial Shocks: Where Next?, EUROMONEY, 
Sept. 15, 1996, at 54, available in 1996 WL 11120815. 
290. See supra nole 201. The lack of adequale disclosure requirements for ABS issuances is a 
current concern of market participants, and the SEC is presently considering more stringent disclosure 
requirements to provide more infonnation and time for investors to evaluate new ABS issuances. See 
supra nole 163. 
291. 995 F.2d 948 (lOth Cir. 1993). 
292. See id. at 951-52. 
293. See id. at 952. The parties 10 Octagon Gas Systems v. Rimmer were not involved in a classic 
securitization. but in fact a much more complex series of transactions; however, the same issues with 
respect 10 the nature ofasset transfers were implicaled. Uniled StaleS DistrictJudge Lee R. West staled 
in his order that although the gas sale interest is most often described as an "overriding royalty 
inlerest," Bankruptcy Judge Ryan found this description to be incorrect in the absence of any 
underlying oil and gas leasehold estale. See In re Meridian Reserve, Inc., No. 88..()6519, at s-7 
( Bankr. W.D. Okla. July 26, 1991) (order granting inlervenor-plaintiffRimmer's motion for summary 
judgment) (on ftle with the Texas Law Review). 
294. The bankruptcy court held that the Rimmer lnlerest was not part of Poll's bankruptcy estate. 
See In re Meridian Reserve, Inc., No. 88..()6519, at 5-7 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. July 26, !991) (order 
granting inlervenor-plaintiff Rimmer's motion for summary judgment) (on ftle with the Texas Law 
Review). In its order outlining its conclusions of law, the court staled that a practical construction of 
the conveyances, as well as the usage of the lerm "overriding royalty," led it 10 conclude that the 
parties intended to convey a "separate, distinct and proportionale ownership right to the future cash 
proceeds from gas sale," and as such, the inlerest held by Rimmer was for the benefit of Rimmer, not 
the bankruptcy estale. Id. at 6. The bankruptcy court further rejecled the debtor's conclusion that an 
analysis under Article 9 was relevant 10 the decision, stating that Article 9 does not delermine, in the 
face of a conflict, whether or not art item of personal propeey is part of a debtor's bankruptcy esiale. 
Id. at 6-7. The District Court for the Weslem District of Oklahoma summarily aff!Inted the decision 
of the bankruptcy court, see In re Meridian Reserve, Inc., No. 88-06519 (W.O. Okla. Jan. 22, 1992) 
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of an analysis of the respective parties' rights and interests under Article 
The court observed that, pursuant to section 541 of the Bankruptcy 
Code, a bankruptcy estate includes "all legal or equitable interests of the 
debtor in property as of the commencement of the case. "296 Relying 
upon the Supreme Court's interpretation of the definition of an "estate" in 
United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc. ;m the Octagon court concluded that, 
because property of the estate includes property subject to a security 
interest, and because the statutory scheme governing security interests 
governs sales of accounts, the accounts thus sold remain the property of the 
debtor's bankruptcy estate. 298 
It was error for the Octagon court to conclude, in reliance on what it 
perceived to be the holding of Whiting Pools, that the sold assets were 
property of the debtor's bankruptcy estate. 299 Although Whiting Pools 
(order affinning the bankruptcy court's summary judgment) (on file with the Texas lAw Review), and 
Octagon appealed this decision to the Tenth Circuit. 
295. The Tenth Circuit concluded as a threshold matter that the transferred interest was an account 
under Article 9 and observed that. notwithstanding the fact that the "transactions giving rise to [the] 
account were not intended to secure a debt," the sale of properry is covered by Article 9. Octagon, 
995 F.2d at 955. Because narural gas, once extracted and sold, is a "good," the right to receive 
payment from the sale of that good is an "account." See id. at 954-55. Article 9 defines an account 
as "any right to payment for goods sold •.• which is not evidenced by an instrument or chattel paper 
••••" OKLA. SrAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 9-106 (West Supp. 1998). The court observed that § 9­
102(1)(b) "states that Article 9 applies 'to any outright sale ofaccounts.'" Octagon. 995 F.2d at 955 
(citations omined). Further, the term "security interest" as defmed by Article 9 expressly includes 
"any interest of a buyer of accounts," and "secured parry" includes "a buyer [to whom] accounts ..• 
have been sold." Jd. The Official Comments to§ 9-102 of the Oklahoma Commercial Code explain 
that in the case of commercial rmaneing on the basis of accounts. "'the distinction between a security 
transfer and sale is blurred, and a sale of such properry is therefore covered by[§ 9-102](1)(b) whether 
intended for security or not. . . . The buyer then is treated as a secured party, and his interest as a 
security interest." OKLA. SrAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 9-102 cmt. 2 (West Supp. 1998). 
296. Octagon, 995 F.2d at 955 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § S41(a)(1) (1988)). 
297. 462 U.S. 198 (1983). The Whiting Pools Court. citing both the legislative history and the 
language ofBankruptcy Code§ 541(a)(l), noted that the provision is "intended to include in the estate 
any properry made available to the estate by other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code." ld. at 205. 
The Court stated that, in order to "filcilitate the rehabilitation of the debtor's business, all of the 
debtor"s properry must be included in the reotganization estate," including properry "in which a 
creditor has a security interest." Id. at 203. The Court continued by noting that Congress could have 
specifically excluded properry subject to a security interest from the bankruptcy estate, but "chose 
instead to include such properry in the estate and to provide secured creditors with 'adequate protection' 
for their interests." ld. at 204. Because properry encumbered by a securiry interest is included in a 
debtor's bankruptcy estate, regardless of whether it is in the possession of the debtor or another parry, 
the truStee has the authority pursuant to § 542(a) to demand that the parry in possession of estate prop­
erry rum such pro perry over to the debtor's estate. See id. at 208. Failure to perfect a sale of accounts 
will bring the transferred accounts under the authority of§§ 544(a),541(3), and S50(a). See 11 U.S.C. 
§§ 541(3), 544(a). 550(a) (1994). Failure to perfect a transfer, however, will bring the transferred 
properry under the authority of§§ 541(3), 544(a)(1), and 550(a). See id. 
298. Su Octagon, 99S F.2d at 954-56. 
299. The Supreme Coun in Whiting Pools addressed a siruation in which the United States held 
a rax lien on all of the properry of Whiting. The IRS had seized and was planning to sell Whiting 
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sketches the contours of what property should properly be included in a 
debtor's bankruptcy estate,300 the case does not stand for the proposition 
that all property in the possession of other parties, which Article 9 
governs, is part of the debtor's bankruptcy estate, regardless of the cir­
cumstances of the transfer. 301 
Pools's property to satisfy the tax lien. As a step in enforcing this lien, the United States seized all of 
Whiting's property, anticipating a sale of the property. Before the sale could take place, however, 
Whiting filed a petition in bankrupll:y under Chapter II. Thus, at the time of the bankrupll:y filing, 
the United States had both possession of the property and a lien on it, but not title to iL The United 
States then claimed that the seized property was not properly of Whiting's bankruptcy estate. The 
Supreme Court held that the IRS was required to return the properly to Whiting Pools as debtor-in­
possessionunder § 542(a) of the Bankrupley Code because Whiting retained a significant interest in the 
properly: its residual rigbt of redemption. See Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. at 199-201, 20<Hl6. 
300. The Court further observed that !he Code safeguards security interests by providing secured 
creditors with adequate protection. Because the proecdural devices available to the IRS to protect and 
satisfy its liens are analogous to those available to private secured creditors when the debtor files for 
bankrupll:y, § 542 of the Bankruptcy Code simply requires the creditor to "seek protection of its 
interest according to the congressionally established bankrupll:y proecdures, rnther than by withholding 
the seized property from the debtor's efforts to reorganize." Id. at 212. 
301. Moreover, not only do the slate Jaw provisions of Article 9 treat the grnnting uf a security 
interest differently from a sale of accounts, but the tenn security interest is not defined in the same way 
under the Bankruptcy Code as it is in Article 9. The Bankrupll:y Code's definition of security interest 
does not include the interest of a purchaser of accounts, whereas § 1-201(37) of the UCC slates that 
the tenn "security interest" also "includes any interest of a buyer of accounts or chattel paper which 
is subject to Article 9." U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (1994). Section 101(51) of the Bankruptcy Code defines 
security interest as a lien created by an agreement. See II U.S.C. § 101(51). 
Thus, as stated above, for the limited purpose of providing for a notice mechanism to third 
parties, Article 9's filing system applies to both sales of accounts and borrowings secured by accounts; 
Article 9 does not conttol, however, which assets constitute properly of the bankruptcy estate. This 
is detennincd with reference to the Bankrupll:y Code provisions. 
Furlber, the Court in Whiting Pools did not address the issue ofunderwhat circumstances IIliDS­
ferred properly is deemed part of a transferor's bankruptcy estate, nor the issue of when, and under 
what circumstances, the trustee bas the power and authority to avoid certain pre-bankrupll:y IIliDSfers 
of properly and recover such transferred properly for the benefit of the estate. Although it is true that 
§ 9-102 of the UCC requires the filing of a notice in the fonn of a UCC-1 fmancing statement in con­
nection with the sale of accounts in the same way debtors file financing statements giving notice of the 
grnnt of collateral, this does not suggest that the properly sold is governed by the provisions ofArticle 
9 for all purposes and in all circumstances. Section 9-102 requires perfection of a buyer's interest in 
both accounts and chattel paper. See U.C.C. § 9-102 (1994). This filing requirement serves the 
purpose of announcing to third parties that the property identified in the financing statement is no 
longer available to third·pany creditors, either as coUatetal or, if the third-party creditors have gener­
ally unsecured clainrs regarding the debtor's bankrupll:y, as part of the banknrpll:y estate. Article 9 
clearly distinguishes, in many instances, between the sale of assets and the gll!Dt of a security interesL 
For example, both § 9-502(2) and § 9-504(2) provide that, if the transaction between parties is a sale 
of accounts, the debtor is not entitled to any surplus and is not liable for any deficiency, absent an 
agreement to the contruy. Thus, Article 9 distinguishes in certain commercial conteXts a sale of assets 
from the gll!Dt ofa security interest in connection with a Joan. See In re Southwest Freight Lines, Inc., 
100 B.R. 55!, 535 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1989) (holding that accounts receivable were not part of the bank­
ruptcy estate because the debtor did not retain an interest in them); In re National Equip. & Mold 
Corp., 64 B.R. 239, 2;45 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1986) (holding that a debtor relinquished his o'l'lletsbip 
rights in accounts receivable because he did not retain an interest in the property); U.C.C. §§ 9-502(2), 
9-504{2). 
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Furthermore, the cases-In re Contractors Equipment Supply Co., 3112 
Major's Furniture Mart, Inc. v. Castle Credit Corp.,303 and In re 
Evergreen lblley Resort, Inc. 304-have all more squarely addressed these 
issues and each suggests that the outright sale of accounts by a debtor prior 
to its bankruptcy filing places it beyond the reach of the trustee and the 
bankruptcy estate. 305 As logical as this analysis and conclusion may be, 
302. 861 F.2d241 (9th Cir. 1988). In Contraelors Equipment, thedebiOr, ConttaciOrs Equipment, 
granted its credi10r, Citibank, a security interest in all of its accounts receivable, including any furure 
accounts. Citibank then notified an account debtor, Pima, that it must make its payments directly to 
Cinbank. Following this proper notification pursuant to§ 9-318 and§ 9-502, the debtor, ConttaciOrs 
Equipment, filed for banlauptcy. Following the bankruptcy filing, Pima began making its payments 
directly 10 the bankrupt debtor. Cinbank then filed a complaint against the account debtor in state 
court, alleging that Pima's payments 10 the debiOr were in violation of the provisions of Article 9. In 
response, the account debiOr filed an adversary proceeding in the banlauptcy court, requesting a 
declaration that it discharged its obligation by paying the debiOr in full. The Bankruptcy Court granted 
summary judgment in favor of Pima, holding that Citibank had only a security interest in the account 
receivable and that the account receivable was property of the estate. The district court affirmed the 
decision of the bankruptcy court. The Ninth Circuit held that because the assignment involved a 
security interest and not an outright sale of accounts, the fuwre accounts receivable were assets of the 
bankruptcy estate, pursuant 10 § 541 of the Banlauptcy Code. The court suggested that the accounts 
receivable would not be part of the bankruptcy estate if the accounts were sold outright to Citibank 
prior 10 the bankruptcy filing. See id. at 242-45. 
303. 602 F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1979). The issue in Major's Furniture was whether the transfer of 
receivables was a true sale or a ttansfer of collateral for a loan. The court held that all relevant factors 
surrounding the circumstances of ttansfer must be examined and that the parties' characterization of 
the transfer was not determinative. The coun found that the transfer in this case was for security and 
not for sale because of the retention of risk, including full recourse, by the ttansferor. See id. 
304. 23 B.R. 659 (Bankr. D. Me. 1982). The Evergreen Valley banlauptcy court further defined 
the indicia of collateral granted in connection with a secured loan, as opposed to an outright sale, in 
a bankruptcy context. See id. at 661. These indicia include: (I) the retention by the ttansferee of the 
rights 10 pursue a deficiency, (2) acknowledgement by the ttansferee that its rights in the property 
would be extinguished if the debt were paid through some other source, (3) a requirement that the 
ttansferee account 10 the transferor for any su~plus, (4) evidence that the ttansferor's debt was not 
reduced on account of the ttansfer, and (5) conttact language expressing the intent that thettansfer was 
for security only. See id. 
305. The Permanent EdiiOrial Board (PEB) for the Uniform Commercial Code has amended UCC 
§ 9-102 comment 2 as follows: 
Neither Section 9-102 nor any other provision of Article 9 is intended to prevent the 
transfer of ownership of accounts or chattel paper. The determination of whether a 
particular ttansfer of accounts or chattel paper constituteS a sale or a ttansfer for security 
pnl]JOSCS (such as in connection with a loan) is not governed by Article 9. Article 9 
applies both to sale of accounts or chattel paper and loans secured by accounts or chattel 
paper primarily to inco1p0rate Article 9's perfection rules. The usc of terminology such 
as "security interest" 10 include the interest of a buyer of accounts or chattel paper, 
"secured party" 10 include a buyer of accounts or chattel paper, "debtor" to include a 
seller of accounts or chattel paper, and "collateral" 10 include accounts or chattel paper 
that have been sold is intended solely as a drafting technique 10 achieve this end and is 
not relevant to the sale or secured transaction detennination. 
U.C.C. § 9-102 cmt. 2~see Thomas E. Plank, Sacred Cows and Workhorses: The Sale ofAcco~~Qtsand 
Chatlel Paper Under the U. C. C. and the Effeas of Violating a Fundamental Drafting Prindpl•. 26 
CONN. L. REv. 397, 456 n.268 (1994). 
658 Texas Law Review [Vol. 76:595 
not all courts have understood the nature of asset transfers in a bankruptcy 
context.306 
The Octagon court got it so wrong307 that the decision sparked the 
UCC Article 9 Drafting Committee to propose an amendment to the UCC 
specifically addressing the issue of whether or not accounts sold to a third 
party remain subject to the seller's bankruptcy proceeding.308 
Furthermore, on April 8, 1996, the Oklahoma Commercial Code was 
amended309 to provide that Article 9 "does not prevent the transfer of 
ownership of accounts or chattel paper" and that "[t]he determination of 
whether a particular transfer of accounts or chattel paper constitutes a sale 
or a transfer for security purposes is not governed by" Article 9.310 As 
predicted by market participants, the Octagon decision has not had the 
effect of chilling the creativity of tenacious structured-finance 
originators;311 these transactions continue to proliferate.312 The decision 
does illustrate, however, some of the uncertainties that remain with respect 
to even the most fundamental issues raised by asset securitization. 
306. Section 361(3) of the Bankrupley Code authorizes the trustee to propose adequate protection 
by giving the secured claimant any fonn of relief that will result in the realization of the "indubitable 
equivalence.. of the claimant's interest in the property. This phrase originated in an opinion written 
by Learned Hand. See 11 U.S.C. § 361(c) (1994); In re Murel Holding Corp .• 75 F.2d 941, 942 {2d 
Cir. 1935). 
307. See BARKLEY CLARK, THE LAW OF SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER TilE UNIFORM 
COMMERCIAL CODE f 4.04[5] (rev. ed. 1993) (arguing that Octagon is wrong because, if a financing 
statement is filed by the buyer of accounts receivable, then the accounts should be removed from the 
bankruptcy estate); Debtor's Estate Doesn't Have Interest in Account that was Sold, Bll)ler Asserts, 
Bankr. L. Daily (BNA) (Nov. 18, 1993), available in Westlaw, 11118/93 BLD; Thomas S. Kiriakos 
eta!., Bankruptcy, in I SECURITlZATION OF FINANCIAL ASsETS, supra note 5, § 5, at 5·1, -32 to -33 
(arguing that the Octagon decision is "clearly incorrect" because it misconstrues the UCC and is 
inconsistent with other court decisions); Steven L. Schwarcz, Octagon Gas Ruling Creates Tunnoil for 
Co/TU1lercial and Asset-Based Finance, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 4, 1993, at I, 2 (criticizing the Octagon 
opinion on the grounds that it is contraty to the UCC and other court decisions). 
308. See U.C.C. § 9·60I(d) (Discussion Draft No.2, 1997). 
309. Act of Apr. 8, 1996, ch. 56, 1996 Okla. Sess. Laws 224. 
310. OKLA. SrAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 9-102(4) (West Supp. 1998). 
311. Recently, an originator located in the Tenth Circuit designed a securitization transaction 
intended to avoid as a matter of law the effects of Octagon, which has not been overruled. The crea­
tive deal strucrure dictated that the laws of lllinois-not the laws of Utah, where the originator's prin­
cipal place of business is located-should govern the rights and responsibilities of the parties. This 
choice of law was based upon § 1-105 of the Utah Commercial Code which states that, "Except as 
provided in this section, when a transaction bears a reasonable relation to this State and also to another 
state or nation, the parties may agree that the law either of this state or of such other state or nation 
shall govern their rights and duties." UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-1-105 (1953). Counsel for the origina­
tor delivered a conflict-of-law opinion under Utah law which concluded that Illinois law should govern 
the true sale status of the asset transfer based upon the fact that the SPC was. established in lllinois, 
transaction payments were made and received in Dlinois, and certain transaction records were kept in 
lllinois. The opinion further concluded that under lllinois law, a non-Tenth Circuit state, the transfer 
of assets from the originator to the SPC was a true sale. See Jack Wagler, Overcoming Octagon: Part 
II, AssET SALES REP., Oct. 21, 1996, at I, available in 1996 WL 5618294. 
312. See supra note 33. 
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VI. Conclusion 
It has been said that the "majority of innovations on Wall Street die 
young. "313 An innovation that fulls within an exception to this maxim is 
asset securitization, whose market has been increasing in volume every 
year since the first issuance in the mid-1980s. 314 It is clear that a great 
many people are making a great deal of money from the billions of dollars 
of ABS that are brought to market every year. It is equally clear that there 
remain unanswered questions with respect to the economic and social effi­
ciency of structured finance transactions. 
The most modest conclusion that may be drawn is that structured fin­
ance's efficiency is unproven. A bolder assertion, and one this Article pre­
dicts will be supported by empirical evidence, is that securitization is 
inefficient.315 When value is diverted from nonadjusting creditors to 
parties with greater knowledge, resources, and opportunity to bargain et 
ante for greater leverage to encourage voluntary repayment (and in the 
event of bankruptcy, to guarantee priority repayment), then this value rep­
resents a distributional inefficiency. Moreover, unsecured creditors of 
securitizing originators do not receive the benefits of protection from the 
phenomenon of debtor misbehavior that they receive when their debtor uses 
its assets as security for credit. In the absence of such protections, unse­
cured creditors are more vulnerable to the risk of nonpayment as well as 
the risk of debtor's bankruptcy. 
Presumably, even if the efficiency of securitization is ever proven to 
unanimous satisfaction, the distributional consequences of some parties 
being preferred over others will result in inequities. Such consequences 
will continue to fuel the flame of commercial law scholars, practitioners, 
bankruptcy trustees, and eventually courts and legislatures concerned about 
"stronger" market participants benefitting at the expense of their weaker 
counterparts-the unsecured creditors. If this prediction is realized at a 
time when the volume and type of securitizing originators in bankruptcy 
mirrors the profile of the newest securitization transaction originators, the 
ABS market will be subject to a drastic adjustment. Investors will lose the 
value of their investments as the previously transferred assets are returned 
to the originator's bankruptcy estate. 
Empirical data is needed to conclusively demonstrate the harm experi­
enced by the unsecured creditors of securitizing originators. Such a study 
would track dollar values with respect to securitization's benefits and its 
313. John Thackray, Corporate Finance: The Golden Age ofInnovation, FORBES, Apr. 29, 1985, 
at 136, 146 (special advenising supplement). 
314. Ste supra note 33. · 
315. For a discussion oflhe type ofdata Jhat should be analyzed in colUlection with a sllldy of Jhe 
lhird·parJy effects of securitization t:tansactions, see supra note 11. 
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costs to third parties. This empirical examination will have to be con­
ducted over time to observe and quantify the market effects of widespread 
originator bankruptcies. 
